AI背景下劳动力市场合作联盟研究
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摘要
在工作场所应用AI技术进行劳动监控对构建与发展和谐劳动关系提出了新的挑战。本文首先分析了不完全信息环境是造成劳动关系不和谐的主要根源,然后在AI背景下组建政府、企业、员工三方构成的劳动合作联盟,采用经典的Shapley Value方法对工作联盟的收益进行配置,从而实现联盟的帕累托效率。最后,引入一个算例进行了模拟计算,模拟结果说明了AI背景下社会劳动关系中需要形成基于政府、企业、员工的一个可持续的、稳定的劳动联盟,它可以有效地解决AI劳动监控所引发的道德伦理问题,更加公平地进行联盟的社会收益分配。
The application of AI technology in the workplace for labor supervision poses a new challenge to the construction and development of harmonious labor relations. Firstly, this paper suggests that the incomplete information environment is the main source of the disharmony of labor relations. Secondly, under the background of AI, the labor cooperation alliance composed of government, enterprises and employees is formed, and the classical Shapley Value method is used to allocate the benefits of the work alliance, to realize the Pareto efficiency of the alliance. Finally, an example is given to illustrate the necessity of forming a sustainable and stable labor union based on the government, enterprises and employees in the social labor relations under the background of AI. It can effectively solve the moral and ethical problems caused by AI labor supervision and distribute the social benefits of the alliance more fairly.
The application of AI technology in the workplace for labor supervision poses a new challenge to the construction and development of harmonious labor relations. Firstly, this paper suggests that the incomplete information environment is the main source of the disharmony of labor relations. Secondly, under the background of AI, the labor cooperation alliance composed of government, enterprises and employees is formed, and the classical Shapley Value method is used to allocate the benefits of the work alliance, to realize the Pareto efficiency of the alliance. Finally, an example is given to illustrate the necessity of forming a sustainable and stable labor union based on the government, enterprises and employees in the social labor relations under the background of AI. It can effectively solve the moral and ethical problems caused by AI labor supervision and distribute the social benefits of the alliance more fairly.
引文
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[2] 黄嬿.先把人当机器人,亚马逊员工监控手环专利过关[OL].TechNews:2018-2-5.
[3] 唐鑛.加强劳动监察工作的逻辑思考与路径选择[J].中国劳动关系学院学报,2015,29:10-14.
[4] Lazear E P,Rosen S.Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts[J].Journal of Political Economy,1981,89,(5):841- 864.
[5] Solow R.Another possible source of wage stickiness[J].Journal of Macroeconomics,1979,1(1):79- 82.
[6] Shapiro C,Stiglitz T.Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device[J].American Economic Review,1984,74,(3):433- 444.
[7] Rubinstein A.Equilibrium in super-games with the overtaking criterion[J].Journal of Econometrics,1979,(21):1-9.
[8] Fama E.Agency problem and theory of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,(88):288-307.
[9] Weitzman M L.The “rachet principle” and performance incentives[J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1980,(11):302-308.
[10] Radner R.Monitoring cooperative agreement in a repeated principle-agent relationship[J].Econometrica,1981,49,(5):1127-1148.
[11] Holmstrom B.Moral hazard in terms[J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1982,7:324-340.
[12] Holmstrom B,Paul Milgrom.Multi-task principal-agent analyses:incentives contracts,asset ownership and job design[J].Journal of Law,Economics and Organization,1991,(7):24-52.
[13] Lazear Edward P.Performance pay and productivity[J].The American Economic Review,2000,90(3):1346-1361.
[14] Mcafee R P,Mcmillan J.Optimal contracts for teams[J].International Economic Journal,1991,32(3):561- 625.
[15] Christiane Prange,Bodo Schlegelmilch B.Managing innovation dilemmas:the cube solution business[J].Hoizons,2018,61:309-322.
[16] Baeten Xavier.Shaping the future research agenda for compensation and benefits management:Some thoughts based on a stakeholder inquiry[J].Human Resource Management Review,2014,24:31- 40.
[17] 严行健.人工智能时代的代议制[J].学习与探索,2018,2:76- 84.
[18] Robert Dahl.A preface of economy democracy[M].Cambridge:Polity Press,1985.