基于策略性竞争博弈的供应链信息共享策略
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摘要
在供应链成员的市场信息以及成本非对称的情形下,讨论两个终端企业(一个自产自销,一个从上游批发产品),在供应链中信息共享策略的方案,包括:信息优势企业如何根据市场需求情况确定是否信息共享(若是,则如何共享);信息劣势企业如何根据对方透露出的市场信息来决策订货量;上游供应链如何决策批发价,从而控制整个供应链的博弈态势,使下游销售商在竞争中更为主动。经过研究发现,低市场类型时,自产自销商乐于共享信息,使竞争对手摄于低迷的市场状况从而降低订货量;在高市场类型且市场波动较小时自产自销商依然选择共享,在乐观的市场条件下表明自己的竞争优势,从而一定程度上威摄入侵者;而市场波动较大时,由于信息共享的额外收益不足以抵消信息共享需付出的额外成本,从而选择不共享信息。
An accurate grasp of market demand is undoubtedly an important factor for retailers to gain a competitive advantage.Retailers often strategically use their informational advantage to control the direction of competitors' decision-making in the process of game in order to indirectly influence the information flow,logistics,capital flow,which will make they get optimal profits.Meanwhile,competitors could also strategically feedback decisions to avoid failure when they realize the information may be concealed,distorted.In addition,more and more products have a variety of cost price and different sources in the operation of supply chain and in the competitive market.The cost advantage is also one of the most important baselines in the competition for terminal retailers in supply chain.Therefore,the study of the motivation of information sharing under cost difference and the way that information is shared is the problem to be solved and is of practical significance.The reverse derivation method is used to discuss the strategy of information sharing for two terminal retailers including the large retailer making its own products and the small retailer wholesaling products from upstream manufacturer in the situation where market information and cost are asymmetric for members in supply chain.The strategy includes the large retailer of information advantage decide whether to share information and how to share information;how the small retailer of information disadvantage decide the order quantity according to the market information shared by the competitor;how the manufacturer from upstream supply chain decide wholesale price to control the situation of game of the entire supply chain and make the downstream retailer more proactive in competition.Research shows that the strategies chosen by large retailers are related to the market:The large retailer are inclined to share information in the low market type to make competitors reduce order quantity;the large retailer still choose to share information to show competition advantage in the high market type if the market fluctuation is small,which will deter the intruders to some extent;when the market fluctuation is large,the information sharing is not selected because the additional gains from information sharing cannot offset the rent of information transmission,however,because in the low market type large retailer would choose to share information,so in this case,although the large retailer are forced to share information even they do not want to do that.And manufacturer influence the cost advantage of large retailer by making wholesale price,which will finally affect the strategies of information sharing in supply chain.The final conclusions can be drawn by the way combining modeling with analysis of examples.What's more,the built model is simulated numerically by Mathmatica to verify the conclusions,which can ensure the accuracy and applicability.
An accurate grasp of market demand is undoubtedly an important factor for retailers to gain a competitive advantage.Retailers often strategically use their informational advantage to control the direction of competitors' decision-making in the process of game in order to indirectly influence the information flow,logistics,capital flow,which will make they get optimal profits.Meanwhile,competitors could also strategically feedback decisions to avoid failure when they realize the information may be concealed,distorted.In addition,more and more products have a variety of cost price and different sources in the operation of supply chain and in the competitive market.The cost advantage is also one of the most important baselines in the competition for terminal retailers in supply chain.Therefore,the study of the motivation of information sharing under cost difference and the way that information is shared is the problem to be solved and is of practical significance.The reverse derivation method is used to discuss the strategy of information sharing for two terminal retailers including the large retailer making its own products and the small retailer wholesaling products from upstream manufacturer in the situation where market information and cost are asymmetric for members in supply chain.The strategy includes the large retailer of information advantage decide whether to share information and how to share information;how the small retailer of information disadvantage decide the order quantity according to the market information shared by the competitor;how the manufacturer from upstream supply chain decide wholesale price to control the situation of game of the entire supply chain and make the downstream retailer more proactive in competition.Research shows that the strategies chosen by large retailers are related to the market:The large retailer are inclined to share information in the low market type to make competitors reduce order quantity;the large retailer still choose to share information to show competition advantage in the high market type if the market fluctuation is small,which will deter the intruders to some extent;when the market fluctuation is large,the information sharing is not selected because the additional gains from information sharing cannot offset the rent of information transmission,however,because in the low market type large retailer would choose to share information,so in this case,although the large retailer are forced to share information even they do not want to do that.And manufacturer influence the cost advantage of large retailer by making wholesale price,which will finally affect the strategies of information sharing in supply chain.The final conclusions can be drawn by the way combining modeling with analysis of examples.What's more,the built model is simulated numerically by Mathmatica to verify the conclusions,which can ensure the accuracy and applicability.
引文
[1]Lee H L,So K C,Tang C S.The value of information sharing in a two-level supply chain[J].Management Science,2000,46(5):626-643.
[2]董振宁,何斌.基于witness的信息共享弱化牛鞭效应效果研究[J].中国管理科学,2012,11(20):569-574.
[3]Lee H L,Whang S.Information sharing in a supply chain[J].International Journal of Manufacturing Technology and Management,2000,1(1):79-93.
[4]Li L.Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition[J].Management Science,2002,48(9):1196-1212.
[5]Li L,Zhang Hongtao.Confidentiality and information sharing in supply chain coordination[J].Management Science,2008,54(8):1467-1481.
[6]Ozer O,Wei W.Strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision under asymmetric forecast information[J].Management Science,2006,52(8):1238-1257.
[7]Cachon G P,Lariviere M A.Capacity choice and allocateeion:Strategic behavior and supply chain performance[J].Management Science,1999,45(8):1091-1108.
[8]Ha A Y.Supplier-buyer contracting:Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation[J].Naval Research Logistics,2001,48(1):41-64.
[9]Corbett C J,de Groote X.A supplier’s optimal quantity discount policy under asymmetric information[J].Management Science,2000,46(3):444-450.
[10]CorbettC J.Stochastic inventory systems in a supply chain with asymmetric information:Cycle stocks,safety stocks,and consignment stock[J].Operations Research,2001,49(4):487-500.
[11]Anand K S,Goyal M.Strategic information management under leakage in a supply chain[J].Management Science,2009,55(3):438-452.
[12]Kong G,Rajagopalan S,Zhang Hao.Revenue sharing and information leakage in a supply chain[J].Management Science,2013,59(3):556-572.
[13]Makadok R.The interaction effect of rivalry restraint and competitive advantage on profit:Why the whole Is Less than the sum of the parts[J].Management Science,2010,56(2):356-372.
[14]周建亨,蒋碧云.水平竞争条件下供应链信息泄露策略[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(11):81-93.
[15]刘浩,冯耕中,蒋炜,等.需求信息扭曲条件下供应链成员运营决策研究[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(4):11-21.
[16]但斌,周茂森,张旭梅.在竞争性制造商的集团采购供应链需求预测信息的共享与激励[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(3):41-51.
[17]李余辉,倪得兵,唐小我.基于企业社会责任的供应链企业质量信号传递博弈[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(7):38-47.
[2]董振宁,何斌.基于witness的信息共享弱化牛鞭效应效果研究[J].中国管理科学,2012,11(20):569-574.
[3]Lee H L,Whang S.Information sharing in a supply chain[J].International Journal of Manufacturing Technology and Management,2000,1(1):79-93.
[4]Li L.Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition[J].Management Science,2002,48(9):1196-1212.
[5]Li L,Zhang Hongtao.Confidentiality and information sharing in supply chain coordination[J].Management Science,2008,54(8):1467-1481.
[6]Ozer O,Wei W.Strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision under asymmetric forecast information[J].Management Science,2006,52(8):1238-1257.
[7]Cachon G P,Lariviere M A.Capacity choice and allocateeion:Strategic behavior and supply chain performance[J].Management Science,1999,45(8):1091-1108.
[8]Ha A Y.Supplier-buyer contracting:Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation[J].Naval Research Logistics,2001,48(1):41-64.
[9]Corbett C J,de Groote X.A supplier’s optimal quantity discount policy under asymmetric information[J].Management Science,2000,46(3):444-450.
[10]CorbettC J.Stochastic inventory systems in a supply chain with asymmetric information:Cycle stocks,safety stocks,and consignment stock[J].Operations Research,2001,49(4):487-500.
[11]Anand K S,Goyal M.Strategic information management under leakage in a supply chain[J].Management Science,2009,55(3):438-452.
[12]Kong G,Rajagopalan S,Zhang Hao.Revenue sharing and information leakage in a supply chain[J].Management Science,2013,59(3):556-572.
[13]Makadok R.The interaction effect of rivalry restraint and competitive advantage on profit:Why the whole Is Less than the sum of the parts[J].Management Science,2010,56(2):356-372.
[14]周建亨,蒋碧云.水平竞争条件下供应链信息泄露策略[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(11):81-93.
[15]刘浩,冯耕中,蒋炜,等.需求信息扭曲条件下供应链成员运营决策研究[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(4):11-21.
[16]但斌,周茂森,张旭梅.在竞争性制造商的集团采购供应链需求预测信息的共享与激励[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(3):41-51.
[17]李余辉,倪得兵,唐小我.基于企业社会责任的供应链企业质量信号传递博弈[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(7):38-47.
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