官员偏爱籍贯地的机制研究——基于资源转移的视角
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摘要
本文旨在探索官员偏爱籍贯地发展现象背后的机制。在理论上,本文证明了,当官员关注其籍贯地发展时,资源在竞争性的要素市场上将向其籍贯地转移,从而出现籍贯地偏爱现象。在实证上,本文把1998—2013年间制造业企业样本在县级层面加总,识别出制造业资本从省内其他地区向省级官员的籍贯地转移。具体而言,省级官员在任期间,其籍贯地的制造业资本平均增长约1.5%,制造业企业数量增长约9%,进入率提高约4个百分点,退出率下降约13个百分点,制造业企业的平均资本规模则没有显著变化。本文还发现,随着制造业资本向籍贯地转移,无论是采用工业总产值还是夜间灯光亮度度量,籍贯地的经济增长快了约2%。这些发现验证了本文的理论预期,揭示了籍贯地偏爱现象是官员通过资源转移影响经济发展的特例。
There is a substantial literature documenting the novel phenomenon of leaders' regional favoritism. This phenomenon is clearly different from the fact that leaders are committed to the economic development of their jurisdiction, and cannot be simply attributed to leaders' ability. It cannot be attributed to political tournaments either, because a leader's place of origin may be outside his or her jurisdiction, and economic performance outside the leader's jurisdiction clearly does not contribute to his or her promotion. This paper therefore examines the mechanisms behind this novel phenomenon.Theoretically, this paper argues that leaders favor their places of origin through resource reallocation, and provides a model for this phenomenon. In this model, the economy involves two regions labeled region I and region J. Each area is divided into n sub-areas, each with the same initial capital and economic activity. There is a unified and competitive capital market, and capital can flow in the economy without cost. Labor cannot flow between sub-regions, and each region inelastically has one unit of labor. Leaders are both concerned with their native area's development and the development of their jurisdiction, and have the ability to provide certain public services for their native area. Other things being equal, the native area has a larger number of public services, resulting in a higher marginal output of capital. In a unified and competitive capital market, capital in other regions will flow to the native area until the marginal output in the two areas re-equalizes. This kind of resource reallocation will eventually be transformed into a difference in economic performance between the two areas, which leads to the phenomenon of regional favoritism observed in the literature.In this paper, this mechanism is tested using a sample of provincial leaders. In 1998—2013, there were 203 provincial party committee secretaries and governors in the country. Places of origins were distributed throughout 74 counties outside jurisdictions and 32 counties inside jurisdictions. This paper adopts a sample of native areas outside the jurisdiction of provincial leaders as the treatment group, based on the following four points. First, the provincial leader's place of origin is exogenous. At the same time, provincial leaders are also exogenous to their places of origin. Second, provincial leaders have the power to influence the economic development of their places of origin. Third, the development of areas outside the jurisdiction has nothing to do with political incentives. Because the leader's place of origin is not in his or her jurisdiction, its economic development does not directly affect personal career development, which eliminates the political incentive for its improved performance. Fourth, the development of leaders' places of origin can be separated from their capabilities. The capacity of provincial leaders will not change significantly with a change in their position, but their impact on their place of origin may change as their position changes.Empirically, based on the aggregate firm data from 1998—2013, we find that manufacturing capital flows to places of origin from other regions in the same province. In the leader's place of origin, manufacturing capital increases by 1.5%, number of firms goes up by 9%, immigration rate increases by 4%, and emigration decreases by 13%, but the capital scale of firms remains unchanged. We also find that the economic growth of the place of origin is 2% greater. These findings are robust, and they reveal that resource reallocation is a likely mechanism of the phenomenon of regional favoritism.This paper complements to the political tournament and ability hypothesis. The resource reallocation hypothesis does not emphasize the direct influence of leaders, but emphasizes that leaders' preference for their place of origin will bring about resource reallocation in market competition, thus affecting the place's economic performance. This paper deepens the empirical analysis of leaders' influence on economic growth. Lu(2017) has pointed out that "the correlation between the assessment incentives and economic growth seen in the panel data at the provincial or municipal level does not mean that the whole economic growth benefits from the existing system. In other words, it is entirely possible that the cake of whole economic growth has not increased, but only the highly motivated leaders have allocated more economic growth". This paper models this idea and provides primary evidence.
There is a substantial literature documenting the novel phenomenon of leaders' regional favoritism. This phenomenon is clearly different from the fact that leaders are committed to the economic development of their jurisdiction, and cannot be simply attributed to leaders' ability. It cannot be attributed to political tournaments either, because a leader's place of origin may be outside his or her jurisdiction, and economic performance outside the leader's jurisdiction clearly does not contribute to his or her promotion. This paper therefore examines the mechanisms behind this novel phenomenon.Theoretically, this paper argues that leaders favor their places of origin through resource reallocation, and provides a model for this phenomenon. In this model, the economy involves two regions labeled region I and region J. Each area is divided into n sub-areas, each with the same initial capital and economic activity. There is a unified and competitive capital market, and capital can flow in the economy without cost. Labor cannot flow between sub-regions, and each region inelastically has one unit of labor. Leaders are both concerned with their native area's development and the development of their jurisdiction, and have the ability to provide certain public services for their native area. Other things being equal, the native area has a larger number of public services, resulting in a higher marginal output of capital. In a unified and competitive capital market, capital in other regions will flow to the native area until the marginal output in the two areas re-equalizes. This kind of resource reallocation will eventually be transformed into a difference in economic performance between the two areas, which leads to the phenomenon of regional favoritism observed in the literature.In this paper, this mechanism is tested using a sample of provincial leaders. In 1998—2013, there were 203 provincial party committee secretaries and governors in the country. Places of origins were distributed throughout 74 counties outside jurisdictions and 32 counties inside jurisdictions. This paper adopts a sample of native areas outside the jurisdiction of provincial leaders as the treatment group, based on the following four points. First, the provincial leader's place of origin is exogenous. At the same time, provincial leaders are also exogenous to their places of origin. Second, provincial leaders have the power to influence the economic development of their places of origin. Third, the development of areas outside the jurisdiction has nothing to do with political incentives. Because the leader's place of origin is not in his or her jurisdiction, its economic development does not directly affect personal career development, which eliminates the political incentive for its improved performance. Fourth, the development of leaders' places of origin can be separated from their capabilities. The capacity of provincial leaders will not change significantly with a change in their position, but their impact on their place of origin may change as their position changes.Empirically, based on the aggregate firm data from 1998—2013, we find that manufacturing capital flows to places of origin from other regions in the same province. In the leader's place of origin, manufacturing capital increases by 1.5%, number of firms goes up by 9%, immigration rate increases by 4%, and emigration decreases by 13%, but the capital scale of firms remains unchanged. We also find that the economic growth of the place of origin is 2% greater. These findings are robust, and they reveal that resource reallocation is a likely mechanism of the phenomenon of regional favoritism.This paper complements to the political tournament and ability hypothesis. The resource reallocation hypothesis does not emphasize the direct influence of leaders, but emphasizes that leaders' preference for their place of origin will bring about resource reallocation in market competition, thus affecting the place's economic performance. This paper deepens the empirical analysis of leaders' influence on economic growth. Lu(2017) has pointed out that "the correlation between the assessment incentives and economic growth seen in the panel data at the provincial or municipal level does not mean that the whole economic growth benefits from the existing system. In other words, it is entirely possible that the cake of whole economic growth has not increased, but only the highly motivated leaders have allocated more economic growth". This paper models this idea and provides primary evidence.
引文
范子英、李欣,2014:《部长的政治关联效应与财政转移支付分配》,《经济研究》第6期。
范子英、彭飞、刘冲,2016:《政治关联与经济增长——基于卫星灯光数据的研究》,《经济研究》第1期。
李书娟、徐现祥,2016:《身份认同与经济增长》,《经济学(季刊)》第3期。
李书娟、徐现祥、戴天仕,2016:《身份认同与夜间灯光亮度》,《世界经济》第8期。
陆铭,2017:《城市、区域和国家发展——空间政治经济学的现在与未来》,《经济学(季刊)》第4期。
罗党论、甄丽明,2008:《民营控制、政治关系与企业融资约束》,《金融研究》第12期。
王贤彬、徐现祥,2008:《地方官员来源、去向、任期与经济增长——来自中国省长省委书记的证据》,《管理世界》第3期。
王贤彬、徐现祥,2010:《地方官员晋升竞争与经济增长》,《经济科学》第6期。
王贤彬、徐现祥,2014:《官员能力与经济发展——来自省级官员个体效应的证据》,《南方经济》第6期。
徐康宁、陈丰龙、刘修岩,2015:《中国经济增长的真实性:基于全球夜间灯光数据的检验》,《经济研究》第5期。
徐现祥、王贤彬、舒元,2007:《地方官员与经济增长》,《经济研究》第9期。
张平、赵国昌、罗知,2012:《中央官员来源与地方经济增长》,《经济学(季刊)》第2期。
张军、高远,2007:《官员任期、异地交流与经济增长》,《经济研究》第11期。
周黎安,2004:《晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因》,《经济研究》第6期。
周黎安,2007:《中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究》,《经济研究》第7期。
Brandt,L.,J.Van Biesebroeck,and Y.Zhang,2012,“Creative Accounting or Creative Destruction?Firm-level Productivity Growth in Chinese Manufacturing”,Journal of Development Economics,97,339—351.
Hodler,R.,and P.A.Raschky,2014,“Regional Favoritism”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,129,995—1033.
Islam,N.,1995,“Growth Empirics:A Panel Data Approach”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,110,1127—1170.
Mankiw,N.G.,D.Romer,and D.N.Weil,1992,“A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,107,407—437.
Rodrik,D.,2012,“Unconditional Convergence in Manufacturing”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,128,165—204.
Yao,Y.,and M.Zhang,2015,“Subnational Leaders and Economic Growth:Evidence from Chinese Cities”,Journal of Economic Growth,20,405—436.
① 大量研究发现,中国省部级领导能够促进其籍贯地的经济增长(张平等,2012;范子英和李欣,2014;李书娟和徐现祥,2016;李书娟等,2016;范子英等,2016)。
② Yao & Zhang(2015)、王贤彬和徐现祥(2014)提出了官员能力假说。
③ 周黎安(2004,2007)提出了官员晋升锦标赛假说。
(1)许多文献以经济增长来度量地区偏爱的程度(Roland & Raschky,2014;李书娟和徐现祥,2016;范子英等,2016)。
(2)根据简历信息,部分省级官员的籍贯地无法落实到县层面。
(3)篇幅所限,没有列出省级官员的籍贯县的具体名单,感兴趣的读者可来信索要。
(4)1998—2013年间,匹配前的样本数为4350179,匹配后的样本数为4123697。
(5)限于篇幅,本文没有报告稳健性检验的具体结果,如果读者有兴趣可以来信索要。
(6)安慰剂检验的具体做法可参考李书娟等(2016)。
(7)省委书记、省长离任后的去向分类同王贤彬和徐现祥(2008)。
(8)对于官员带来资源转移的具体渠道,可能存在多种可能,其中不排除政治关联等因素,深入挖掘具体的影响机制是进一步研究的方向。大量的公司金融文献发现,企业的政治关联对企业会起到正面或者负面的作用,尤其在发展中国家和转轨国家更是如此(罗党论和甄明全,2008)。
(9)李书娟和徐现祥(2016)采用地级样本发现省委书记、省长对其籍贯地GDP增长率有显著影响,大小约为0.5个百分点。
(10)徐康宁等(2015)对夜间灯光亮度度量经济绩效的优势进行了全面考察。
(11)篇幅所限,没有汇报安慰剂检验的结果,感兴趣的读者可来信索要。
范子英、彭飞、刘冲,2016:《政治关联与经济增长——基于卫星灯光数据的研究》,《经济研究》第1期。
李书娟、徐现祥,2016:《身份认同与经济增长》,《经济学(季刊)》第3期。
李书娟、徐现祥、戴天仕,2016:《身份认同与夜间灯光亮度》,《世界经济》第8期。
陆铭,2017:《城市、区域和国家发展——空间政治经济学的现在与未来》,《经济学(季刊)》第4期。
罗党论、甄丽明,2008:《民营控制、政治关系与企业融资约束》,《金融研究》第12期。
王贤彬、徐现祥,2008:《地方官员来源、去向、任期与经济增长——来自中国省长省委书记的证据》,《管理世界》第3期。
王贤彬、徐现祥,2010:《地方官员晋升竞争与经济增长》,《经济科学》第6期。
王贤彬、徐现祥,2014:《官员能力与经济发展——来自省级官员个体效应的证据》,《南方经济》第6期。
徐康宁、陈丰龙、刘修岩,2015:《中国经济增长的真实性:基于全球夜间灯光数据的检验》,《经济研究》第5期。
徐现祥、王贤彬、舒元,2007:《地方官员与经济增长》,《经济研究》第9期。
张平、赵国昌、罗知,2012:《中央官员来源与地方经济增长》,《经济学(季刊)》第2期。
张军、高远,2007:《官员任期、异地交流与经济增长》,《经济研究》第11期。
周黎安,2004:《晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因》,《经济研究》第6期。
周黎安,2007:《中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究》,《经济研究》第7期。
Brandt,L.,J.Van Biesebroeck,and Y.Zhang,2012,“Creative Accounting or Creative Destruction?Firm-level Productivity Growth in Chinese Manufacturing”,Journal of Development Economics,97,339—351.
Hodler,R.,and P.A.Raschky,2014,“Regional Favoritism”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,129,995—1033.
Islam,N.,1995,“Growth Empirics:A Panel Data Approach”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,110,1127—1170.
Mankiw,N.G.,D.Romer,and D.N.Weil,1992,“A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,107,407—437.
Rodrik,D.,2012,“Unconditional Convergence in Manufacturing”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,128,165—204.
Yao,Y.,and M.Zhang,2015,“Subnational Leaders and Economic Growth:Evidence from Chinese Cities”,Journal of Economic Growth,20,405—436.
① 大量研究发现,中国省部级领导能够促进其籍贯地的经济增长(张平等,2012;范子英和李欣,2014;李书娟和徐现祥,2016;李书娟等,2016;范子英等,2016)。
② Yao & Zhang(2015)、王贤彬和徐现祥(2014)提出了官员能力假说。
③ 周黎安(2004,2007)提出了官员晋升锦标赛假说。
(1)许多文献以经济增长来度量地区偏爱的程度(Roland & Raschky,2014;李书娟和徐现祥,2016;范子英等,2016)。
(2)根据简历信息,部分省级官员的籍贯地无法落实到县层面。
(3)篇幅所限,没有列出省级官员的籍贯县的具体名单,感兴趣的读者可来信索要。
(4)1998—2013年间,匹配前的样本数为4350179,匹配后的样本数为4123697。
(5)限于篇幅,本文没有报告稳健性检验的具体结果,如果读者有兴趣可以来信索要。
(6)安慰剂检验的具体做法可参考李书娟等(2016)。
(7)省委书记、省长离任后的去向分类同王贤彬和徐现祥(2008)。
(8)对于官员带来资源转移的具体渠道,可能存在多种可能,其中不排除政治关联等因素,深入挖掘具体的影响机制是进一步研究的方向。大量的公司金融文献发现,企业的政治关联对企业会起到正面或者负面的作用,尤其在发展中国家和转轨国家更是如此(罗党论和甄明全,2008)。
(9)李书娟和徐现祥(2016)采用地级样本发现省委书记、省长对其籍贯地GDP增长率有显著影响,大小约为0.5个百分点。
(10)徐康宁等(2015)对夜间灯光亮度度量经济绩效的优势进行了全面考察。
(11)篇幅所限,没有汇报安慰剂检验的结果,感兴趣的读者可来信索要。
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