政府边界、政企距离对企业创新的影响研究
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摘要
本文由政府产权边界、行政边界与企业产权边界的交互派生出4种政府管控模式。通过构建政企互动的多主体模型和模拟仿真来检验4种政府管控模式对企业创新活动的影响,结果显示:(1)双向分离模式下,创新投入高,创新绩效好;(2)通过对比"行政固定效应"与"产权固定效应",双向集权管控模式下行政破坏力更强,企业适应力滞后,存在"创新惰性";(3)单向产权管控模式下,随着参数λ值的不断增大,创新投入动力不足,创新绩效偏低;(4)单向行政管控模式下,随着参数ξ的加强,创新投入和创新绩效不断下降,企业自主创新积极性不高。最后,针对不同政府管控模式,提出促进企业创新活动的对策建议。
This paper derives four government-control modes from the interaction of government property-right boundary, administrative boundary and enterprise property-right boundary. Through the construction of a multi-agent model of government-enterprise interaction and simulation to test the impact of the four government-control models on corporate innovation activities, the results show that:(1) under the two-way separation mode, innovation investment is high and innovation performance is good;(2) by comparing the "administrative-fixed effect" and the "property-fixed effect", the administrative destructive power under the two-way-centralized control mode is stronger, the adaptability of enterprises lags behind, and there is "innovation inertia";(3) Under the one-way property-right management mode, with the increase of parameterλ, innovation input is insufficient and innovation performance is low;(4) Under the one-way administrative management mode, with the enhancement of parameter ξ, innovation investment and innovation performance are decreasing, and the initiative of enterprises' independent innovation is not high. Finally, aiming at different government-control modes, proposals for promoting corporate innovation activities are proposed.
This paper derives four government-control modes from the interaction of government property-right boundary, administrative boundary and enterprise property-right boundary. Through the construction of a multi-agent model of government-enterprise interaction and simulation to test the impact of the four government-control models on corporate innovation activities, the results show that:(1) under the two-way separation mode, innovation investment is high and innovation performance is good;(2) by comparing the "administrative-fixed effect" and the "property-fixed effect", the administrative destructive power under the two-way-centralized control mode is stronger, the adaptability of enterprises lags behind, and there is "innovation inertia";(3) Under the one-way property-right management mode, with the increase of parameterλ, innovation input is insufficient and innovation performance is low;(4) Under the one-way administrative management mode, with the enhancement of parameter ξ, innovation investment and innovation performance are decreasing, and the initiative of enterprises' independent innovation is not high. Finally, aiming at different government-control modes, proposals for promoting corporate innovation activities are proposed.
引文
[1] 孙丽丽.关于构建新型政商关系的思考[J].经济问题,2016,(2):32-35.
[2] 江飞涛,耿强,吕大国,等.地区竞争、体制扭曲与产能过剩的形成机理[J].中国工业经济,2012,(6):44-56.
[3] 左惠.论转型期文化产品供给的政府与市场作用边界特征[J].青海师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2008,(2):1-6.
[4] Kuhnle S,Selle P.Government and voluntary organizations:A relational respective [J].Contemporary Sociology,1992,23(4):617-620.
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[6] 潘红波,余明桂.支持之手、掠夺之手与异地并购[J].经济研究,2011,(9):108-120.
[7] 李世刚,尹恒.寻租导致的人才误配置的社会成本有多大?[J].经济研究,2014,(7):56-66.
[8] Lu H,Tan Y,Huang H.Why do venture capital firms exist:An institution-based rent-seeking perspective and Chinese evidence [J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2013,309(3):921-936.
[9] 栾强,罗守贵.R&D资助、企业创新和技术进步—基于国有企业与民营企业对比的实证研究[J].科学学研究,2017,35(4):625-632.
[10] 李玲,陶厚永.纵容之手、引导之手与企业自主创新:基于股权性质分组的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2013,16(3):69-79,88.
[11] 汤吉军,张壮.国有企业的创新障碍与现实选择[J].江汉论坛,2017,(7):5-10.
[12] 李莉,顾春霞,于嘉懿.高管政治晋升对国有企业创新投资的影响研究[J].2018,,36(2):342-35,360.
[13] Helbing D,Yu W,Opp K-D,et al.Conditions for the emergence of shared norms in populations with incompatible preferences [J].PLOS ONE,2014,9(8):1-14.
[14] 董晓庆,赵坚,袁朋伟.国有企业创新效率损失研究[J].中国工业经济,2014,(2):97 -108.
[15] 北大国发院课题组.“新型政商关系”研究报告—给企业家的七点建议[EB/OL].http://www.rmlt.com.cn/2016/0428/424542.shtml.2016-04-28.
① “强产权”本文中主要是指由于在经济领域政府处于主导地位,除了拥有产权之外,还拥有超越产权之外的资源支配权、处置权等权力。
[2] 江飞涛,耿强,吕大国,等.地区竞争、体制扭曲与产能过剩的形成机理[J].中国工业经济,2012,(6):44-56.
[3] 左惠.论转型期文化产品供给的政府与市场作用边界特征[J].青海师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2008,(2):1-6.
[4] Kuhnle S,Selle P.Government and voluntary organizations:A relational respective [J].Contemporary Sociology,1992,23(4):617-620.
[5] 李政,任妍.“新常态”下民营企业的创新驱动发展战略[J].理论学刊,2015,(10):32-39.
[6] 潘红波,余明桂.支持之手、掠夺之手与异地并购[J].经济研究,2011,(9):108-120.
[7] 李世刚,尹恒.寻租导致的人才误配置的社会成本有多大?[J].经济研究,2014,(7):56-66.
[8] Lu H,Tan Y,Huang H.Why do venture capital firms exist:An institution-based rent-seeking perspective and Chinese evidence [J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2013,309(3):921-936.
[9] 栾强,罗守贵.R&D资助、企业创新和技术进步—基于国有企业与民营企业对比的实证研究[J].科学学研究,2017,35(4):625-632.
[10] 李玲,陶厚永.纵容之手、引导之手与企业自主创新:基于股权性质分组的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2013,16(3):69-79,88.
[11] 汤吉军,张壮.国有企业的创新障碍与现实选择[J].江汉论坛,2017,(7):5-10.
[12] 李莉,顾春霞,于嘉懿.高管政治晋升对国有企业创新投资的影响研究[J].2018,,36(2):342-35,360.
[13] Helbing D,Yu W,Opp K-D,et al.Conditions for the emergence of shared norms in populations with incompatible preferences [J].PLOS ONE,2014,9(8):1-14.
[14] 董晓庆,赵坚,袁朋伟.国有企业创新效率损失研究[J].中国工业经济,2014,(2):97 -108.
[15] 北大国发院课题组.“新型政商关系”研究报告—给企业家的七点建议[EB/OL].http://www.rmlt.com.cn/2016/0428/424542.shtml.2016-04-28.
① “强产权”本文中主要是指由于在经济领域政府处于主导地位,除了拥有产权之外,还拥有超越产权之外的资源支配权、处置权等权力。