高管激励、董事会独立性与研发投入——基于制造业的经验证据

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英文篇名：Executive Incentive,Board Independence and R&D Input——Empirical Evidence Based on Manufacturing Industry 作者：王凯 英文作者：WANG Kai;School of Accounting,Anhui University of Finance and Economics; 关键词：高管激励 ; 外部董事 ; 研发投入 ; 董事会独立性 英文关键词：executive incentive;;external directors;;R&D investment;;board independence 中文刊名：DZHX 英文刊名：Journal of Dezhou University 机构：安徽财经大学会计学院; 出版日期：2019-04-15 出版单位：德州学院学报 年：2019 期：v.35;No.164 基金：安徽财经大学研究生科研创新基金项目(ACYC2017164) 语种：中文; 页：DZHX201902017 页数：6 CN：02 ISSN：37-1372/Z 分类号：76-80+95

摘要

本文以2012-2017年中国A股制造业上市公司为样本,研究高管激励机制、董事会独立性与企业研发投入的关系,研究发现:高管股权激励机制与企业研发投入呈倒U型关系;高管薪酬激励机制与两职合一均与企业研发投入显著正相关;董事会越独立,其对高管激励与研发投入的正向调节作用越显著.该研究丰富了与执行高管激励和企业研发投资的相关理论研究.
        This paper takes Chinese A-share manufacturing listed companies from 2012 to 2017 as samples to study the relationship between executive incentive mechanism,board independence and corporate R&D investment. The results show that:executive equity incentive mechanism and corporate R&D investment are inverted U-shaped relationship;executive incentive mechanism and job integration are significantly positively correlated with corporate R&D investment;the more independent the board of directors,the more aggressive it is to executive R&D investment. The positive adjustment of incentive and R&D investment is more significant. This study enriches the relevant theoretical research on executive incentives and corporate R&D investment.

引文

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