需求扰动下生产规模不经济闭环供应链的应急渠道决策
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摘要
针对生产规模不经济闭环供应链,在突发事件干扰其产品的市场需求发生扰动的情况下,比较研究了各类回收渠道分散式决策系统和集中式决策系统的应急均衡决策及契约协调问题。结果表明:当需求的扰动程度不大时,各类系统正常运营环境下新产品的订购量和废旧品的回收量等均衡决策均具鲁棒性,当需求的扰动程度较大时,各类系统均应按其扰动方向调整正常运营环境下制定的均衡决策;制造商回收渠道分散式决策系统中其获得的利润和系统的总利润均高于零售商回收渠道分散式决策系统的,且制造商会利用更高比例的废旧品生产再造品,因此其应直接回收废旧品;各企业的利润和系统的总利润均随生产规模不经济弹性系数的增加而降低;设计的应急收益费用共享契约可协调解决各类回收渠道分散式决策系统中存在的"双重边际效应"问题,且各企业可通过讨价还价确定收益费用共享比例的取值来获得帕累托改进的利润。
Considering the product process faces diseconomies of scales and the product demand can be disrupted for many reasons,we analyze the emergency channel decisions of closed-loop supply with production diseconomies under demand disruptions.Two decentralized decision models are given with manufacturer and retailer as collector respectively,and the results about the two models are compared to give the effective collecting structure.Furthermore,emergency revenue and expense sharing contracts are designed to coordinate the member's independent decision-making behavior in the two decentralized systems to improve their efficiency.The simulated analysis method is combined to examine the results and it is found that if the demand disruption is small,ordering quantity of new products and collecting quantity of used products in normal operation state have some robustness,if the demand disruption is large,they should be adjusted along the same direction with the disruption.In addition to this,the "double marginalization"problems in decentralized decision systems of two collection channels can be solved by the designed emergency revenue and expense sharing contracts.Meanwhile,each member can determine sharing proportion by bargaining to get improved Pareto profits.The numerical examples also analyze the impacts of demand disruptions,diseconomy coefficients and sharing proportion on equilibrium decisions.The results show that manufacturer's profits and system's total profits in decentralized decision system of manufacturer collection channel are greater than that in retailer collection channel system,and manufacturer make use of recycling products with higher proportion to produce remanufactured products.So,manufacturer prefers to collect used products directly.And the profits of each member and system decrease with the increase of diseconomy coefficient.These results provide some references for emergency equilibrium decisions and channel choice.
Considering the product process faces diseconomies of scales and the product demand can be disrupted for many reasons,we analyze the emergency channel decisions of closed-loop supply with production diseconomies under demand disruptions.Two decentralized decision models are given with manufacturer and retailer as collector respectively,and the results about the two models are compared to give the effective collecting structure.Furthermore,emergency revenue and expense sharing contracts are designed to coordinate the member's independent decision-making behavior in the two decentralized systems to improve their efficiency.The simulated analysis method is combined to examine the results and it is found that if the demand disruption is small,ordering quantity of new products and collecting quantity of used products in normal operation state have some robustness,if the demand disruption is large,they should be adjusted along the same direction with the disruption.In addition to this,the "double marginalization"problems in decentralized decision systems of two collection channels can be solved by the designed emergency revenue and expense sharing contracts.Meanwhile,each member can determine sharing proportion by bargaining to get improved Pareto profits.The numerical examples also analyze the impacts of demand disruptions,diseconomy coefficients and sharing proportion on equilibrium decisions.The results show that manufacturer's profits and system's total profits in decentralized decision system of manufacturer collection channel are greater than that in retailer collection channel system,and manufacturer make use of recycling products with higher proportion to produce remanufactured products.So,manufacturer prefers to collect used products directly.And the profits of each member and system decrease with the increase of diseconomy coefficient.These results provide some references for emergency equilibrium decisions and channel choice.
引文
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[15]公彦德,达庆利,占济舟.基于处理基金和拆解补贴的电器电子产品CLSC研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(6):97-105.
[16]Miao Zhaowei,Fu Ke,Xia Zhiqiang,et al.Models for closed-loop supply chain with trade-ins[J].Omega,2017,66:308-326.
[17]Li Hui,Wang Chuanxu,Xu Lang,et al.Emission reduction,pricing and collection decisions and coordination in low-carbon closed-loop supply chain with hybrid collecting channel[J].Boletín Técnico,2017,55(6):233-247.
[18]Li Yongjian,Zhen Xueping,Qi Xiangtong,et al.Penalty and financial assistance in a supply chain with supply disruption[J].Omega,2016,61:167-181.
[19]Qi Xiangtong,Bard J F,Yu Gang.Supply chain coordination with demand disruptions[J].Omega,2004,32(4):301-312.
[20]覃艳华,曹细玉,陈本松.努力弹性系数与成本同时扰动的闭环供应链协调应对研究[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(5):41-47.
[21]孙嘉轶,滕春贤,姚锋敏.需求扰动下闭环供应链回收决策及协调策略[J].系统工程学报,2017,32(5):699-709.
[22]Huo Liangan,Jiang Jiehui,Zhao Yuping,et al.Risk averse closed-loop supply chain coordination mechanism with rebate and penalty contracts under emergency events[J].Application Research of Computers,2017,34(1):31-35.
[23]Wu Haiyan,Han Xiaohua,Yang Qianxia,et al.Production and coordination decisions in a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing cost disruptions when retailers compete[J].Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing,2018,29(1):227-235.
[24]Han Xiaohua,Wu Haiyan,Yang Qianxia,et al.Reverse channel selection under remanufacturing risks:Balancing profitability and robustness[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2016,182:63-72.
[25]Han Xiaohua,Wu Haiyan,Yang Qianxia,et al.Collection channel and production decisions in a closedloop supply chain with remanufacturing cost disruption[J].International Journal of Production Research,2017,55(4):1147-1167.
[26]Huang Yanting,Wang Zongjun.Dual-recycling channel decision in a closed-loop supply chain with cost disruptions[J].Sustainability,2017,9(11):2004.
[27]Orsdemir A,Kemahlioglu-Ziya E,Parlaktürk A K.Competitive quality choice and remanufacturing[J].Production&Operations Management,2014,23(1):48-64.
[28]Bakal I S,Akcali E.Effects of random yield in remanufacturing with price-sensitive supply and demand[J].Production&Operations Management,2006,15(3):407-420.
[29]Cachon G P,Lariviere M A.Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts:Strengths and limitations[J].Management Science,2005,51(1):30-44.
[30]Cachon G P.Supply chain coordination with contracts[J].Handbooks in Operations Research&Management Science,2003,11(11):227-339.
[2]Mollick A V.Production smoothing in the Japanese vehicle industry[J].International Journal of Production E-conomics,2004,91(1):63-74.
[3]赵海霞,艾兴政,滕颖.基于制造商规模不经济的链与链竞争数量折扣合同选择[J].管理工程学报,2013,27(4):110-118.
[4]赵海霞,艾兴政,唐小我.链与链基于规模不经济的纵向联盟和利润分享[J].管理科学学报,2014,17(1):48-56.
[5]Ha A Y,Tong Shilu,Zhang Hongtao.Sharing demand information in competing supply chains with production diseconomies[J].Mathematics of Operations Research,2011,57(3):566-581.
[6]Shang Weixin,Ha A Y,Tong Shilu.Information sharing in a supply chain with a common retailer[J].Management Science Journal of the Institute for Operations Research&the Management Sciences,2016,62(1):245-263.
[7]王先甲,周亚平,钱桂生.生产商规模不经济的双渠道供应链协调策略选择[J].管理科学学报,2017,20(1):17-31.
[8]聂佳佳,石纯来.规模不经济对制造商开通直销渠道的影响[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(2):68-75.
[9]Geyer R,Wassenhove L N V,Atasu A.The economics of remanufacturing under limited component durability and finite product life cycles[J].Management Science,2007,53(1):88-100.
[10]Takahashi K,Doi Y,Hirotani D,et al.An adaptive pull strategy for remanufacturing systems[J].Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing,2014,25(4):629-645.
[11]Savaskan R C,Bhattacharya S,Wassenhove L N V.Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing[J].Management Science,2004,50(2):239-252.
[12]Atasu A,Toktay L B,Wassenhove L N V.How collection cost structure drives a manufacturer's reverse channel choice[J].Production&Operations Management,2013,22(5):1089-1102.
[13]Hong Xianpei,Xu Lei,Du Peng,et al.Joint advertising,pricing and collection decisions in a closed-loop supply chain[J].International Journal of Production E-conomics,2015,167:12-22.
[14]卢荣花,李南.电子产品闭环供应链回收渠道选择研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(7):1687-1695.
[15]公彦德,达庆利,占济舟.基于处理基金和拆解补贴的电器电子产品CLSC研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(6):97-105.
[16]Miao Zhaowei,Fu Ke,Xia Zhiqiang,et al.Models for closed-loop supply chain with trade-ins[J].Omega,2017,66:308-326.
[17]Li Hui,Wang Chuanxu,Xu Lang,et al.Emission reduction,pricing and collection decisions and coordination in low-carbon closed-loop supply chain with hybrid collecting channel[J].Boletín Técnico,2017,55(6):233-247.
[18]Li Yongjian,Zhen Xueping,Qi Xiangtong,et al.Penalty and financial assistance in a supply chain with supply disruption[J].Omega,2016,61:167-181.
[19]Qi Xiangtong,Bard J F,Yu Gang.Supply chain coordination with demand disruptions[J].Omega,2004,32(4):301-312.
[20]覃艳华,曹细玉,陈本松.努力弹性系数与成本同时扰动的闭环供应链协调应对研究[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(5):41-47.
[21]孙嘉轶,滕春贤,姚锋敏.需求扰动下闭环供应链回收决策及协调策略[J].系统工程学报,2017,32(5):699-709.
[22]Huo Liangan,Jiang Jiehui,Zhao Yuping,et al.Risk averse closed-loop supply chain coordination mechanism with rebate and penalty contracts under emergency events[J].Application Research of Computers,2017,34(1):31-35.
[23]Wu Haiyan,Han Xiaohua,Yang Qianxia,et al.Production and coordination decisions in a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing cost disruptions when retailers compete[J].Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing,2018,29(1):227-235.
[24]Han Xiaohua,Wu Haiyan,Yang Qianxia,et al.Reverse channel selection under remanufacturing risks:Balancing profitability and robustness[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2016,182:63-72.
[25]Han Xiaohua,Wu Haiyan,Yang Qianxia,et al.Collection channel and production decisions in a closedloop supply chain with remanufacturing cost disruption[J].International Journal of Production Research,2017,55(4):1147-1167.
[26]Huang Yanting,Wang Zongjun.Dual-recycling channel decision in a closed-loop supply chain with cost disruptions[J].Sustainability,2017,9(11):2004.
[27]Orsdemir A,Kemahlioglu-Ziya E,Parlaktürk A K.Competitive quality choice and remanufacturing[J].Production&Operations Management,2014,23(1):48-64.
[28]Bakal I S,Akcali E.Effects of random yield in remanufacturing with price-sensitive supply and demand[J].Production&Operations Management,2006,15(3):407-420.
[29]Cachon G P,Lariviere M A.Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts:Strengths and limitations[J].Management Science,2005,51(1):30-44.
[30]Cachon G P.Supply chain coordination with contracts[J].Handbooks in Operations Research&Management Science,2003,11(11):227-339.
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