权威董事专业性、高管激励与创新活跃度研究
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摘要
通过我国A股上市公司2007年～2015年的数据,实证检验了权威专业董事通过高管激励影响创新活跃度的逻辑链条.发现权威专业董事通过影响高管激励的结构与水平增强了企业创新的活跃度,且不同类别的权威专业董事均能够产生积极作用.这种影响不仅促进了企业的实质性创新,提升了企业的创新效率,并使之具有可持续性.研究结论在对主要变量采取不同度量方式以及控制了内生性等因素影响的情况下依然成立.本文的研究结论拓展了权威专业董事职能发挥的途径,增补了上市公司高管激励的经验证据,同时,为董事会治理有效性的识别提供了新的视角.对于当前企业高管创新激励机制的匹配性设计,以及监管部门完善董事会治理规则具有一定的借鉴意义.
Using the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2015,we empirically examines the logic chain that how authoritative professional directors influence innovation activity through executive incentive. It turns out that the partial mediation effect of the executive incentive is significant. Authoritative professional directors play the role of consultation and supervision by influencing executive incentives at the same time. The advisory role is embodied in improving the level of equity incentive to encourage the innovation of senior executives,while the enterprise will develop to the substantial innovation. This paper extends the potential role of professional directors,and suggests a new angle to recognize their functionary and governance effectiveness. Also,we provide the overall situation of current executives incentive of listed companies in our country. The conclusion of this paper provides some advices for enterprises to set up reasonable incentive contracts and for supervision department to improve the board governance rules.
Using the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2015,we empirically examines the logic chain that how authoritative professional directors influence innovation activity through executive incentive. It turns out that the partial mediation effect of the executive incentive is significant. Authoritative professional directors play the role of consultation and supervision by influencing executive incentives at the same time. The advisory role is embodied in improving the level of equity incentive to encourage the innovation of senior executives,while the enterprise will develop to the substantial innovation. This paper extends the potential role of professional directors,and suggests a new angle to recognize their functionary and governance effectiveness. Also,we provide the overall situation of current executives incentive of listed companies in our country. The conclusion of this paper provides some advices for enterprises to set up reasonable incentive contracts and for supervision department to improve the board governance rules.
引文
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[16]朱滔.董事薪酬、CEO薪酬与公司未来业绩:监督还是合谋?[J].会计研究,2015,(8):49-56.Zhu Tao. Director’s compensation,CEO’s compensation and firm’s future performance:Supervision or collusion?[J].Accounting Research,2015,(8):49-56.(in Chinese)
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[18]Laux C,Laux V. Board committees,CEO compensation,and earnings management[J]. The Accounting Review,2009,84(3):869-891.
[19]Manso G. Motivating innovation[J]. The Journal of Finance,2011,66(5):1823-1860.
[20]Haynes K T,Hillman A. The effect of board capital and CEO power on strategic change[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2010,31(11):1145-1163.
[21]温忠麟,张雷,侯杰泰,等.中介效应检验程序及其应用[J].心理学报,2004,(5):614-620.Wen Zhonglin,Zhang Lei,Hou Jietai,et al. Testing and application of the mediating effects[J]. Acta Psychologica Sinica,2004,(5):614-620.(in Chinese)
[22]MacKinnon D P,Dwyer J H. Estimating mediated effects in prevention studies[J]. Evaluation review,1993,17(2):144-158.
[23]Baron R M,Kenny D A. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research:Conceptual,strategic,and statistical considerations[J]. Journal of personality and social psychology,1986,51(6):1173-1192.
[24]Kumar A,Page J K,Spalt O G. Religious beliefs,gambling attitudes,and financial market outcomes[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2011,102(3):671-708.
[25]Hochberg Y V,Lindsey L. Incentives,targeting,and firm performance:An analysis of non-executive stock options[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(11):4148-4186.
[26]Kedia S,Rajgopal S. Neighborhood matters:The impact of location on broad based stock option plans[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2009,92(1):109-127.
[27]Ellison G,Glaeser E L,Kerr W R. What causes industry agglomeration? Evidence from coagglomeration patterns[J]. American Economic Review,2010,100(3):1195-1213.
[28]Chang X,Fu K,Low A,et al. Non-executive employee stock options and corporate innovation[J]. Journal of financial economics,2015,115(1):168-188.
[2]Balsmeier B,Fleming L,Manso G. Independent boards and innovation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2017,123(3):536-557.
[3]Faleye O,Hoitash R,Hoitash U. Industry expertise on corporate boards[J]. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,2018,50(2):441-479.
[4]胡元木,纪端.董事技术专长、创新效率与企业绩效[J].南开管理评论,2017,(3):40-52.Hu Yuanmu,Ji Duan. Technology expertise of directors,innovation efficiency and enterprise performance[J]. Nankai Business Review,2017,(3):40-52.(in Chinese)
[5]杨青,薛宇宁,Yurtoglu B B.我国董事会职能探寻:战略咨询还是薪酬监控?[J].金融研究,2011,(3):165-183.Yang Qing,Xue Yuning,YURTOGLU Besim Burcin. Exploring the function of board of directors in China:Strategic advisory or compensation monitoring?[J]. Journal of Financial Research,2011,(3):165-183.(in Chinese)
[6]陈闯,张岩,吴晓晖.风险投资、创始人与高管薪酬——多边代理视角[J].管理科学学报,2017,20(6):78-88.Chen Chuang,Zhang Yan,Wu Xiaohui. Venture capital,founder and top management team compensation:A viewfrom multiple agency theory[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China,2017,20(6):78-88.(in Chinese)
[7]Adams R B,Ferreira D. A theory of friendly boards[J]. Journal of Finance,2010,62(1):217-250.
[8]刘亚伟,张兆国.股权制衡、董事长任期与投资挤占研究[J].南开管理评论,2016,(1):54-69.Liu Yawei,Zhang Zhaoguo. Research on the counterbalance mechanism of block-holders,chairman tenure and investment extrusion[J]. Nankai Business Review,2016,(1):54-69.(in Chinese)
[9]Huang S,Hilary G. Zombie board:Board tenure and firm performance[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2018,56(4):1285-1329.
[10]龚辉锋,茅宁.咨询董事、监督董事与董事会治理有效性[J].管理科学学报,2014,17(2):81-94.Gong Huifeng,Mao Ning. Advisory directors,monitoring directors and board governance effectiveness[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China,2014,17(2):81-94.(in Chinese)
[11]Chen C J,Lin B W,Lin Y H,et al. Ownership structure,independent board members and innovation performance:A contingency perspective[J]. Journal of Business Research,2016,69(9):3371-3379.
[12]Dong Y,Bartol K M,Zhang Z X,et al. Enhancing employee creativity via individual skill development and team knowledge sharing:Influences of dual-focused transformational leadership[J]. Journal of Organizational Behavior,2017,38(3):439-458.
[13]陈运森,谢德仁.董事网络、独立董事治理与高管激励[J].金融研究,2012,(2):168-182.Chen Yunsen,Xie Deren. Director network,independent director governance and executive incentives[J]. Journal of Financial Research,2012,(2):168-182.(in Chinese)
[14]Custódio C,Ferreira M A,Matos P. Do general managerial skills spur innovation?[J]. Management Science,2017,(3):206-225.
[15]吴昊旻,墨沈微,孟庆玺.公司战略可以解释高管与员工的薪酬差距吗?[J].管理科学学报,2018,21(9):105-117.Wu haomin,Mo Shenwei,Meng Qingxi. Is the corporate strategy responsible for the CEO-employee pay gap?[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China,2018,21(9):105-117.(in Chinese)
[16]朱滔.董事薪酬、CEO薪酬与公司未来业绩:监督还是合谋?[J].会计研究,2015,(8):49-56.Zhu Tao. Director’s compensation,CEO’s compensation and firm’s future performance:Supervision or collusion?[J].Accounting Research,2015,(8):49-56.(in Chinese)
[17]Bennett B,Bettis J C,Gopalan R,et al. Compensation goals and firm performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2017,124(2):307-330.
[18]Laux C,Laux V. Board committees,CEO compensation,and earnings management[J]. The Accounting Review,2009,84(3):869-891.
[19]Manso G. Motivating innovation[J]. The Journal of Finance,2011,66(5):1823-1860.
[20]Haynes K T,Hillman A. The effect of board capital and CEO power on strategic change[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2010,31(11):1145-1163.
[21]温忠麟,张雷,侯杰泰,等.中介效应检验程序及其应用[J].心理学报,2004,(5):614-620.Wen Zhonglin,Zhang Lei,Hou Jietai,et al. Testing and application of the mediating effects[J]. Acta Psychologica Sinica,2004,(5):614-620.(in Chinese)
[22]MacKinnon D P,Dwyer J H. Estimating mediated effects in prevention studies[J]. Evaluation review,1993,17(2):144-158.
[23]Baron R M,Kenny D A. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research:Conceptual,strategic,and statistical considerations[J]. Journal of personality and social psychology,1986,51(6):1173-1192.
[24]Kumar A,Page J K,Spalt O G. Religious beliefs,gambling attitudes,and financial market outcomes[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2011,102(3):671-708.
[25]Hochberg Y V,Lindsey L. Incentives,targeting,and firm performance:An analysis of non-executive stock options[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(11):4148-4186.
[26]Kedia S,Rajgopal S. Neighborhood matters:The impact of location on broad based stock option plans[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2009,92(1):109-127.
[27]Ellison G,Glaeser E L,Kerr W R. What causes industry agglomeration? Evidence from coagglomeration patterns[J]. American Economic Review,2010,100(3):1195-1213.
[28]Chang X,Fu K,Low A,et al. Non-executive employee stock options and corporate innovation[J]. Journal of financial economics,2015,115(1):168-188.
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