信息不对称下多因素波动的应急数量弹性契约
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摘要
考虑突发事件导致市场需求大幅波动、市场价格随机波动,构建生产成本信息不对称时应急供应链的数量弹性契约模型,寻找最优定价及订货策略;与完全信息情形对比,分析突发事件的信息共享及其对供应链最优决策的影响程度。研究发现,在生产成本信息不对称情形下,突发事件发生时,虽然零售商设计的数量弹性契约可以有效体现真实生产成本,但对供应链协调不起作用。同时,如果市场需求规模缩减,制造商表现出隐藏信息行为,可以促使供应链整体效益增加。最后通过算例验证了这些结论。
Considering market demand and market price fluctuations due to supply chain disruption and emergencies, we deal with the situations by constructing an emergency quantity flexibility contract under production cost information asymmetry, and then derive the corresponding optimal equilibrium. Meanwhile, we make the comparison between the result with that of information symmetry, exploring the impacts of emergencies and the degree of information sharing on optimal decision of the supply chain. The conclusion shows that, if production cost information is asymmetric, the retailer can design quantity flexibility contracts to reveal the true production cost effectively under emergencies, but cannot achieve the coordination of supply chain. Simultaneously, when the demand reduces with the outburst of emergencies, the behavior of withholding information by the manufacturer can promote the overall efficiency of the supply chain. Finally, numerical experiments are given to verify the results.
Considering market demand and market price fluctuations due to supply chain disruption and emergencies, we deal with the situations by constructing an emergency quantity flexibility contract under production cost information asymmetry, and then derive the corresponding optimal equilibrium. Meanwhile, we make the comparison between the result with that of information symmetry, exploring the impacts of emergencies and the degree of information sharing on optimal decision of the supply chain. The conclusion shows that, if production cost information is asymmetric, the retailer can design quantity flexibility contracts to reveal the true production cost effectively under emergencies, but cannot achieve the coordination of supply chain. Simultaneously, when the demand reduces with the outburst of emergencies, the behavior of withholding information by the manufacturer can promote the overall efficiency of the supply chain. Finally, numerical experiments are given to verify the results.
引文
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[2] Xiao T, Qi X. Price competition, cost and demand disruptions and coordination of a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers[J]. Omega, 2008, 36(5): 741-753.
[3] Gao D, Zhao X, Geng W. A delay-in-payment contract for pareto improvement of a supply chain with stochastic demand[J]. Omega, 2014, 49: 60- 68.
[4] Ren J, Xie H, Liu Y, et al. Coordinating a multi-retailer decentralized distribution system with random demand based on buyback and compensation contracts[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management, 2015, 8(1): 203-216.
[5] Giri B C, Chakraborty A. Coordinating a vendor-buyer supply chain with stochastic demand and uncertain yield[J]. International Journal of Management Science and Engineering Management, 2017, 12(2): 96-103.
[6] Tsay A A. The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives[J]. Management science, 1999, 45(10): 1339-1358.
[7] Lariviere M A, Porteus E L. Selling to the newsvendor: an analysis of price-only contracts[J]. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 2001, 3(4): 293-305.
[8] Barnes-Schuster D, Bassok Y, Anupindi R. Coordination and flexibility in supply contracts with options[J]. Manufacturing Service Operations Management, 2002, 4(3): 171-207.
[9] Kanda A, Deshmukh S G. A framework for evaluation of coordination by contracts: a case of two-level supply chains[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2009, 56(4): 1177-1191.
[10] Govindan K, Diabat A, Popiuc M N. Contract analysis: a performance measures and profit evaluation within two-echelon supply chains[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2012, 63(1): 58-74.
[11] Karakaya S, Bakal ī S S. Joint quantity flexibility for multiple products in a decentralized supply chain[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2013, 64(2): 696-707.
[12] Chung W, Talluri S, Narasimhan R. Quantity flexibility contract in the presence of discount incentive[J]. Decision Sciences, 2014, 45(1): 49-79.
[13] 林强,李海晴,李青.资金约束下集中型供应链数量柔性契约设计[J].工业工程与管理,2010,(6):26-30.
[14] Kim J S, Park S I, Shin K Y. A quantity flexibility contract model for a system with heterogeneous suppliers[J]. Computers & Operations Research, 2014, 41: 98-108.
[15] Tsay A, Lovejoy W. Quantity flexibility contracts and supply chain performance[J]. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 1999, 1(2): 89-111.
[16] Sethi S P, Yan H, Zhang H. Quantity flexibility contracts: optimal decisions with information updates[J]. Decision Science, 2004, 35(4): 691-712.
[17] Bassok Y, Anupindi R. Analysis of supply contracts with commitments and flexibility[J]. Naval Research Logistics, 2008, 55(5): 459- 477.
[18] Kim W S. Order quantity flexibility as a form of customer service in a supply chain contract model[J]. Flexible Services and Manufacturing Journal, 2011, 23(3): 290-315.
[19] Kim W S. A supply chain contract with flexibility as a risk-sharing mechanism for demand forecasting[J]. International Journal of Systems Science, 2013, 44(6): 1134-1149.
[20] Tiwari A K, Tiwari A, Samuel C, Bhardwaj P. Procurement flexibility as a tool for supplier selection in disastrous environments[J]. Global Journal of Flexible Systems Management, 2013, 14(4): 211-223.
[21] 刘臣,张庆普,单伟.基于数量弹性契约的供应商数量选择问题研究[J].运筹与管理,2010,19(4):1-7.
[22] 尚文芳,祁明,陈琴.需求预测信息即时更新的供应链柔性期权协调契约[J].管理学报,2013,10(12):1827-1854.
[23] 朱海波,胡文.基于期权的供应链数量柔性契约决策模型[J].控制与决策,2014,29(5):860- 866.
[24] 刘咏梅,成尚汶,谢虎.具有损失厌恶偏好零售商的供应链弹性数量契约[J].控制与决策,2012,27(7):975-982,990.
[25] 杨建华,牛坤,于本海,范德明.买方市场时效性产品的供应链弹性契约优化模型[J].中国管理科学,2013,29(5):80- 85.
[26] 罗伟伟,刘伟,邵东国.不确定环境下具有损失厌恶偏好零售商的供应链协调[J].计算机集成制造系统,2016,22(12):2867-2874.
[27] 张琳,田军,杨瑞娜,冯耕中.数量柔性契约中的应急物资采购定价策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(10):2590-2600.
[28] 刘浪,史文强,冯良清.多因素扰动情景下应急数量弹性契约的供应链协调[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(7):163-176.
[29] 刘浪,史文强,石岩.需求和价格同时波动零售商损失厌恶的应急数量弹性契约[J].控制与决策,2016,31(12):2200-2210.
[30] 吴忠和,陈宏,赵千.非对称信息下闭环供应链回购契约应对突发事件策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(6):97-106.
[31] 覃艳华,曹细玉,宋璐君.突发事件下需求信息不对称时的供应链协调应对[J].运筹与管理,2012,21(4):59- 64.
[32] 吴忠和,陈宏,赵千.不对称信息供应链应对突发事件协调模型[J].系统管理学报,2015,24(1):91-97.
[33] 朱传波,季建华,陈祥国.突发性需求下的供应链能力决策及应急协调机制[J].计算机集成制造系统,2011,17(5):1071-1077.
[34] Chen K, Xiao T. Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2009, 197(1): 225-234.
[35] Kolay S, Shaffer G. Contract design with a dominant retailer and a competitive fringe[J]. Management Science, 2013, 59(9): 2111-2116.
[36] Wang J C, Lau H S, Lau A H L. When should a manufacturer share truthful manufacturing cost information with a dominant retailer?[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2009, 197(1): 266-286.
[37] Xu H, Shi N, Ma S H, Lai K K. Contracting with an urgent supplier under cost information asymmetry[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 206(2): 374-383.
[2] Xiao T, Qi X. Price competition, cost and demand disruptions and coordination of a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers[J]. Omega, 2008, 36(5): 741-753.
[3] Gao D, Zhao X, Geng W. A delay-in-payment contract for pareto improvement of a supply chain with stochastic demand[J]. Omega, 2014, 49: 60- 68.
[4] Ren J, Xie H, Liu Y, et al. Coordinating a multi-retailer decentralized distribution system with random demand based on buyback and compensation contracts[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management, 2015, 8(1): 203-216.
[5] Giri B C, Chakraborty A. Coordinating a vendor-buyer supply chain with stochastic demand and uncertain yield[J]. International Journal of Management Science and Engineering Management, 2017, 12(2): 96-103.
[6] Tsay A A. The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives[J]. Management science, 1999, 45(10): 1339-1358.
[7] Lariviere M A, Porteus E L. Selling to the newsvendor: an analysis of price-only contracts[J]. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 2001, 3(4): 293-305.
[8] Barnes-Schuster D, Bassok Y, Anupindi R. Coordination and flexibility in supply contracts with options[J]. Manufacturing Service Operations Management, 2002, 4(3): 171-207.
[9] Kanda A, Deshmukh S G. A framework for evaluation of coordination by contracts: a case of two-level supply chains[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2009, 56(4): 1177-1191.
[10] Govindan K, Diabat A, Popiuc M N. Contract analysis: a performance measures and profit evaluation within two-echelon supply chains[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2012, 63(1): 58-74.
[11] Karakaya S, Bakal ī S S. Joint quantity flexibility for multiple products in a decentralized supply chain[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2013, 64(2): 696-707.
[12] Chung W, Talluri S, Narasimhan R. Quantity flexibility contract in the presence of discount incentive[J]. Decision Sciences, 2014, 45(1): 49-79.
[13] 林强,李海晴,李青.资金约束下集中型供应链数量柔性契约设计[J].工业工程与管理,2010,(6):26-30.
[14] Kim J S, Park S I, Shin K Y. A quantity flexibility contract model for a system with heterogeneous suppliers[J]. Computers & Operations Research, 2014, 41: 98-108.
[15] Tsay A, Lovejoy W. Quantity flexibility contracts and supply chain performance[J]. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 1999, 1(2): 89-111.
[16] Sethi S P, Yan H, Zhang H. Quantity flexibility contracts: optimal decisions with information updates[J]. Decision Science, 2004, 35(4): 691-712.
[17] Bassok Y, Anupindi R. Analysis of supply contracts with commitments and flexibility[J]. Naval Research Logistics, 2008, 55(5): 459- 477.
[18] Kim W S. Order quantity flexibility as a form of customer service in a supply chain contract model[J]. Flexible Services and Manufacturing Journal, 2011, 23(3): 290-315.
[19] Kim W S. A supply chain contract with flexibility as a risk-sharing mechanism for demand forecasting[J]. International Journal of Systems Science, 2013, 44(6): 1134-1149.
[20] Tiwari A K, Tiwari A, Samuel C, Bhardwaj P. Procurement flexibility as a tool for supplier selection in disastrous environments[J]. Global Journal of Flexible Systems Management, 2013, 14(4): 211-223.
[21] 刘臣,张庆普,单伟.基于数量弹性契约的供应商数量选择问题研究[J].运筹与管理,2010,19(4):1-7.
[22] 尚文芳,祁明,陈琴.需求预测信息即时更新的供应链柔性期权协调契约[J].管理学报,2013,10(12):1827-1854.
[23] 朱海波,胡文.基于期权的供应链数量柔性契约决策模型[J].控制与决策,2014,29(5):860- 866.
[24] 刘咏梅,成尚汶,谢虎.具有损失厌恶偏好零售商的供应链弹性数量契约[J].控制与决策,2012,27(7):975-982,990.
[25] 杨建华,牛坤,于本海,范德明.买方市场时效性产品的供应链弹性契约优化模型[J].中国管理科学,2013,29(5):80- 85.
[26] 罗伟伟,刘伟,邵东国.不确定环境下具有损失厌恶偏好零售商的供应链协调[J].计算机集成制造系统,2016,22(12):2867-2874.
[27] 张琳,田军,杨瑞娜,冯耕中.数量柔性契约中的应急物资采购定价策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(10):2590-2600.
[28] 刘浪,史文强,冯良清.多因素扰动情景下应急数量弹性契约的供应链协调[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(7):163-176.
[29] 刘浪,史文强,石岩.需求和价格同时波动零售商损失厌恶的应急数量弹性契约[J].控制与决策,2016,31(12):2200-2210.
[30] 吴忠和,陈宏,赵千.非对称信息下闭环供应链回购契约应对突发事件策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(6):97-106.
[31] 覃艳华,曹细玉,宋璐君.突发事件下需求信息不对称时的供应链协调应对[J].运筹与管理,2012,21(4):59- 64.
[32] 吴忠和,陈宏,赵千.不对称信息供应链应对突发事件协调模型[J].系统管理学报,2015,24(1):91-97.
[33] 朱传波,季建华,陈祥国.突发性需求下的供应链能力决策及应急协调机制[J].计算机集成制造系统,2011,17(5):1071-1077.
[34] Chen K, Xiao T. Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2009, 197(1): 225-234.
[35] Kolay S, Shaffer G. Contract design with a dominant retailer and a competitive fringe[J]. Management Science, 2013, 59(9): 2111-2116.
[36] Wang J C, Lau H S, Lau A H L. When should a manufacturer share truthful manufacturing cost information with a dominant retailer?[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2009, 197(1): 266-286.
[37] Xu H, Shi N, Ma S H, Lai K K. Contracting with an urgent supplier under cost information asymmetry[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 206(2): 374-383.
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