环境分权与经济竞争背景下河流跨界污染的县域证据
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摘要
在环境地方分权治理和县域经济竞争体制下,县级政府间在环境污染治理方面可能存在"以邻为壑"的行为,这使得同一流域上下游县域间更容易产生跨界污染问题。本文通过引入污染"累积效应"和河流"自净效应",建立了河流污染的外部性模型,并推导出相应的假说,再从不同环境规制强度和行政分割前后两个维度,对河流污染程度的动态变化进行了情景模拟。基于2004—2014年七大流域中国国控监测断面的周数据,本文对河流污染程度与"县边界-监测站"沿河距离的关系进行了实证检验,并进一步检验了环境分权体制下不同行政分割程度对"跨界效应"的影响。研究发现:(1)随着河流接近县域下游边界,在更强"累积效应"作用下,河流污染指标COD和NH3-N呈现加速递增趋势,河流"跨界污染"问题显著;(2)在河流跨越县域边界后,由于更强"自净效应"和相对严苛的环境监管,COD和NH3-N增长放缓乃至局部下降,县边界两侧污染程度呈现出结构性差异,且这种差异在中西部地区更为突出;(3)河流跨越的行政边界越多,所面临的沟通与协调难度就越大,潜在的利益冲突下"以邻为壑"动机就更强,因而污染排放就更加严重。据此,本文建议加快推进"环保机构监测监察执法垂直管理制度改革"和"河长制"河湖管理模式,改革现行以块为主的环境治理方式,从制度层面解决好中央与地方、地方政府之间的权责关系;推行环保督查的同时,从官员绩效考核层面提升环保激励;建立组织架构完备、各级监测站点分布合理、衡量指标齐全的河流水质监测体系。
In the systems of environmental decentralization and county economy competition,‘beggar-thy-neighbor'behaviors may exist in environmental pollution control within county-level governments,which is easier to generate transboundary pollution problems for counties in the upper and lower reaches of the same river basin. This paper built an externality model of river pollution by introducing the ‘cumulative effect'of pollution and the ‘self-purification effect'of the river and the corresponding hypotheses were derived. Scenario simulation based on the dynamic changes of river pollution was further conducted from before and after the two dimensions of different environmental regulation intensity and administrative segmentation. Based on the weekly data of China's statecontrolled monitoring sections of the seven major river basins from 2004 to 2014,this paper empirically tested the relationship between the pollution level of rivers and the distance along the ‘county boundary-monitoring stations' and further examined the effects of different administrative division degrees on ‘transboundary pollution 'in the context of environmental decentralization system. The results showed that: first,as the river approached the lower reaches of the county,the river pollution indicators,COD and NH3-N,showed an accelerating trend with the action of the stronger‘cumulative effect',and the‘cross-border pollution'problem of the river was significant; second,when the river crossed the county 's boundary,the growth of COD and NH3-N slowed down or even decreased partly due to the stronger‘self-purification effect'and the relatively strict environmental regulation. The pollution levels on both sides of the county boundaries showed structural differences and the differences were even greater in the central and western regions; thirdly the more administrative boundaries the river crossed,the more difficulties to communicate and coordinate they faced.The motive to ‘shift one's troubles onto others' became stronger in the potential conflict of interest,and therefore the pollution emissions were even more serious. Accordingly,this paper proposed to speed up the ‘reform of the vertical control system of monitoring,supervision and law enforcement of environmental protection agencies' and the administration mode of‘river chief system'for rivers and lakes,reform the current block-based environmental management mode,and solve the authority-responsibility relationship between the central and local governments as well as between local governments; enhance environmental incentives from the perspective of officials' performance assessment along with the implementation of environmental supervision; and establish a river water quality monitoring system with complete organizational structure,reasonable distribution of monitoring stations at all levels and complete measurement indicators.
In the systems of environmental decentralization and county economy competition,‘beggar-thy-neighbor'behaviors may exist in environmental pollution control within county-level governments,which is easier to generate transboundary pollution problems for counties in the upper and lower reaches of the same river basin. This paper built an externality model of river pollution by introducing the ‘cumulative effect'of pollution and the ‘self-purification effect'of the river and the corresponding hypotheses were derived. Scenario simulation based on the dynamic changes of river pollution was further conducted from before and after the two dimensions of different environmental regulation intensity and administrative segmentation. Based on the weekly data of China's statecontrolled monitoring sections of the seven major river basins from 2004 to 2014,this paper empirically tested the relationship between the pollution level of rivers and the distance along the ‘county boundary-monitoring stations' and further examined the effects of different administrative division degrees on ‘transboundary pollution 'in the context of environmental decentralization system. The results showed that: first,as the river approached the lower reaches of the county,the river pollution indicators,COD and NH3-N,showed an accelerating trend with the action of the stronger‘cumulative effect',and the‘cross-border pollution'problem of the river was significant; second,when the river crossed the county 's boundary,the growth of COD and NH3-N slowed down or even decreased partly due to the stronger‘self-purification effect'and the relatively strict environmental regulation. The pollution levels on both sides of the county boundaries showed structural differences and the differences were even greater in the central and western regions; thirdly the more administrative boundaries the river crossed,the more difficulties to communicate and coordinate they faced.The motive to ‘shift one's troubles onto others' became stronger in the potential conflict of interest,and therefore the pollution emissions were even more serious. Accordingly,this paper proposed to speed up the ‘reform of the vertical control system of monitoring,supervision and law enforcement of environmental protection agencies' and the administration mode of‘river chief system'for rivers and lakes,reform the current block-based environmental management mode,and solve the authority-responsibility relationship between the central and local governments as well as between local governments; enhance environmental incentives from the perspective of officials' performance assessment along with the implementation of environmental supervision; and establish a river water quality monitoring system with complete organizational structure,reasonable distribution of monitoring stations at all levels and complete measurement indicators.
引文
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[22]李静,杨娜,陶璐.跨境河流污染的“边界效应”与减排政策效果研究——基于重点断面水质监测周数据的检验[J].中国工业经济,2015(3):31-43.[LI Jing,YANG Na,TAO Lu.Study on the‘boundary emissions mitigation policy effect’of transboundary river pollution and impact:an empirical research based on the key monitoring sections’weekly data[J].China industrial economics,2015(3):31-43.]
[23]李静,陶璐,杨娜.淮河流域污染的“行政边界效应”与新环境政策影响[J].中国软科学,2015(6):91-102.[LI Jing,TAO Lu,YANG Na.The‘administrative boundary effect’of the Huaihe River Basin pollution and the environmental policy effect[J].China soft science,2015(6):91-102.]
[24]中国环境保护部.2016年中国环境状况公报[R].2017-06-05:5-6.[Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection.2016China environmental status bulletin[R].2017-06-05:5-6.]
[25]王圣君.政府治理跨界水污染模式研究[D].上海:东华大学,2015:38-41.[WANG Shengjun.The model research of government in transboundary water pollution[D].Shanghai:Donghua University,2015:38-41.]
[2]WOLF A T,KRAMER A,CARIUS A,et al.Managing water conflict and cooperation[J].State of the world 2005:redefining global security,2005:80-95.
[3]OATES W E.An essay on fiscal federalism[J].Journal of economic literature,1999,37(3):1120-1149.
[4]OATES W E.A reconsideration of environmental federalism[M].Washington DC:Resources for the Future,2001.
[5]JOHNSSON R M F,KEMPER K.Institutional and policy analysis of river basin management:the Jaguaribe river basin,Ceara,Brazil[R].Washington DC:World Bank,2005.
[6]SIGNMAN H.Decentralization and environmental quality:an international analysis of water pollution levels and variation[J].Land economics,2014,90(1):114-130.
[7]胡若隐.地方行政分割与流域水污染治理悖论分析[J].环境保护,2006(3B):65-68.[HU Ruoyin.Analyse of the absurdity of the administration division and the river basin water pollution mending[J].Environmental protection,2006(3B):65-68.]
[8]BURGESS R,HANSEN M,OLKEN B A,et al.The political economy of deforestation in the tropics[J].The quarterly journal of economics,2012,127(4):1707-1754.
[9]BRANNSTROM C.Decentralising water resource management in Brazil[J].The European journal of development research,2004,16(1):214-234.
[10]KONISKY D M,WOODS N D.Environmental policy,federalism,and the Obama presidency[J].Publius:the journal of federalism,2016,46(3):366-391.
[11]SIGNMAN H.International spillovers and water quality in rivers:do countries free ride?[J].American economic review,2002,92(4):1152-1159.
[12]GRAY W B,SHADBEGIAN R J.‘Optimal’pollution abatement:whose benefits matter,and how much?[J].Journal of environmental economics and management,2004,47(3):510-534.
[13]KONISKY D M,WOODS N D.Environmental free riding in state water pollution enforcement[J].State politics&policy quarterly,2012,12(3):227-251.
[14]SIGNMAN H.Transboundary spillovers and decentralization of environmental policies[J].Journal of environmental economics and management,2005,50(1):82-101.
[15]LIPSCOMB M,MOBARAK A M.Decentralization and pollution spillovers:evidence from the re-drawing of county borders in Brazil[J].Review of economic studies,2017,84(1):464-502.
[16]BERNAUER T,KUHN P M.Is there an environmental version of the Kantian peace?insights from water pollution in Europe[J].European journal of international relations,2010,16(1):77-102.
[17]HELLAND E,WHITFORD A B.Pollution incidence and political jurisdiction:evidence from the TRI[J].Journal of environmental economics and management,2003,46(3):403-424.
[18]TYLER Z.Transboundary water pollution in China:an analysis of the failure of the legal framework to protect downstream jurisdictions[J].Columbia journal of Asian law,2005,19(2):572-613.
[19]沈大军,王浩,蒋云钟.流域管理机构:国际比较分析及对我国的建议[J].自然资源学报,2004,19(1):86-95.[SHEN Dajun,WANG Hao,JIANG Yunzhong.Riverbasin management organization:an international comparison and suggestions on China[J].Journal of natural resources,2004,19(1):86-95.]
[20]施祖麟,毕亮亮.我国跨行政区河流域水污染治理管理机制的研究——以江浙边界水污染治理为例[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2007,17(3):3-9.[SHI Zulin,BI Liangliang.The study on trans-jurisdictional water pollution management and cooperation pattern of river basin in China:a case study water pollution management and cooperation between Jiangsu Province and Zhejiang Province[J].China population,resources and environment,2007,17(3):3-9.]
[21]李胜,陈晓春.基于府际博弈的跨行政区流域水污染治理困境分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011,21(12):104-109.[LI Sheng,CHEN Xiaochun.Governance dilemma of trans-district water pollution:an intergovernmental game perspective[J].China population,resources and environment,2011,21(12):104-109.]
[22]李静,杨娜,陶璐.跨境河流污染的“边界效应”与减排政策效果研究——基于重点断面水质监测周数据的检验[J].中国工业经济,2015(3):31-43.[LI Jing,YANG Na,TAO Lu.Study on the‘boundary emissions mitigation policy effect’of transboundary river pollution and impact:an empirical research based on the key monitoring sections’weekly data[J].China industrial economics,2015(3):31-43.]
[23]李静,陶璐,杨娜.淮河流域污染的“行政边界效应”与新环境政策影响[J].中国软科学,2015(6):91-102.[LI Jing,TAO Lu,YANG Na.The‘administrative boundary effect’of the Huaihe River Basin pollution and the environmental policy effect[J].China soft science,2015(6):91-102.]
[24]中国环境保护部.2016年中国环境状况公报[R].2017-06-05:5-6.[Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection.2016China environmental status bulletin[R].2017-06-05:5-6.]
[25]王圣君.政府治理跨界水污染模式研究[D].上海:东华大学,2015:38-41.[WANG Shengjun.The model research of government in transboundary water pollution[D].Shanghai:Donghua University,2015:38-41.]