基于制造商创新的零售商需求预测信息共享研究
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摘要
针对制造商创新投入不足和零售商缺乏信息共享动机的问题,构建了由单个(进行成本降低创新的)制造商和单个(拥有需求预测信息的)零售商组成的两级供应链模型,求解了供应链双方的均衡决策和事前利润,比较了制造商在不同信息共享情形下的创新投入。研究发现:当制造商的创新能力较强时,制造商和零售商的信息共享价值均为正,供应链能够自发实现信息共享。此时,制造商的创新投入与其所获得的随机需求预测量、零售商的风险厌恶程度正相关。当制造商的创新能力较弱时,零售商的信息共享价值为负,制造商可以通过支付信息共享费用来激励零售商共享需求预测信息,从而实现供应链的帕累托改进。制造商支付的信息共享费用与自身的创新能力负相关,与零售商的风险厌恶程度正相关。
Focusing on lack of manufacturer's innovation investment and retailer's motivation to share information, this paper establishes a two-layer supply chain model consisting of a single manufacturer conducting cost-reduction innovation and a single retailer possessing demand forecasting information. And then, it solves the equilibrium decisions and ex ante profits of both parties and compares manufacturer's innovation investment decisions under different information sharing circumstances. Results show that when the manufacturer's innovation ability is strong, the information sharing value of the manufacturer and the retailer is positive, and the supply chain can realize the information sharing spontaneously. Manufacturer's innovation investment is positively related to the acquired stochastic demand forecasting information and the degree of risk aversion of the retailer. When the manufacturer's innovation ability is weak, the information sharing value of the retailer is negative, and the manufacturer can afford information sharing payment to encourage the retailer to share demand forecasting information in order to achieve the supply chain Pareto improvement. The information sharing payment is negatively related to manufacturer's innovation capacity and is positively related to the risk aversion of the retailer.
Focusing on lack of manufacturer's innovation investment and retailer's motivation to share information, this paper establishes a two-layer supply chain model consisting of a single manufacturer conducting cost-reduction innovation and a single retailer possessing demand forecasting information. And then, it solves the equilibrium decisions and ex ante profits of both parties and compares manufacturer's innovation investment decisions under different information sharing circumstances. Results show that when the manufacturer's innovation ability is strong, the information sharing value of the manufacturer and the retailer is positive, and the supply chain can realize the information sharing spontaneously. Manufacturer's innovation investment is positively related to the acquired stochastic demand forecasting information and the degree of risk aversion of the retailer. When the manufacturer's innovation ability is weak, the information sharing value of the retailer is negative, and the manufacturer can afford information sharing payment to encourage the retailer to share demand forecasting information in order to achieve the supply chain Pareto improvement. The information sharing payment is negatively related to manufacturer's innovation capacity and is positively related to the risk aversion of the retailer.
引文
[1] 王海燕,郑秀梅.创新驱动发展的理论基础、内涵与评价[J].中国软科学,2017(1):41-49.
[2] Iida T.Coordination of Cooperative Cost-Reduction Efforts in a Supply Chain Partnership[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2012,222(2):180-190.
[3] Gilbert S M,Cvsa V.Strategic Commitment to Price to Stimulate Downstream Innovation in a Supply Chain[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2003,150(3):617-639.
[4] Krishnan H,Kapuscinski R,Butz A.Coordinating Contracts for Decentralized Supply Chains with Retailer Promotional Effort[J].Management Science,2004,50(1):48-63.
[5] 孙国岩,郭耀煌.两层供应链制造商创新投资协调研究[J].科研管理,2008,29(4):64-70.
[6] Kim B.Coordinating an Innovation in Supply Chain Management[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2000,123(3):568-584.
[7] Corbett C J,Decroix G A.Shared-Savings Contracts for Indirect Materials in Supply Chains:Channel Profits and Environmental Impacts [J].Management Science,2001,47(7):881-893.
[8] 王先甲,周鑫.包含信任的供应链预测信息共享问题研究[J].软科学,2014,28(7):110-113.
[9] 肖美丹,陈铭洋,沙德春,李幸子.考虑额外服务和渠道地位的供应链信息共享均衡策略[J].软科学,2016,30(9):99-103.
[10] 高锡荣,罗扬.基于心理承受能力假说的供应链信息共享模型[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(10):117-123.
[11] Cachon G P,Lariviere M A.Contracting to Assure Supply:How to Share Demand Forecasts in a Supply Chain[J].Management Science,2001,47(5):629-646.
[12] 侯琳琳,邱菀华.基于信号传递博弈的供应链需求信息共享机制[J].控制与决策,2007,22(12):1421-1424.
[13] Qian Y,Chen J,Miao L,et al.Information Sharing in a Competitive Supply Chain with Capacity Constraint[J].Flexible Services and Manufacturing Journal,2012,24(4):549-574.
[14] 周建亨,王晓敏.收益共享机制下的供应链纵向信息共享策略[J].系统管理学报,2018,27(5):971-980.
[15] 但斌,周茂森,张旭梅.存在竞争性制造商的集团采购供应链需求预测信息的共享与激励[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(3):41-51.
[16] 李亮,卢捷琦,季建华.降低信息共享风险的价格补偿模式研究[J].软科学,2014,28(7):105-109.
[17] Jeong I.A Centralized/Decentralized Design of a Full Return Contract for a Risk-Free Manufacturer and a Risk-Neutral Retailer under Partial Information Sharing[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,136(1):110-115.
[18] 卢继周,冯耕中,王能民,等.信息共享下库存量牛鞭效应的影响因素研究[J].管理科学学报,2017(3):137-148.
[19] 聂佳佳.预测信息分享对制造商开通直销渠道的影响[J].管理工程学报,2012(2):106-112.
[20] 聂佳佳.需求信息预测对制造商回收再制造策略的价值[J].管理科学学报,2014(1):35-47.
[21] Bourland K E,Powell S G,Pyke D F.Exploiting Timely Demand Information to Reduce Inventories[J].European Journal of Operational Research,1996,92(2):239-253.
[22] 赵道致,杜其光.供应链中需求信息更新对制造能力共享的影响[J].系统管理学报,2017(2):374-380.
[23] Yan R,Wang K Y.Franchisor–Franchisee Supply Chain Cooperation:Sharing of Demand Forecast Information in High-Tech Industries[J].Industrial Marketing Management,2012,41(7):1164-1173.
[24] Jeong I,Leon V J.A Serial Supply Chain of Newsvendor Problem with Safety Stocks under Complete and Partial Information Sharing[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,135(1):412-419.
[25] 李书娟,张子刚.双渠道供应链预测信息分享的绩效研究[J].工业工程与管理,2010,15(5):40-43.
[26] 肖静华,汪鸿昌,谢康,等.信息共享视角下供应链信息系统价值创造机制[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(11):2862-2871.
[27] Ha A,Tong S,Zhang H.Sharing Demand Information in Competing Supply Chains with Production Diseconomies [J].Management Science,2011,57(3):566-581.
[28] Yan R,Pei Z.Incentive Information Sharing in Various Market Structures[J].Decision Support Systems,2015,76:76-86.
[29] Taylor T,Xiao W.Does a Manufacturer Benefit from Selling to a Better-Forecasting Retailer?[J].Management Science,2010,56(9):1584-1598.
[30] Gal-Or E,Geylani T,Dukes A J.Information Sharing in a Channel with Partially Informed Retailers[J].Marketing Science,2008,27(4):642-658.
[31] Shang W,Ha A Y,Tong S.Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer[J].Management Science,2016,62(1):245-263.
[32] Ericson W A.A Note on the Posterior Mean of a Population Mean[J].Journal of the Royal Statistical Society.Series B (Methodological),1969,31(2):332-334.
[33] Li L,Zhang H.Confidentiality and Information Sharing in Supply Chain Coordination[J].Management Science,2008,54(8):1467-1481.
[34] Rogerson W P.Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-based Procurement and Regulation[J].American Economic Review,2003,93(3):919-926.
[35] Chu L Y,Sappington D M.Implementing High-powered Contracts to Motivate Intertemporal Effort Supply[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,2009,40(2):296-316.
[36] Veldman J,Gaalman C.Competitive Investments in Cost Reducing Process Improvement:The Role of Managerial Incentives and Spillover Learning[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2015,170,Part B:701-709.
[37] Li C,Wan Z.Supplier Competition and Cost Improvement[J].Management Science,2017,63(8):2460-2477.
[38] 田巍,张子刚,刘宁杰.零售商竞争环境下上游企业创新投入的供应链协调[J].系统工程理论与实践,2008,28(1):64-70.
[39] Winkler R L.Combining Probability Distributions from Dependent Information Sources[J].Management Science,1981,27(4):479-488.
[40] 王聪,杨德礼,程兴群.考虑零售商风险偏好的双渠道供应链信息共享研究[J].工业工程与管理,2017(2):83-88.
[41] Zhang J,Chen J.Coordination of Information Sharing in a Supply Chain[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2013,143(1):178-187.
[42]Nagarajan M,So■ Analysis of Cooperation among Supply Chain Agents:Review and Extensions[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2008,187(3):719-745.
(1) 详见http://www.best-consulting.cn/jingdiananli/shenxinfeitongguangdianzijishuyouxiangongsi.html
[2] Iida T.Coordination of Cooperative Cost-Reduction Efforts in a Supply Chain Partnership[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2012,222(2):180-190.
[3] Gilbert S M,Cvsa V.Strategic Commitment to Price to Stimulate Downstream Innovation in a Supply Chain[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2003,150(3):617-639.
[4] Krishnan H,Kapuscinski R,Butz A.Coordinating Contracts for Decentralized Supply Chains with Retailer Promotional Effort[J].Management Science,2004,50(1):48-63.
[5] 孙国岩,郭耀煌.两层供应链制造商创新投资协调研究[J].科研管理,2008,29(4):64-70.
[6] Kim B.Coordinating an Innovation in Supply Chain Management[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2000,123(3):568-584.
[7] Corbett C J,Decroix G A.Shared-Savings Contracts for Indirect Materials in Supply Chains:Channel Profits and Environmental Impacts [J].Management Science,2001,47(7):881-893.
[8] 王先甲,周鑫.包含信任的供应链预测信息共享问题研究[J].软科学,2014,28(7):110-113.
[9] 肖美丹,陈铭洋,沙德春,李幸子.考虑额外服务和渠道地位的供应链信息共享均衡策略[J].软科学,2016,30(9):99-103.
[10] 高锡荣,罗扬.基于心理承受能力假说的供应链信息共享模型[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(10):117-123.
[11] Cachon G P,Lariviere M A.Contracting to Assure Supply:How to Share Demand Forecasts in a Supply Chain[J].Management Science,2001,47(5):629-646.
[12] 侯琳琳,邱菀华.基于信号传递博弈的供应链需求信息共享机制[J].控制与决策,2007,22(12):1421-1424.
[13] Qian Y,Chen J,Miao L,et al.Information Sharing in a Competitive Supply Chain with Capacity Constraint[J].Flexible Services and Manufacturing Journal,2012,24(4):549-574.
[14] 周建亨,王晓敏.收益共享机制下的供应链纵向信息共享策略[J].系统管理学报,2018,27(5):971-980.
[15] 但斌,周茂森,张旭梅.存在竞争性制造商的集团采购供应链需求预测信息的共享与激励[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(3):41-51.
[16] 李亮,卢捷琦,季建华.降低信息共享风险的价格补偿模式研究[J].软科学,2014,28(7):105-109.
[17] Jeong I.A Centralized/Decentralized Design of a Full Return Contract for a Risk-Free Manufacturer and a Risk-Neutral Retailer under Partial Information Sharing[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,136(1):110-115.
[18] 卢继周,冯耕中,王能民,等.信息共享下库存量牛鞭效应的影响因素研究[J].管理科学学报,2017(3):137-148.
[19] 聂佳佳.预测信息分享对制造商开通直销渠道的影响[J].管理工程学报,2012(2):106-112.
[20] 聂佳佳.需求信息预测对制造商回收再制造策略的价值[J].管理科学学报,2014(1):35-47.
[21] Bourland K E,Powell S G,Pyke D F.Exploiting Timely Demand Information to Reduce Inventories[J].European Journal of Operational Research,1996,92(2):239-253.
[22] 赵道致,杜其光.供应链中需求信息更新对制造能力共享的影响[J].系统管理学报,2017(2):374-380.
[23] Yan R,Wang K Y.Franchisor–Franchisee Supply Chain Cooperation:Sharing of Demand Forecast Information in High-Tech Industries[J].Industrial Marketing Management,2012,41(7):1164-1173.
[24] Jeong I,Leon V J.A Serial Supply Chain of Newsvendor Problem with Safety Stocks under Complete and Partial Information Sharing[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,135(1):412-419.
[25] 李书娟,张子刚.双渠道供应链预测信息分享的绩效研究[J].工业工程与管理,2010,15(5):40-43.
[26] 肖静华,汪鸿昌,谢康,等.信息共享视角下供应链信息系统价值创造机制[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(11):2862-2871.
[27] Ha A,Tong S,Zhang H.Sharing Demand Information in Competing Supply Chains with Production Diseconomies [J].Management Science,2011,57(3):566-581.
[28] Yan R,Pei Z.Incentive Information Sharing in Various Market Structures[J].Decision Support Systems,2015,76:76-86.
[29] Taylor T,Xiao W.Does a Manufacturer Benefit from Selling to a Better-Forecasting Retailer?[J].Management Science,2010,56(9):1584-1598.
[30] Gal-Or E,Geylani T,Dukes A J.Information Sharing in a Channel with Partially Informed Retailers[J].Marketing Science,2008,27(4):642-658.
[31] Shang W,Ha A Y,Tong S.Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer[J].Management Science,2016,62(1):245-263.
[32] Ericson W A.A Note on the Posterior Mean of a Population Mean[J].Journal of the Royal Statistical Society.Series B (Methodological),1969,31(2):332-334.
[33] Li L,Zhang H.Confidentiality and Information Sharing in Supply Chain Coordination[J].Management Science,2008,54(8):1467-1481.
[34] Rogerson W P.Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-based Procurement and Regulation[J].American Economic Review,2003,93(3):919-926.
[35] Chu L Y,Sappington D M.Implementing High-powered Contracts to Motivate Intertemporal Effort Supply[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,2009,40(2):296-316.
[36] Veldman J,Gaalman C.Competitive Investments in Cost Reducing Process Improvement:The Role of Managerial Incentives and Spillover Learning[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2015,170,Part B:701-709.
[37] Li C,Wan Z.Supplier Competition and Cost Improvement[J].Management Science,2017,63(8):2460-2477.
[38] 田巍,张子刚,刘宁杰.零售商竞争环境下上游企业创新投入的供应链协调[J].系统工程理论与实践,2008,28(1):64-70.
[39] Winkler R L.Combining Probability Distributions from Dependent Information Sources[J].Management Science,1981,27(4):479-488.
[40] 王聪,杨德礼,程兴群.考虑零售商风险偏好的双渠道供应链信息共享研究[J].工业工程与管理,2017(2):83-88.
[41] Zhang J,Chen J.Coordination of Information Sharing in a Supply Chain[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2013,143(1):178-187.
[42]Nagarajan M,So■ Analysis of Cooperation among Supply Chain Agents:Review and Extensions[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2008,187(3):719-745.
(1) 详见http://www.best-consulting.cn/jingdiananli/shenxinfeitongguangdianzijishuyouxiangongsi.html
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