政治关联与企业涉诉风险
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摘要
从政治关联的保护效应出发,采用2011—2015年沪深两市A股非国有上市公司为研究样本,以企业年度涉诉次数和涉诉金额为被解释变量,考察政治关联与企业涉诉风险的关系。结论显示:(1)政治关联能降低企业涉诉风险;(2)相比官员型政治关联,代表型政治关联降低企业涉诉风险的效果更加明显;(3)政治关联对企业涉诉风险的影响受限于当地的法制完善程度,仅当法制完善程度较低时政治关联才能降低企业涉诉风险,而当法制完善程度较高时,政治关联难以发挥作用;(4)政治关联主要降低的是企业被诉的概率而不是企业起诉的概率;(5)政治关联主要降低的是企业借款融资类诉讼发生的概率而不是买卖合同类诉讼的概率。
From the perspective of protection effect of political connection,this paper takes the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for 2011 to 2015 as a sample to examine the relationship between the political connection and the lawsuit risks involved in the business. The conclusion shows political connection can reduce the risk of enterprises' lawsuit,and the representative-type political connection has a more obvious effect on reducing the risk of litigation when compared with official-type political connection. At the same time,the influence of the political connection on the risk is limited by local legal system perfection. Only when the legal system is poor,can the political relation reduce the risk,the political relation is difficult to exert effect when the legal system is perfect enough. Further study has found that political connection mainly reduces the probability of firms being sued rather than the probability of the prosecution,and mainly reduces the probability of the occurrence of financing suits rather than the sale and purchase of contractual suits.
From the perspective of protection effect of political connection,this paper takes the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for 2011 to 2015 as a sample to examine the relationship between the political connection and the lawsuit risks involved in the business. The conclusion shows political connection can reduce the risk of enterprises' lawsuit,and the representative-type political connection has a more obvious effect on reducing the risk of litigation when compared with official-type political connection. At the same time,the influence of the political connection on the risk is limited by local legal system perfection. Only when the legal system is poor,can the political relation reduce the risk,the political relation is difficult to exert effect when the legal system is perfect enough. Further study has found that political connection mainly reduces the probability of firms being sued rather than the probability of the prosecution,and mainly reduces the probability of the occurrence of financing suits rather than the sale and purchase of contractual suits.
引文
杜兴强,郭剑花,雷宇.2009.政治联系方式与民营上市公司业绩:“政府干预”抑或“关系”[J].金融研究(11):158-173.
黄少卿.2006.中国转型时期一个非正式合同执行机制:背景、模型与解说---地方官员在转轨过程中的合同执行功能[J].制度经济学研究(1):47-69.
逯东,王运陈,王春国,等.2013.政治关联与民营上市公司的内部控制执行[J].中国工业经济(11):96-108.
罗党论,刘晓龙.2009.政治关系、进入壁垒与企业绩效:来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界(5):97-106.
毛新述,孟杰.2013.内部控制与诉讼风险[J].管理世界(11):155-165.
潘红波,夏新平,余明桂.2008.政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J].经济研究(4):41-52.
王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.2017.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:中国社会科学文献出版社.
魏下海,黄玖立,林涛.2017.政治关系、制度环境与多元化商业纠纷解决机制[J].经济学动态(3):12-23.
吴文锋,吴冲锋,芮萌.2009.中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠[J].管理世界(3):134-142.
余明桂,潘红波.2008.政治关系、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款[J].管理世界(8):9-21.
张建君,张志学.2005.中国民营企业家的政治战略[J].管理世界(7):94-105.
张维迎,柯荣住.2002.诉讼过程中的逆向选择及其解释:以契约纠纷的基层法院判决书为例的经验研究[J].中国社会科学(2):32-43.
ALLEN F,QIAN J,QIAN M J.2005.Law,finance and economic growth in China[J].Journal of Financial Economics,77(1):57-116.
BAI C E,LI D D,WANG Y.2003.Thriving on a tilted playing field:China's nonstate enterprises in the reform era[M]//HOPE N C,YANG D T,LI M Y.How far across the river,Chinese policy reform at the millennium.Stanford:Stanford University Press:97-121.
BOUBAKRI N,COSSET J C,SAFFAR W.2008.Political connections of newly privatized firms[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,14(5):654-673.
CAPRIO L,FACCIO M,MCCONNELL J J.2013.Sheltering corporate assets from political extraction[J].Journal of Law,Economics&Organization,29(2):332-354.
CHEN S,SUN Z,TANG S,et al.2011.Government intervention and investment efficiency:evidence from China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,17(2):259-271.
CHOI C J,LEE S H,KIM J B.1999.A note on countertrade:contractual uncertainty and transaction governance in transition economies[J].Journal of International Business Studies,30(1):189-201.
FACCIO M.2006.Politically connected firms[J].American Economic Review,96(1):369-386.
FIRTH M,RUI O M,WU W.2011.The effects of political connections and state ownership on corporate litigation in China[J].Journal of Law and Economics,54(3):573-607.
FISMAN R.2001.Estimating the value of political connections[J].American Economic Review,91(4):1095-1102.
GREIF A.1993.Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade:the Maghribi Traders’coalition[J].American Economic Review,83(3):525-548.
JOHNSON S,MCMILLAN J,WOODRUFF C.2002.Courts and relational contracts[J].Journal of Law,Economics and Organization,18(1):221-277.
LI H,MENG L,ZHANG J.2006.Why do entrepreneurs enter politics?Evidence from China[J].Economic Inquiry,44(3):559-578.
LU H,PAN H,ZHANG C.2012.Property rights protection through litigations:ownership bias and the role of political connections[R].29th International Conference of the French Finance Association(AFFI),Available at SSRN:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2084903 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2084903.
LU Y.2011.Political connections and trade expansion[J].Economics of Transition,19(2):231-254.
XIN K,PEARCE J.1996.Guanxi:connections as substitute for formal institutional support[J].Academy of Management Journal,39(6):1641-1658.
(1)在诉讼样本中,涉及买卖合同类的诉讼占所有诉讼比重高达54.92%,借款融资类诉讼所占比重为28.33%。
(1)也可能是作为第三人涉诉,鉴于诉讼样本中作为第三人涉诉情况较少(不到3%),这里忽略。
黄少卿.2006.中国转型时期一个非正式合同执行机制:背景、模型与解说---地方官员在转轨过程中的合同执行功能[J].制度经济学研究(1):47-69.
逯东,王运陈,王春国,等.2013.政治关联与民营上市公司的内部控制执行[J].中国工业经济(11):96-108.
罗党论,刘晓龙.2009.政治关系、进入壁垒与企业绩效:来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界(5):97-106.
毛新述,孟杰.2013.内部控制与诉讼风险[J].管理世界(11):155-165.
潘红波,夏新平,余明桂.2008.政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J].经济研究(4):41-52.
王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.2017.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:中国社会科学文献出版社.
魏下海,黄玖立,林涛.2017.政治关系、制度环境与多元化商业纠纷解决机制[J].经济学动态(3):12-23.
吴文锋,吴冲锋,芮萌.2009.中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠[J].管理世界(3):134-142.
余明桂,潘红波.2008.政治关系、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款[J].管理世界(8):9-21.
张建君,张志学.2005.中国民营企业家的政治战略[J].管理世界(7):94-105.
张维迎,柯荣住.2002.诉讼过程中的逆向选择及其解释:以契约纠纷的基层法院判决书为例的经验研究[J].中国社会科学(2):32-43.
ALLEN F,QIAN J,QIAN M J.2005.Law,finance and economic growth in China[J].Journal of Financial Economics,77(1):57-116.
BAI C E,LI D D,WANG Y.2003.Thriving on a tilted playing field:China's nonstate enterprises in the reform era[M]//HOPE N C,YANG D T,LI M Y.How far across the river,Chinese policy reform at the millennium.Stanford:Stanford University Press:97-121.
BOUBAKRI N,COSSET J C,SAFFAR W.2008.Political connections of newly privatized firms[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,14(5):654-673.
CAPRIO L,FACCIO M,MCCONNELL J J.2013.Sheltering corporate assets from political extraction[J].Journal of Law,Economics&Organization,29(2):332-354.
CHEN S,SUN Z,TANG S,et al.2011.Government intervention and investment efficiency:evidence from China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,17(2):259-271.
CHOI C J,LEE S H,KIM J B.1999.A note on countertrade:contractual uncertainty and transaction governance in transition economies[J].Journal of International Business Studies,30(1):189-201.
FACCIO M.2006.Politically connected firms[J].American Economic Review,96(1):369-386.
FIRTH M,RUI O M,WU W.2011.The effects of political connections and state ownership on corporate litigation in China[J].Journal of Law and Economics,54(3):573-607.
FISMAN R.2001.Estimating the value of political connections[J].American Economic Review,91(4):1095-1102.
GREIF A.1993.Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade:the Maghribi Traders’coalition[J].American Economic Review,83(3):525-548.
JOHNSON S,MCMILLAN J,WOODRUFF C.2002.Courts and relational contracts[J].Journal of Law,Economics and Organization,18(1):221-277.
LI H,MENG L,ZHANG J.2006.Why do entrepreneurs enter politics?Evidence from China[J].Economic Inquiry,44(3):559-578.
LU H,PAN H,ZHANG C.2012.Property rights protection through litigations:ownership bias and the role of political connections[R].29th International Conference of the French Finance Association(AFFI),Available at SSRN:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2084903 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2084903.
LU Y.2011.Political connections and trade expansion[J].Economics of Transition,19(2):231-254.
XIN K,PEARCE J.1996.Guanxi:connections as substitute for formal institutional support[J].Academy of Management Journal,39(6):1641-1658.
(1)在诉讼样本中,涉及买卖合同类的诉讼占所有诉讼比重高达54.92%,借款融资类诉讼所占比重为28.33%。
(1)也可能是作为第三人涉诉,鉴于诉讼样本中作为第三人涉诉情况较少(不到3%),这里忽略。