供给侧改革下激发企业家创新的微观机制与制度选择
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摘要
新古典经济学并没有一个特别令人注目的企业家理论。企业家只是类似于劳动、资本等生产要素,对企业的贡献并没有什么独特之处。究其原因,是源于新古典经济模型是一个完全理性和完全信息的经济人模型,通过相对价格机制就会实现帕累托最优,因而看不到市场经济中企业家的创新行为。一旦摒弃完全理性和完全知识这一苛刻假设,将不确定性和沉淀成本置于经济分析中心就会发现,滞后、寡头垄断、敲竹杠、承诺升级等严重阻碍企业家的创新行为。激发企业家创新热情、营造良好的制度环境的关键在于加强沉淀成本与不确定性管理,使市场在配置企业家创新资源起决定性作用和更好地发挥政府作用,这对于深化供给侧结构性改革具有重要的现实意义。
Neoclassical economics does not have a particularly striking entrepreneurial theory. Entrepreneurs are just like production factors such as labor and capital, and there is nothing unique about their contribution to the enterprises. The reason is that the neoclassical economic model is a model of economic man with complete rationality and complete information. The Pareto optimality can be achieved through the relative price mechanism, so the entrepreneurs' innovative behavior in the market economy cannot be seen. Once the harsh assumptions of complete rationality and complete information are abandoned, and the uncertainty and precipitation costs are placed in the center of economic analysis, it will find that lag, oligopoly, rip-off, commitment to upgrade, etc., seriously hinder entrepreneurs' innovative behavior. Through analysis, we know that we should create a good institutional environment in order to stimulate entrepreneurial innovation and enthusiasm, the key is to strengthen the management of sedimentation costs and uncertainty, so that the market plays a decisive role in the allocation of entrepreneurial innovation resources and can make full use of the government, and it has important practical significance in deepening supply-side structural reform.
Neoclassical economics does not have a particularly striking entrepreneurial theory. Entrepreneurs are just like production factors such as labor and capital, and there is nothing unique about their contribution to the enterprises. The reason is that the neoclassical economic model is a model of economic man with complete rationality and complete information. The Pareto optimality can be achieved through the relative price mechanism, so the entrepreneurs' innovative behavior in the market economy cannot be seen. Once the harsh assumptions of complete rationality and complete information are abandoned, and the uncertainty and precipitation costs are placed in the center of economic analysis, it will find that lag, oligopoly, rip-off, commitment to upgrade, etc., seriously hinder entrepreneurs' innovative behavior. Through analysis, we know that we should create a good institutional environment in order to stimulate entrepreneurial innovation and enthusiasm, the key is to strengthen the management of sedimentation costs and uncertainty, so that the market plays a decisive role in the allocation of entrepreneurial innovation resources and can make full use of the government, and it has important practical significance in deepening supply-side structural reform.
引文
[1]张维迎.经济学原理[M].西安:西北大学出版社,2015.
[2]BAUMOL,W.J.The Free-Market Innovation Machine:Analyzing the Growth Miracle of Capitalism[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,2002.
[3]KNIGHT,F.Risk,Uncertainty and Profit[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1921.
[4]SPULBER,D.F.Unlocking Techonology:Antitrust and Innovation[J].Journal of Competition Law and Economics,2008,4(4):915-966.
[5]COASE,R.H.The Nature of the Firm[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1937,4(16):386-405.
[6]BLAIR,M.M.Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm[C].M.M.Blair and M.J.Roe(eds),Employment and Corporate Governance,Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution Press,1999.
[7]魏尔汉.企业家的经济作用和社会责任[M].雷立柏等,译.上海:华东师范大学出版社,2011.
[8]BAUMOL,W.J.Entrepreneurship in Economic Theory[J].American Economic Review,1968,58(2):64-71.
[9]史普博.企业理论——企业家、企业、市场与组织内生化的微观经济学[M].贺小刚等,译.上海:格致出版社、上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2014.
[10]WILLIAMSON,O.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism:Firms,Markets,Relational Contracting[M].New York:Free Press,1985.
[11]DAVIDSON,P.Reality and Economic Theory[J].Journal of Post Keynesian Economics,1996,18(4):479-508.
[12]STIGLER,J.The Organization of Industry[M].Homewood:Richard D.Irwin,1968.
[13]斯旺.创新经济学[M].韦倩译.上海:格致出版社、上海人民出版社,2013.
[14]SAMUELSON,P.A.Wages and Interest:A Modern Dissection of Marxian Models[J].American Economic Review,1957,47(6):884-912.
[15]MIKAMI,K.Market Power and the Form of Enterprise:Capitalist Firms,Worker-Owned Firms and Consumer Cooperatives[J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2003,52(4):533-552.
[16]DOW,G.K.and PUTTERMAN,L.Why Capital Suppliers(Usually)Hires Workers:What We Know and What We Need to Know[J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2000,43(3):319-336.
[17]DAVID,P.A.Clio and the Economics of QWERTY[J].American Economic Review,1985,75(2):332-337.
[18]MICHAEL,S.Tansaction Cost Entrepreneurship[J].Journal of Business Venture,2007,22(3):412-426.
[19]LEVINE,M.E.Price Discrimination without Market Power[J].Yale Journal on Regulation,2002,19(1):1-36.
(1)实际上,不算那些“企业家就是所有者”的情况,我们还有无数的仅仅管理别人企业的企业家,今天他们被称为“经理”(managers)。他们的作用就是原来意义上的企业家。我们前面就已经说过,企业家的角色不一定意味着他拥有这家企业。企业家的作用与所有权似乎没有太密切的关系[7]。
(1)对于sunk cost的理解和翻译较为混乱,但就笔者长期研究得知,它有两层涵义:一层是针对资源充分流动性而言,提出潜在意义上的预期沉淀成本,这是大多数主流经济学家研究的重点,往往等价于资产专用性、不可逆投资或专用性投资等概念;另一层是指过去已经发生意义上的沉淀成本,亦可称为沉没成本效应,往往不被主流经济学家所研究,却被行为经济学家所关注。本文则是在潜在或预期意义上来研究沉淀成本问题的。
[2]BAUMOL,W.J.The Free-Market Innovation Machine:Analyzing the Growth Miracle of Capitalism[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,2002.
[3]KNIGHT,F.Risk,Uncertainty and Profit[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1921.
[4]SPULBER,D.F.Unlocking Techonology:Antitrust and Innovation[J].Journal of Competition Law and Economics,2008,4(4):915-966.
[5]COASE,R.H.The Nature of the Firm[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1937,4(16):386-405.
[6]BLAIR,M.M.Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm[C].M.M.Blair and M.J.Roe(eds),Employment and Corporate Governance,Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution Press,1999.
[7]魏尔汉.企业家的经济作用和社会责任[M].雷立柏等,译.上海:华东师范大学出版社,2011.
[8]BAUMOL,W.J.Entrepreneurship in Economic Theory[J].American Economic Review,1968,58(2):64-71.
[9]史普博.企业理论——企业家、企业、市场与组织内生化的微观经济学[M].贺小刚等,译.上海:格致出版社、上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2014.
[10]WILLIAMSON,O.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism:Firms,Markets,Relational Contracting[M].New York:Free Press,1985.
[11]DAVIDSON,P.Reality and Economic Theory[J].Journal of Post Keynesian Economics,1996,18(4):479-508.
[12]STIGLER,J.The Organization of Industry[M].Homewood:Richard D.Irwin,1968.
[13]斯旺.创新经济学[M].韦倩译.上海:格致出版社、上海人民出版社,2013.
[14]SAMUELSON,P.A.Wages and Interest:A Modern Dissection of Marxian Models[J].American Economic Review,1957,47(6):884-912.
[15]MIKAMI,K.Market Power and the Form of Enterprise:Capitalist Firms,Worker-Owned Firms and Consumer Cooperatives[J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2003,52(4):533-552.
[16]DOW,G.K.and PUTTERMAN,L.Why Capital Suppliers(Usually)Hires Workers:What We Know and What We Need to Know[J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2000,43(3):319-336.
[17]DAVID,P.A.Clio and the Economics of QWERTY[J].American Economic Review,1985,75(2):332-337.
[18]MICHAEL,S.Tansaction Cost Entrepreneurship[J].Journal of Business Venture,2007,22(3):412-426.
[19]LEVINE,M.E.Price Discrimination without Market Power[J].Yale Journal on Regulation,2002,19(1):1-36.
(1)实际上,不算那些“企业家就是所有者”的情况,我们还有无数的仅仅管理别人企业的企业家,今天他们被称为“经理”(managers)。他们的作用就是原来意义上的企业家。我们前面就已经说过,企业家的角色不一定意味着他拥有这家企业。企业家的作用与所有权似乎没有太密切的关系[7]。
(1)对于sunk cost的理解和翻译较为混乱,但就笔者长期研究得知,它有两层涵义:一层是针对资源充分流动性而言,提出潜在意义上的预期沉淀成本,这是大多数主流经济学家研究的重点,往往等价于资产专用性、不可逆投资或专用性投资等概念;另一层是指过去已经发生意义上的沉淀成本,亦可称为沉没成本效应,往往不被主流经济学家所研究,却被行为经济学家所关注。本文则是在潜在或预期意义上来研究沉淀成本问题的。