基于SEIQR演化博弈模型的突发网络舆情传播与控制研究
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摘要
【目的/意义】突发网络舆情具有爆发快、破坏强的特点。准确建立突发网络舆情的传播模型,研究其内在传播规律,对控制突发网络舆情的传播具有重要意义。【方法/过程】建立SEIQR演化博弈模型,将网媒与地方政府的策略互动行为融入改进的传染病模型中,同时针对期望效用理论在描述博弈主体损益方面的缺陷,将前景理论引入模型的分析过程中,探讨了地方政府不同引导策略对舆情发展的影响,并进行仿真实验。【结论/结果】研究结果表明:地方政府对社会效益与形象损失的感知、网媒对地方政府非财政性奖励的感知、罚金以及网民的集体认同感等因素将对突然网络舆情的发展趋势产生重大影响,进而为地方政府部门提出对策建议。
【Purpose/significance】Emergency network public opinion is rapidly outbreak and make strong destruction,It is of great significance to accurately establish the diffusion model of the emergency network public opinion and study its internal diffusion laws for prevention and control of the opinion.【Method/process】We establish the SEIQR evolutionary model,the strategy interaction and behaviour evolution between network media and local government are put into the improved infectious disease diffusion model.Aiming at the defects of the expected utility function in the description of the player's profit, the prospect theory is introduced into the model to analysis the Influence of local government's different strategies on the trend of public opinion, furthermore, a data simulation analysis is made.【Result/conclusion】The results show that: the degree of social benefits and image loss perception for local government, punishment, the degree of reward for network media,and internet users' collective identity are related to the public opinion diffusion.Finally, we put forward suggests for government to control the emergency network public opinion diffusion.
【Purpose/significance】Emergency network public opinion is rapidly outbreak and make strong destruction,It is of great significance to accurately establish the diffusion model of the emergency network public opinion and study its internal diffusion laws for prevention and control of the opinion.【Method/process】We establish the SEIQR evolutionary model,the strategy interaction and behaviour evolution between network media and local government are put into the improved infectious disease diffusion model.Aiming at the defects of the expected utility function in the description of the player's profit, the prospect theory is introduced into the model to analysis the Influence of local government's different strategies on the trend of public opinion, furthermore, a data simulation analysis is made.【Result/conclusion】The results show that: the degree of social benefits and image loss perception for local government, punishment, the degree of reward for network media,and internet users' collective identity are related to the public opinion diffusion.Finally, we put forward suggests for government to control the emergency network public opinion diffusion.
引文
1 Mai M,Nadamoto A,Aramaki E.How do rumors spread during a crisis?[J].International Journal of Web Information Systems,2014,10(4):394-412.
2 Weisbuch G.Bounded confidence and social networks[J].The European Physical Journal B-Condensed Matter and Complex Systems,2004,38(2):339-343.
3 Cho Y G,Junseok Hwang,Daeho Lee.Identification of effective opinion leaders in the diffusion of technological innovation:A social network approach[J].Technological Forecasting&Social Change,2012,79(1):97-106.
4 Daley D J,Kendall D G.Epidemics and Rumours[J].Nature,1964,204(4963):1118-1128.
5 Gruhl D,Guha R,Liben-Nowell D,et al.Information diffusion through blogspace[J].International Conference on World Wide Web,2004,6(2):491-501.
6 Leskovec J,Mcglohon M,Faloutsos C,et al.Cascading Behavior in Large Blog Graphs[J].Sdm,2007,15(1):3-9,56.
7林晓静,庄亚明,孙莉玲.具有饱和接触率的SEIR网络舆情传播模型研究[J].情报杂志,2015,34(3):150-155.
8陈业华,张晓倩.网络突发群体事件网民群体情绪传播模型及仿真研究[J].情报科学,2018,36(3):151-156.
9赵剑华,万克文.基于信息传播模型-SIR传染病模型的社交网络舆情传播动力学模型研究[J].情报科学,2017,35(12):34-38.
10杨志,祁凯.基于”情景-应对”的突发网络舆论事件演化博弈分析[J].情报科学,2018,36(2):30-36,94.
11陈福集,黄江玲.三方博弈视角下的网络舆情演化研究[J].情报科学,2015,33(9):22-26.
12陈婷,曲霏,陈福集.突发事件网络舆情扩散的政府应对仿真描述--基于三方博弈视角[J].图书馆杂志,2017,36(2):79-86,94.
13郭东伟,乌云娜,邹蕴,孟祥燕.基于非理性博弈的舆情传播仿真建模研究[J].自动化学报,2014,40(8):1721-1732.
14宋彪,朱建明,黄启发.基于群集动力学和演化博弈论的网络舆情疏导模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(11):2984-2994.
15韩少春,刘云,张彦超,程辉.基于动态演化博弈论的舆论传播羊群效应[J].系统工程学报,2011,26(2):275-281.
16张润莲,兰月新,王彩华,高秋菊.网络群体性事件演化博弈分析及对策研究[J].图书与情报,2016,36(4):24-30.
17杨尊琦,张琳.网络多方冲突演化博弈行为策略研究[J].情报杂志,2016,35(7):86-94.
18 Tversky A,Kahneman D.Prospect Theory:An Analysis of Decision under Risk[J].Econometrica,1979,47(2):140-170.
19崔金栋,郑鹊,孙硕.基于改良SEIR模型的微博话题式信息传播研究[J].情报科学,2017,35(12):22-27.
20 Friedman D.On economic applications of evolutionary game theory[J].Journal of Evolutionary Economics,1998,8(1):15-43.(责任编辑:孙晓明)
2 Weisbuch G.Bounded confidence and social networks[J].The European Physical Journal B-Condensed Matter and Complex Systems,2004,38(2):339-343.
3 Cho Y G,Junseok Hwang,Daeho Lee.Identification of effective opinion leaders in the diffusion of technological innovation:A social network approach[J].Technological Forecasting&Social Change,2012,79(1):97-106.
4 Daley D J,Kendall D G.Epidemics and Rumours[J].Nature,1964,204(4963):1118-1128.
5 Gruhl D,Guha R,Liben-Nowell D,et al.Information diffusion through blogspace[J].International Conference on World Wide Web,2004,6(2):491-501.
6 Leskovec J,Mcglohon M,Faloutsos C,et al.Cascading Behavior in Large Blog Graphs[J].Sdm,2007,15(1):3-9,56.
7林晓静,庄亚明,孙莉玲.具有饱和接触率的SEIR网络舆情传播模型研究[J].情报杂志,2015,34(3):150-155.
8陈业华,张晓倩.网络突发群体事件网民群体情绪传播模型及仿真研究[J].情报科学,2018,36(3):151-156.
9赵剑华,万克文.基于信息传播模型-SIR传染病模型的社交网络舆情传播动力学模型研究[J].情报科学,2017,35(12):34-38.
10杨志,祁凯.基于”情景-应对”的突发网络舆论事件演化博弈分析[J].情报科学,2018,36(2):30-36,94.
11陈福集,黄江玲.三方博弈视角下的网络舆情演化研究[J].情报科学,2015,33(9):22-26.
12陈婷,曲霏,陈福集.突发事件网络舆情扩散的政府应对仿真描述--基于三方博弈视角[J].图书馆杂志,2017,36(2):79-86,94.
13郭东伟,乌云娜,邹蕴,孟祥燕.基于非理性博弈的舆情传播仿真建模研究[J].自动化学报,2014,40(8):1721-1732.
14宋彪,朱建明,黄启发.基于群集动力学和演化博弈论的网络舆情疏导模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(11):2984-2994.
15韩少春,刘云,张彦超,程辉.基于动态演化博弈论的舆论传播羊群效应[J].系统工程学报,2011,26(2):275-281.
16张润莲,兰月新,王彩华,高秋菊.网络群体性事件演化博弈分析及对策研究[J].图书与情报,2016,36(4):24-30.
17杨尊琦,张琳.网络多方冲突演化博弈行为策略研究[J].情报杂志,2016,35(7):86-94.
18 Tversky A,Kahneman D.Prospect Theory:An Analysis of Decision under Risk[J].Econometrica,1979,47(2):140-170.
19崔金栋,郑鹊,孙硕.基于改良SEIR模型的微博话题式信息传播研究[J].情报科学,2017,35(12):22-27.
20 Friedman D.On economic applications of evolutionary game theory[J].Journal of Evolutionary Economics,1998,8(1):15-43.(责任编辑:孙晓明)