财政分权背景下中国环境治理体系演化博弈研究
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摘要
立足于新时代环境政策的一系列变革举措,聚焦环境治理体系的重要抓手和基础支撑―财政分权体制,深入研究多元主体背景下有效环境治理体系运行机制,为建立新时代背景下稳定高效的环境治理体系提供理论基础。创新性地将中央政府策略集合与财税体制发生关联,运用演化博弈模型,探讨了在(中央政府、地方政府、企业)交互作用下,中央政府的财税体制选择与其余主体策略选择间的作用机理和演化过程,并通过均衡点稳定条件求解,分析了不同政策取向下环境规制体系的作用效率与演化路径。结论显示:环境治理体系三方演化博弈模型存在多重演化稳定策略,且存在相应的演化稳定条件。其中,在中央政府选择高财政分权度、地方政府选择积极治理、企业选择治污达标情景下,中央政府以更快的速度到达均衡;在中央政府选择低财政分权度、地方政府选择积极治理、企业选择治污达标情景下,地方政府以更快的速度到达均衡,而企业在两种情景下均呈现最为缓慢的演化速度。总体来看,三方主体在(低财政分权度、积极治理、治污达标)情境下以最快速度达成有效的稳定均衡解。通过对混合策略均衡进行参数敏感性分析得出结论:扩大地方环保财政支出、提高企业减排补贴以及强化官员政治约束,同时调整中央转移支付额度与结构、适度使用行政罚款类手段将有助于构建三方主体协同联动治理模式。进而提出央地间财权事权合理划分、提高环保财政支出、强化政约束等政策建议,推进环境治理体系稳定高效运行。
Based on a series of reform measures of environmental policy in the new era,focusing on the fiscal decentralization system,the paper makes a thorough study of the effective environmental governance system under the background of multiple subjects,and provides a theoretical basis for the establishment of stable and efficient environmental governance system in the new era. This paper innovatively associates the central government strategies with the finance and taxation system. With the evolutionary game model,this paper explores the evolutionary process between the fiscal and taxation system selection of central government and the strategy selection of other main bodies under the interaction of three subjects,stabilizes them through the equilibrium point,and analyzes the efficiency and evolution path of environmental regulation system under different policies. The conclusion shows that the tripartite evolutionary game model of environmental governance system has multiple evolutionary stabilization strategies. The central government achieves equilibrium faster in the circumstance of central government choosing high fiscal decentralization,local government choosing active governance,and enterprises choosing pollution control; the local government achieves equilibrium faster in the circumstance of the central government choosing low fiscal decentralization,the local government choosing active governance,and enterprises choosing pollution control; in both circumstances,enterprises show the slowest evolution speed. Generally speaking,the three subjects can reach an effective stable and balanced solution as quickly as possible under the circumstances of low fiscal decentralization,active governance and pollution control.Through the parametric sensitivity analysis of the mixed strategy equilibrium,it is concluded that expanding protection fiscal expenditure of the local environmental,increasing enterprise emission reduction subsidies,strengthening officials' political constraints,adjusting the amount and structure of central transfer payment,and using administrative fines appropriately will help to build a three-party principal coordinated governance model. Then it puts forward some policy suggestions,such as reasonable division of financial powers between central and local governments,increasing financial expenditure on environmental protection and strengthening political constraints,to promote stable and efficient operation of environmental governance system.
Based on a series of reform measures of environmental policy in the new era,focusing on the fiscal decentralization system,the paper makes a thorough study of the effective environmental governance system under the background of multiple subjects,and provides a theoretical basis for the establishment of stable and efficient environmental governance system in the new era. This paper innovatively associates the central government strategies with the finance and taxation system. With the evolutionary game model,this paper explores the evolutionary process between the fiscal and taxation system selection of central government and the strategy selection of other main bodies under the interaction of three subjects,stabilizes them through the equilibrium point,and analyzes the efficiency and evolution path of environmental regulation system under different policies. The conclusion shows that the tripartite evolutionary game model of environmental governance system has multiple evolutionary stabilization strategies. The central government achieves equilibrium faster in the circumstance of central government choosing high fiscal decentralization,local government choosing active governance,and enterprises choosing pollution control; the local government achieves equilibrium faster in the circumstance of the central government choosing low fiscal decentralization,the local government choosing active governance,and enterprises choosing pollution control; in both circumstances,enterprises show the slowest evolution speed. Generally speaking,the three subjects can reach an effective stable and balanced solution as quickly as possible under the circumstances of low fiscal decentralization,active governance and pollution control.Through the parametric sensitivity analysis of the mixed strategy equilibrium,it is concluded that expanding protection fiscal expenditure of the local environmental,increasing enterprise emission reduction subsidies,strengthening officials' political constraints,adjusting the amount and structure of central transfer payment,and using administrative fines appropriately will help to build a three-party principal coordinated governance model. Then it puts forward some policy suggestions,such as reasonable division of financial powers between central and local governments,increasing financial expenditure on environmental protection and strengthening political constraints,to promote stable and efficient operation of environmental governance system.
引文
[1]蔡防,都阳,王美艳.经济发展方式转变与节能减排内在动力[J].经济研究,2008(6):4-11.
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[4]陶然,陆曦,苏福兵,等.地区竞争格局演变下的中国转轨:财政激励和发展模式反思[J].经济研究,2009(7):21-33.
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[10]胡东滨,蔡洪鹏.财政分权、经济增长与环境污染:基于省级面板数据的实证分析[J].生态经济,2018(2):84-88.
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[14]高明,郭施宏,夏玲玲.大气污染府际间合作治理联盟的达成与稳定———基于演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2016(8):62-70.
[15]陈真玲,王文举.环境税制下政府与污染企业演化博弈分析[J].管理评论,2017,29(5):226-236.
[16]许玲燕,杜建国,汪文丽.农村水环境治理行动的演化博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(5):17-26,26.
[17]罗能生,王玉泽.财政分权、环境规制与区域生态效率———基于动态空间杜宾模型的实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017(4):110-118.
[18]史丹,吴仲斌.支持生态文明建设中央财政转移支付问题研究[J].地方财政研究,2015(3):74-79.
[19]安虎森.开征环保税能有效治理空气污染吗[J].中国工业经济,2017(5):54-74.
[20]朱小会,陆远权.开放经济、环保财政支出与污染治理———来自中国省级与行业面板数据的经验证据[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(10):10-18.
[21]张同斌,孙静,范庆泉.环境公共治理政策的效果评价与优化组合研究[J].统计研究,2017,34(3):3-15.
[22]席鹏辉.财政激励、环境偏好与垂直式环境管理———纳税大户议价能力的视角[J].中国工业经济,2017(11):100-117.
[2]OATES W,SCHWAB R. Economic competition among jurisdictions:efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing[J]. Journal of public economics,1988,35(3):333-354.
[3]QIAN Y,ROLAND G. Federalism and the Soft Constraint[J]. The American economic review,1998,88(5):1143-1162.
[4]陶然,陆曦,苏福兵,等.地区竞争格局演变下的中国转轨:财政激励和发展模式反思[J].经济研究,2009(7):21-33.
[5]吴延兵.中国式分权下的偏向性投资[J].经济研究,2017(6):137-152.
[6]吴士健,孙向彦,杨萍.双重治理体制下政府碳排放监管博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017(12):21-30.
[7]FARZANEGAN M R, MENNEL T. Fiscal decentralization and pollution:institutions matter[J]. Magks papers on economics,2012,22:12-41.
[8]贺俊,刘亮亮,张玉娟.税收竞争、收入分权与中国环境污染[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(4):1-7.
[9]HE Q. Fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution:evidence from Chinese panel data[J]. China economic review,2015,36:86-100.
[10]胡东滨,蔡洪鹏.财政分权、经济增长与环境污染:基于省级面板数据的实证分析[J].生态经济,2018(2):84-88.
[11]薛钢,潘孝珍.财政分权对中国环境污染影响程度的实证分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2012,22(1):83-89.
[12]谢识予.有限理性条件下的进化博弈理论[J].上海财经大学学报,2001(5):3-9.
[13]姜珂,游达明.基于央地分权视角的环境规制策略演化博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(9):139-148.
[14]高明,郭施宏,夏玲玲.大气污染府际间合作治理联盟的达成与稳定———基于演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2016(8):62-70.
[15]陈真玲,王文举.环境税制下政府与污染企业演化博弈分析[J].管理评论,2017,29(5):226-236.
[16]许玲燕,杜建国,汪文丽.农村水环境治理行动的演化博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(5):17-26,26.
[17]罗能生,王玉泽.财政分权、环境规制与区域生态效率———基于动态空间杜宾模型的实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017(4):110-118.
[18]史丹,吴仲斌.支持生态文明建设中央财政转移支付问题研究[J].地方财政研究,2015(3):74-79.
[19]安虎森.开征环保税能有效治理空气污染吗[J].中国工业经济,2017(5):54-74.
[20]朱小会,陆远权.开放经济、环保财政支出与污染治理———来自中国省级与行业面板数据的经验证据[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(10):10-18.
[21]张同斌,孙静,范庆泉.环境公共治理政策的效果评价与优化组合研究[J].统计研究,2017,34(3):3-15.
[22]席鹏辉.财政激励、环境偏好与垂直式环境管理———纳税大户议价能力的视角[J].中国工业经济,2017(11):100-117.