高管持股促进企业研发投资了么?——基于套现行为视角的观察
|
摘要
高管股权激励不仅有利于解决第一类代理问题,而且对企业研发投资活动也有促进作用(利益协同效应),被视为保持企业竞争优势的重要途径。本文选择高管套现这个特殊情境,从静态和动态双重视角观察投资迎合行为对利益协同效应的影响。研究发现,发生高管套现的上市公司,企业研发投资的增加是投资迎合效应和利益协同效应的共同作用结果,两种效应之间存在着一定的互补关系。值得注意的是,套现情境下增强的利益协同效应大大提升了企业非效率投资。因而,企业在实施股权激励机制的时候不应当忽视高管自利动机对研发投资活动的影响。
Executive equity incentive is an indispensable mechanism to eliminate the agency problem,and the effect of executive stock ownership on the promotion of R&D investment (interest cooperation) is regarded as an important way to keep the competitive advantage of enterprises. This paper chooses the special situation of executive cash,and observes the effect of the investment catering on interest cooperation effect from static and dynamic double visual angle. The conclusion is that the increase of R&D investment in listed corporation which executives cashed is the result of the effect of investment catering and the interest cooperation,and there is a certain complementary relationship between the two effects. It is worth noting that,under the situation of executives' cashing behavior,enhanced synergy of interests led to the inefficient investment of enterprises. Therefore,enterprise should not ignore the influence of executive self motivation on R&D investment activities in the implementation of equity incentive mechanism.
Executive equity incentive is an indispensable mechanism to eliminate the agency problem,and the effect of executive stock ownership on the promotion of R&D investment (interest cooperation) is regarded as an important way to keep the competitive advantage of enterprises. This paper chooses the special situation of executive cash,and observes the effect of the investment catering on interest cooperation effect from static and dynamic double visual angle. The conclusion is that the increase of R&D investment in listed corporation which executives cashed is the result of the effect of investment catering and the interest cooperation,and there is a certain complementary relationship between the two effects. It is worth noting that,under the situation of executives' cashing behavior,enhanced synergy of interests led to the inefficient investment of enterprises. Therefore,enterprise should not ignore the influence of executive self motivation on R&D investment activities in the implementation of equity incentive mechanism.
引文
[1]Dosi G.Sources,procedures,and microeconomic effect of innovation[J].Journal of Economic Literature,1988,26(3):1120-1171.
[2]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Capital Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,76(3):305-360.
[3]Balkin D B,Gomez-Mejia L R.Is Ceo Pay In HighTechnology Firms Related To Innovation?[J].Academy of Management Journal,2000,43(6):1118-1129.
[4]Wu J,Tu R.CEO stock option pay and R&D spending:a behavioral agency explanation[J].Journal of Business Research,2007,60(5):482-492.
[5]Cheng S.R&D expenditures and CEO compensation[J].Accounting Review,2004,79(2):305-328.
[6]王文华,张卓,季小立.高管持股与研发投资:利益趋同效应还是管理防御效应?---基于高新技术上市公司的实证研究[J].研究与发展管理,2014,26(4).
[7]朱迪星,市场情绪、研发投入与企业实际投资:基于迎合渠道视角的实证研究[J].科技进步与对策,2011,28(9):75-79.
[8]倪德锋.内部人股权激励对企业R&D投入强度的影响---基于中国A股上市公司的实证研究[J].江西社会科学,2018(6):227-233.
[9]Bebchuk L A,Fried J M.Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,17(3):71-92.
[10]Bertrand M,Mullainathan S.Enjoying the Quiet Life?Corporate Governance and Managerial Control[J].Journal of Political Economy,2003,111(5):1043-1075.
[11]韩亮亮,李凯,宋力.高管持股与企业价值:基于利益趋同效应与壕沟防守效应的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,2006,9(4):35-41.
[12]Narayanan,M.P.Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results[J].Journal of Finance,1985,40(40):1469-84.
[13]Baber W R,Fairfield P M,Haggard J A.The Effect of concern about Reported Income on Discretionary Spending Decisions:The Case of Research and Development[J].Accounting Review,1991,66(4):818-829.
[14]刘运国,刘雯.我国上市公司的高管任期与R&D支出[J].管理世界,2007(1):128-136.
[15]Phillips K L,Wrase J.Is Schumpeterian“creative destruction”a plausible source of endogenous real business cycle shocks?[J].Journal of Economic Dynamics&Control,2006,30(11):1885-1913.
[16]Morck R,Wolfenzon D,Bernard Y.Corporate Governance,Economic Entrenchment,and Growth[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2005,43(3):655-720.
[17]唐清泉,夏芸,徐欣.我国企业高管股权激励与研发投资---基于内生性视角的研究[J].中国会计评论,2011(1):21-42.
[18]Dong M,Hirshleifer D A,Teoh S H.Stock Market Misvaluation and Corporate Investment[J].Ssrn Electronic Journal,2007,25(12):3645-3683.
[19]Bolton P,Xiong W,Scheinkman J A.Executive Compensation and Short-termist Behavior in Speculative Markets[J].Review of Economic Studies,2003,73(3):577-610.
[20]Polk C,Sapienza P.The Stock Market and Investment:a Test of Catering Theory[J].Plos One,2006,10(4):1377-82.
[21]Polk C,Sapienza P.The Stock Market and Corporate Investment:A Test of Catering Theory[J].Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(1):187-217.
[22]Baker M,Wurgler J.Appearing and disappearing dividends:The link to catering incentives[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2004,73(2):271-288.
[23]Richardson S.Over-Investment of Free Cash Flow[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2006,11(2):159-189.
[2]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Capital Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,76(3):305-360.
[3]Balkin D B,Gomez-Mejia L R.Is Ceo Pay In HighTechnology Firms Related To Innovation?[J].Academy of Management Journal,2000,43(6):1118-1129.
[4]Wu J,Tu R.CEO stock option pay and R&D spending:a behavioral agency explanation[J].Journal of Business Research,2007,60(5):482-492.
[5]Cheng S.R&D expenditures and CEO compensation[J].Accounting Review,2004,79(2):305-328.
[6]王文华,张卓,季小立.高管持股与研发投资:利益趋同效应还是管理防御效应?---基于高新技术上市公司的实证研究[J].研究与发展管理,2014,26(4).
[7]朱迪星,市场情绪、研发投入与企业实际投资:基于迎合渠道视角的实证研究[J].科技进步与对策,2011,28(9):75-79.
[8]倪德锋.内部人股权激励对企业R&D投入强度的影响---基于中国A股上市公司的实证研究[J].江西社会科学,2018(6):227-233.
[9]Bebchuk L A,Fried J M.Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,17(3):71-92.
[10]Bertrand M,Mullainathan S.Enjoying the Quiet Life?Corporate Governance and Managerial Control[J].Journal of Political Economy,2003,111(5):1043-1075.
[11]韩亮亮,李凯,宋力.高管持股与企业价值:基于利益趋同效应与壕沟防守效应的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,2006,9(4):35-41.
[12]Narayanan,M.P.Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results[J].Journal of Finance,1985,40(40):1469-84.
[13]Baber W R,Fairfield P M,Haggard J A.The Effect of concern about Reported Income on Discretionary Spending Decisions:The Case of Research and Development[J].Accounting Review,1991,66(4):818-829.
[14]刘运国,刘雯.我国上市公司的高管任期与R&D支出[J].管理世界,2007(1):128-136.
[15]Phillips K L,Wrase J.Is Schumpeterian“creative destruction”a plausible source of endogenous real business cycle shocks?[J].Journal of Economic Dynamics&Control,2006,30(11):1885-1913.
[16]Morck R,Wolfenzon D,Bernard Y.Corporate Governance,Economic Entrenchment,and Growth[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2005,43(3):655-720.
[17]唐清泉,夏芸,徐欣.我国企业高管股权激励与研发投资---基于内生性视角的研究[J].中国会计评论,2011(1):21-42.
[18]Dong M,Hirshleifer D A,Teoh S H.Stock Market Misvaluation and Corporate Investment[J].Ssrn Electronic Journal,2007,25(12):3645-3683.
[19]Bolton P,Xiong W,Scheinkman J A.Executive Compensation and Short-termist Behavior in Speculative Markets[J].Review of Economic Studies,2003,73(3):577-610.
[20]Polk C,Sapienza P.The Stock Market and Investment:a Test of Catering Theory[J].Plos One,2006,10(4):1377-82.
[21]Polk C,Sapienza P.The Stock Market and Corporate Investment:A Test of Catering Theory[J].Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(1):187-217.
[22]Baker M,Wurgler J.Appearing and disappearing dividends:The link to catering incentives[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2004,73(2):271-288.
[23]Richardson S.Over-Investment of Free Cash Flow[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2006,11(2):159-189.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |