基于考核模式分类的公共组织绩效考核政治性研究
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摘要
在对考核模式进行分类的基础上,以CNKI数据库2004至2016年间研究公共组织绩效考核政治性的文献为样本,运用内容分析和文献计量分析方法概括了绩效考核政治性的内涵、表现形式与成因。绩效考核政治性在顾客主导型绩效考核中体现为考核主体基于情绪和利益考虑抬高或者压低考核结果,在科层制主导型绩效考核中体现为上级根据特定需要纵容抬高考核结果的政治性行为,通过分配考核权力或者设计考核工具抬高考核结果。考核对象通过提供虚假绩效信息或者开展印象管理抬高考核结果存在于两种绩效考核模式中。考核主体独立性不够、利益相关者的压力、行为主体之间的信任程度低、监管难度大、考核对象赢取政绩竞争的压力是绩效考核政治性的主要成因。
The article has analyzed the concept,manifestations and its causes of public organization performance appraisal politics( PAP) through the classification of assessment models,the method of content analysis,and biometric analysis,sampling on the literature from China National Knowledge Infrastructure database between 2004 and 2016. The PAP is embodied in either customer-dominant performance appraisal or bureaucracy-dominant one. As the former one,the PAP was described that the rater raises or lowers the appraisal results according to his emotions or interest. As the later one,the PAP was defined that the superior will raise appraisal results according to specific considerations by allocating assessment power or designing assessment tools. It's necessary to point out that,the rater objects can raise appraisal results by providing false information or executing impression management. The article also has summarized the cause of PAP as the insufficient independence of raters,the pressure from related stakeholders,and low level of trust between related bodies,the difficulty in supervision,and the pressure from performance competition.
The article has analyzed the concept,manifestations and its causes of public organization performance appraisal politics( PAP) through the classification of assessment models,the method of content analysis,and biometric analysis,sampling on the literature from China National Knowledge Infrastructure database between 2004 and 2016. The PAP is embodied in either customer-dominant performance appraisal or bureaucracy-dominant one. As the former one,the PAP was described that the rater raises or lowers the appraisal results according to his emotions or interest. As the later one,the PAP was defined that the superior will raise appraisal results according to specific considerations by allocating assessment power or designing assessment tools. It's necessary to point out that,the rater objects can raise appraisal results by providing false information or executing impression management. The article also has summarized the cause of PAP as the insufficient independence of raters,the pressure from related stakeholders,and low level of trust between related bodies,the difficulty in supervision,and the pressure from performance competition.
引文
[1]秦晓蕾.地方政府绩效评估中的有效公民参与:责任与信任的交换正义——以南京市“万人评议机关”15年演化历程为例[J].中国行政管理,2017(2).
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[3]Ferris G R,Judge T. A. Personnel Human Resources Management:A Political Influence Perspective. Journal of Management,1991,17(2).
[4]王利平,金淑霞.组织政治研究回顾与展望[J].经济管理,2009,31(5).
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[7]Poon J. M. L. Effects of performance appraisal politics on job satisfaction and turnover intention. Personnel Review,2004,33(3).
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[9]赵书松.绩效考核政治性对个体知识共享行为影响的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2012,15(3).
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[13]吴建南,高小平.行风评议:公众参与的政府绩效评价研究进展与未来框架[J].中国行政管理,2006(4).
[14]胡春萍,吴建南,杨宇谦.试论行风评议中的“黑箱”及对策[J].西北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2009,39(3).
[15]倪星,李佳源.政府绩效的公众主观评价模式:有效,抑或无效?[J].中国人民大学学报,2010(4).
[16]曾莉,李佳源,李民政.公共服务绩效评价中公众参与的效度研究[J].管理评论,2015,27(3).
[17]付景涛,曾莉.对主观型政府绩效评估结果的统计分析[J].学术论文,2010(2).
[18]付景涛,黄辉.企业参与地方政府绩效评估的机会和空间[J].中国行政管理,2013(3).
[19]付景涛.主观型政府绩效评估结果的控制方式研究[J].武汉理工大学学报(社会科学版),2011,24(6).
[20]马亮,于文轩.第三方公共服务绩效评价的评价:一项比较案例研究[J].南京社会科学,2013(5).
[21]徐艳晴,周志忍.公民满意度数据失真考察:信任赤字、博弈策略、理论意涵[J].公共行政评论,2014(6).
[22]吴建南,岳妮.利益相关性是否影响评价结果客观性:基于模拟实验的绩效评价主体选择研究[J].管理评论,2007,19(3).
[23]吴建南,刘佳.地方政府绩效评估中的利益相关者与绩效数据[J].华东经济管理,2011,25(4).
[24]吴建南,杨宇谦.公共服务评价中的组织“迎评策略”研究[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会社科版),2009,62(5).
[25]阎波,吴建南.目标责任制下的绩效问责与印象管理[J].中州学刊,2013(12).
[26]阎波,吴建南.问责、组织政治知觉与印象管理[J].管理评论,2013,25(11).
[27]倪星.反思中国政府绩效评估实践[J].中山大学学报(社科版),2008,48(3).
[28]范柏乃,余有贤,程宏伟.影响政府绩效评估误差的因素及其对策研究[J].软科学,2005,19(4):33-39.
[29]盛明科,刘叶.政府绩效信息失真机制及规避路径研究[J].湘潭大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2014,38(3).
[30]周志忍,徐艳晴.绩效评估中的博弈行为及其致因研究:国际文献综述[J].中国行政管理,2014(11).
[31]徐艳晴,周志忍.地方政府绩效评估中博弈行为的致因研究[J].上海行政学院学报,2015,16(4).
[32]蔡立辉,刘晓洋.政府绩效评估中的博弈及其影响[J].社会科学战线,2016(3).
[33]Russ D S. Reducing organizational politics in performance appraisal:The role of coaching leaders for age-diverse employees. Human Resource Management,2017,56(5).
[34]何文盛,王炎,蔡明君.政府绩效评估结果偏差探析:基于一种三维视角[J].中国行政管理,2013(1).
[35]何文盛,姜雅婷,蔡明君.我国地方政府绩效评估结果偏差探析:基于PV-GPG模型的分析[J].中国行政管理,2014(10).
[36]Mi1ambres J. G. Motivation through goal setting. Journal of Economic Psychology,2012,33(6).
[37]王永贵,张言彩.元分析方法中国内外经济管理研究中的应用比较[J].经济管理,2012,34(4).
[2]Longenecker C. O. On the politics of performance appraisal:A Quality study of executives as raters. Academy of Management Journal,1986,49(8).
[3]Ferris G R,Judge T. A. Personnel Human Resources Management:A Political Influence Perspective. Journal of Management,1991,17(2).
[4]王利平,金淑霞.组织政治研究回顾与展望[J].经济管理,2009,31(5).
[5]Longenecker C. O. Truth or consequence politics and performance appraisals. Business Horizon,1989,32(62).
[6]Tziner A,Latham G. P,Price B. S,Haccoun R. Development and validation of a questionnaire for measuring perceived political considerations in performance appraisal. Journal of Organizational and Behavior,1996,17(2).
[7]Poon J. M. L. Effects of performance appraisal politics on job satisfaction and turnover intention. Personnel Review,2004,33(3).
[8]陈云云,张一驰.绩效评估中的政治性考虑——基于内容分析的中国情境研究[J].管理评论,2008,20(9).
[9]赵书松.绩效考核政治性对个体知识共享行为影响的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2012,15(3).
[10]赵君,张光进,赵书松.绩效考核政治研究述评与展望[J].经济管理,2015,37(6).
[11]Selvarajan T. T,Cloninger P. A. Can performance appraisals motivate employee to improve performance? A Mexican study. International Journal of Human Resource Management,2012,23(15).
[12]吴建南,庄秋爽.自下而上评价政府绩效探索:公民评议政府的得失分析[J].理论与改革,2004(5).
[13]吴建南,高小平.行风评议:公众参与的政府绩效评价研究进展与未来框架[J].中国行政管理,2006(4).
[14]胡春萍,吴建南,杨宇谦.试论行风评议中的“黑箱”及对策[J].西北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2009,39(3).
[15]倪星,李佳源.政府绩效的公众主观评价模式:有效,抑或无效?[J].中国人民大学学报,2010(4).
[16]曾莉,李佳源,李民政.公共服务绩效评价中公众参与的效度研究[J].管理评论,2015,27(3).
[17]付景涛,曾莉.对主观型政府绩效评估结果的统计分析[J].学术论文,2010(2).
[18]付景涛,黄辉.企业参与地方政府绩效评估的机会和空间[J].中国行政管理,2013(3).
[19]付景涛.主观型政府绩效评估结果的控制方式研究[J].武汉理工大学学报(社会科学版),2011,24(6).
[20]马亮,于文轩.第三方公共服务绩效评价的评价:一项比较案例研究[J].南京社会科学,2013(5).
[21]徐艳晴,周志忍.公民满意度数据失真考察:信任赤字、博弈策略、理论意涵[J].公共行政评论,2014(6).
[22]吴建南,岳妮.利益相关性是否影响评价结果客观性:基于模拟实验的绩效评价主体选择研究[J].管理评论,2007,19(3).
[23]吴建南,刘佳.地方政府绩效评估中的利益相关者与绩效数据[J].华东经济管理,2011,25(4).
[24]吴建南,杨宇谦.公共服务评价中的组织“迎评策略”研究[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会社科版),2009,62(5).
[25]阎波,吴建南.目标责任制下的绩效问责与印象管理[J].中州学刊,2013(12).
[26]阎波,吴建南.问责、组织政治知觉与印象管理[J].管理评论,2013,25(11).
[27]倪星.反思中国政府绩效评估实践[J].中山大学学报(社科版),2008,48(3).
[28]范柏乃,余有贤,程宏伟.影响政府绩效评估误差的因素及其对策研究[J].软科学,2005,19(4):33-39.
[29]盛明科,刘叶.政府绩效信息失真机制及规避路径研究[J].湘潭大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2014,38(3).
[30]周志忍,徐艳晴.绩效评估中的博弈行为及其致因研究:国际文献综述[J].中国行政管理,2014(11).
[31]徐艳晴,周志忍.地方政府绩效评估中博弈行为的致因研究[J].上海行政学院学报,2015,16(4).
[32]蔡立辉,刘晓洋.政府绩效评估中的博弈及其影响[J].社会科学战线,2016(3).
[33]Russ D S. Reducing organizational politics in performance appraisal:The role of coaching leaders for age-diverse employees. Human Resource Management,2017,56(5).
[34]何文盛,王炎,蔡明君.政府绩效评估结果偏差探析:基于一种三维视角[J].中国行政管理,2013(1).
[35]何文盛,姜雅婷,蔡明君.我国地方政府绩效评估结果偏差探析:基于PV-GPG模型的分析[J].中国行政管理,2014(10).
[36]Mi1ambres J. G. Motivation through goal setting. Journal of Economic Psychology,2012,33(6).
[37]王永贵,张言彩.元分析方法中国内外经济管理研究中的应用比较[J].经济管理,2012,34(4).