高管激励还是市场竞争促进了研发投入

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英文篇名：Does Executive Incentives or Market Competition Promote R&D Investment? 作者：梁毕明 ; 齐聪俐 英文作者：Liang Bi-ming;Qi Cong-li;School of Business,Jilin University;School of Accounting,Jilin University of Finance and Economics; 关键词：市场竞争 ; 研发投入 ; 上市公司 ; 高管激励 ; 薪酬激励 ; 股权激励 英文关键词：market competition;;R&D investment;;listed company;;executive incentive;;executive compensation incentive;;executive equity incentive 中文刊名：SWYJ 英文刊名：Taxation and Economy 机构：吉林大学商学院;吉林财经大学会计学院; 出版日期：2019-03-06 出版单位：税务与经济 年：2019 期：No.223 基金：吉林省科技厅软科学项目“政府财税激励效果对上市公司创新影响的研究——基于吉林和浙江省际差异”(项目编号:20180418094FG);; 吉林省教育厅“十三五”社会科学研究项目“基于区域差异的财税补贴对东北地区农业龙头企业绩效影响研究”(项目编号:JJKH20180485SK) 语种：中文; 页：SWYJ201902009 页数：8 CN：02 ISSN：22-1210/F 分类号：59-66

摘要

高管激励作为减缓代理成本的一种工具势必会促进企业研发投入,但在日渐激烈的市场竞争环境下,企业为占据市场地位也会加大研发力度。究竟是高管激励还是市场竞争促进了研发投入?以2006～2016年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验"内部治理"和"行业市场竞争"两个维度对研发投入的影响。研究发现:高管薪酬激励与研发投入正相关,高管股权激励与研发投入倒U型相关。在市场竞争程度较高的情况下,研发投入较高,市场竞争强化了高管薪酬的激励作用,减弱了高管股权的激励作用。研究结论可以为企业设计旨在促使高管做出有利于企业长期发展的研发投资决策的激励机制,还可以为企业在不同市场竞争环境下的创新发展战略选择提供经验借鉴。
        As a tool to reduce agency costs,executive incentives will inevitably promote R&D investment,but in the increasingly fierce market competition environment,enterprises will also increase R&D investment in an effort to occupy market position. Is it executive incentives or market competition that promotes R&D investment? Based on the samples of 2006-2016 Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed company,the empirical test is conducted in this paper to examine the impact of the two dimensions of "internal governance"and "industry market competition"on R&D investment. The result shows that executive compensation incentives are positively related to R&D investment,and there is an inverted U-shape relation between executive equity incentives and R&D investment.In the case of a high degree of market competition,when R&D investment is high,market competition strengthens the incentive effect of executive compensation,and weakens the incentive effect of executive equity. The research conclusion can provide experience for enterprise which will put great effort to make incentive mechanism that is conducive to long-term development. It can also provide some experience for enterprise to choose innovative development strategies in different market competition environments.

引文

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