官员交流与地方政府职能转变——以地区招商引资为例
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摘要
中央对地方的考核已从"唯GDP"逐步过渡到"把民生改善、社会进步、生态效益等指标和实绩作为重要考核内容,再也不能简单以国内生产总值增长率来论英雄"。而是否将地区GDP增长率作为考核指标会直接影响地方政府的招商引资行为,进而影响地方政府职能的发挥。官员交流制度是中央针对地方官员治理的一项重要制度安排,其能否在转变地方政府职能方面发挥积极作用?为了回答这一问题,文章以2008-2015年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,以上市公司股权投资和政府补助的相关关系作为地方政府招商引资行为的衡量指标,分析了官员交流制度对地区招商引资行为的影响以检验其有效性。研究结果表明:第一,官员交流制度的实施可以有效抑制企业通过股权投资获得政府补助的行为;第二,无论是垂直交流官员还是横向交流官员,其任期越长、地区资源禀赋越好,上述抑制作用越明显;第三,官员交流可以显著抵减政府补助对企业业绩的负向效应。文章证实了官员交流制度能在一定程度上正确引导地方政府的招商引资行为,有助于实现地方政府职能的转变。
Government functions should serve the national strategy,and should change as the national strategy changes. In the early stage of Chinese reform and opening-up,the national strategy must be centeredon economic constructions. To achieve this goal,the arrangement of fiscal decentralization and political centralization assessment play a positive role; local officials launch a "promotion championship" to achieve economic growth. Under this system,China's economy has achieved rapid development over the past more than30 years. However,behind the rapid economic development,there are a lot of hidden dangers;many regional governments pay too much attention to attract as much capital as possible. This would lead to the imbalance between economic development and social public service supply,breed local sectarianism and official corruption,and would deviate seriously from the intrinsic motivation of the decentralization system. The 19 th session of the National People's Congress pointed out that China's economic model has shifted from the high-speed development stage to the high-quality development stage. Thus,the national overall strategy should be transformed into the development idea of advocating innovation,coordination,and green,opening and sharing while stressing economic construction. Therefore,the government's functional objectives will also shift from a single economic goal to diversity goals,including economic,social,political,etc. In the process of transformation,how to coordinate the relationship between economic goals and other objectives,and how to balance the relationship between officials' performance assessment and the government's comprehensive evaluation are important contents in the "new normal economy". In the governance mechanisms,the officials transfer system is an important arrangement for the central government to coordinate regional development and implement the strategic intention of regional development. However,can it play a substantial role in practical application? In this paper,we select 11 076 observations between 2008-2015 from the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market in China as our samples,analyze the relationship between corporate investment and government subsidies,and test whether the officials transfer arrangement can play a regulation role above them. As a result,we find that:first,the more the listed companies invest,the more government subsidies they will receive;second,for both vertical and horizontal transfer officials,when the term is longer or the area is more developed,the inhibition function will be more obvious;third,the government subsidy obtained through equity investment has a significant negative impact on enterprise performance,but the officials transfer system can restrain the local government rentseeking behavior to some extent. The contributions of this article lie in that:First,the existing literature on the officials transfer system mainly focuses on the economic development,the party style construction and so on,while our paper empirically analyzes the regulation role of the local officials transfer system from the perspective of regional investment behaviors,and also helps to identify and evaluate the influence of local officials on economic development. Thus,we not only enrich the research of relevant literature,but also help to understand the intention of the central government to allocate local administration consciously. Second,from the perspective of investment,our paper expounds that different types of officials transfer to the same place,the same type of officials transfer to different places,and the roles played by the local government to the economic development are different,thus reflecting the function that the official plays should be based on a certain area of resources endowment as a prerequisite. Third,the conclusions of this paper further support the idea which our central government promotes the "reduction of government direct intervention in micro-economy" in recent years,and help to better understand how to optimize the relationship between governments and enterprises.
Government functions should serve the national strategy,and should change as the national strategy changes. In the early stage of Chinese reform and opening-up,the national strategy must be centeredon economic constructions. To achieve this goal,the arrangement of fiscal decentralization and political centralization assessment play a positive role; local officials launch a "promotion championship" to achieve economic growth. Under this system,China's economy has achieved rapid development over the past more than30 years. However,behind the rapid economic development,there are a lot of hidden dangers;many regional governments pay too much attention to attract as much capital as possible. This would lead to the imbalance between economic development and social public service supply,breed local sectarianism and official corruption,and would deviate seriously from the intrinsic motivation of the decentralization system. The 19 th session of the National People's Congress pointed out that China's economic model has shifted from the high-speed development stage to the high-quality development stage. Thus,the national overall strategy should be transformed into the development idea of advocating innovation,coordination,and green,opening and sharing while stressing economic construction. Therefore,the government's functional objectives will also shift from a single economic goal to diversity goals,including economic,social,political,etc. In the process of transformation,how to coordinate the relationship between economic goals and other objectives,and how to balance the relationship between officials' performance assessment and the government's comprehensive evaluation are important contents in the "new normal economy". In the governance mechanisms,the officials transfer system is an important arrangement for the central government to coordinate regional development and implement the strategic intention of regional development. However,can it play a substantial role in practical application? In this paper,we select 11 076 observations between 2008-2015 from the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market in China as our samples,analyze the relationship between corporate investment and government subsidies,and test whether the officials transfer arrangement can play a regulation role above them. As a result,we find that:first,the more the listed companies invest,the more government subsidies they will receive;second,for both vertical and horizontal transfer officials,when the term is longer or the area is more developed,the inhibition function will be more obvious;third,the government subsidy obtained through equity investment has a significant negative impact on enterprise performance,but the officials transfer system can restrain the local government rentseeking behavior to some extent. The contributions of this article lie in that:First,the existing literature on the officials transfer system mainly focuses on the economic development,the party style construction and so on,while our paper empirically analyzes the regulation role of the local officials transfer system from the perspective of regional investment behaviors,and also helps to identify and evaluate the influence of local officials on economic development. Thus,we not only enrich the research of relevant literature,but also help to understand the intention of the central government to allocate local administration consciously. Second,from the perspective of investment,our paper expounds that different types of officials transfer to the same place,the same type of officials transfer to different places,and the roles played by the local government to the economic development are different,thus reflecting the function that the official plays should be based on a certain area of resources endowment as a prerequisite. Third,the conclusions of this paper further support the idea which our central government promotes the "reduction of government direct intervention in micro-economy" in recent years,and help to better understand how to optimize the relationship between governments and enterprises.
引文
[1]步丹璐,狄灵瑜.治理环境、股权投资与政府补助[J].金融研究,2017,(10):193-206.
[2]步丹璐,黄杰.企业寻租与政府的利益输送——基于京东方的案例分析[J].中国工业经济,2013,(6):135-147.
[3]陈刚,李树.官员交流、任期与反腐败[J].世界经济,2012,(2):120-142.
[4]陈晓,李静.地方政府财政行为在提升上市公司业绩中的作用探析[J].会计研究,2001,(12):20-28.
[5]陈绪群,赵立群.试论实行领导干部交流制度的理论依据[J].党建研究,1996,(4):31-33.
[6]付文林,沈坤荣.均等化转移支付与地方财政支出结构[J].经济研究,2012,(5):45-57.
[7]郭剑花,杜兴强.政治联系、预算软约束与政府补助的配置效率——基于中国民营上市公司的经验研究[J].金融研究,2011,(2):114-128.
[8]过勇.集体腐败:一种危险的不良趋势[J].人民论坛,2008,(20):38-39.
[9]洪银兴.地方政府行为和中国市场经济的发展[J].经济学家,1997,(1):42-50.
[10]姜少勇.警惕腐败新动向:腐败犯罪群体化[J].廉政瞭望,2007,(1):42-43.
[11]金智.官员异地交流、政绩诉求与公司会计政策选择[J].会计研究,2013,(11):31-37.
[12]李敬涛.财政分权、信息公开与官员腐败——基于宏微观制度环境的双重考察[J].会计与经济研究,2016,(5):25-44.
[13]陆铭,李爽.社会资本、非正式制度与经济发展[J].管理世界,2008,(9):161-165.
[14]潘红波,周颖,陈世来.地方官员任期考核与企业盈余管理[J].会计与经济研究,2018,(5):3-26.
[15]王文剑.中国的财政分权与地方政府规模及其结构——基于经验的假说与解释[J].世界经济文汇,2010,(5):105-119.
[16]王小鲁,樊纲.中国地区差距的变动趋势和影响因素[J].经济研究,2004,(1):33-44.
[17]魏建,王安.反腐败水平的决定:官员交流与独立性[J].经济与管理研究,2014,(11):98-107.
[18]徐现祥,李郇,王美今.区域一体化、经济增长与政治晋升[J].经济学(季刊),2007,(4):1075-1096.
[19]徐现祥,王贤彬,舒元.地方官员与经济增长——来自中国省长、省委书记交流的证据[J].经济研究,2007,(9):18-31.
[20]杨海生,陈少凌,罗党论,等.政策不稳定性与经济增长——来自中国地方官员变更的经验证据[J].管理世界,2014,(9):13-28.
[21]张军,高远.官员任期、异地交流与经济增长——来自省级经验的证据[J].经济研究,2007,(11):91-103.
[22]周黎安,罗凯.企业规模与创新:来自中国省级水平的经验证据[J].经济学(季刊),2005,(2):623-638.
[23]朱红军,何贤杰,陈信元.金融发展、预算软约束与企业投资[J].会计研究,2006,(10):64-71.
[24]邹薇,钱雪松.融资成本、寻租行为和企业内部资本配置[J].经济研究,2005,(5):64-74.
[25]Bebchuk L A,Stole L A.Do short-term objectives lead to under-or overinvestment in long-term projects[J].Journal of Finance,1993,48(2):719-729.
[26]Chen C J P,Li Z Q,Su X J,et al.Rent-seeking incentives,corporate political connections,and the control structure of private firms:Chinese evidence[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):229-243.
[27]Faccio M,Masulis R W,Mcconnell J J.Political connections and corporate bailouts[J].Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2597-2635.
[28]Huang Y S.Managing Chinese bureaucrats:An institutional economics perspective[J].Political Studies,2002,50(1):61-79.
[29]Shleifer A.State versus private ownership[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,1998,12(4):133-150.
[30]Zhang J J,Keh H T.Interorganizational exchanges in China:Organizational forms and governance mechanisms[J].Management and Organization Review,2010,6(1):123-147.
(1)见中国新闻网。我们手工整理了历届人大会议对于经济建设的定位和具体指标,限于篇幅未列示,如有需要可向作者索取。
(1)见十九大报告。
(2)根据人民网相关资料整理而得。
(3)如鼓励发展服装产业,在工程建设方面出台各项减免政策,为新疆企业IPO、再融资开辟绿色通道,借助资本市场实现跨越式增长;成立新疆发展商会,加大对外宣传力度,促进新疆与内地的交往交流,鼓励内地企业到新疆投资、旅游以促进新疆的繁荣发展。
(4)见中华人民共和国商务部网站。
(1)摘自十一届三中全会会议报告。
(1)见十八大报告。
(2)见十九大报告。
(3)见十九大报告。
(1)即职位低者回避职位较高者。
(2)即后任命者回避任职在先者。
(3)即晚辈回避尊亲长辈。
(4)即官员品阶不变,仅改调其他地区或部门。
(5)该规定明确指出:“为了推进干部交流工作,进一步优化领导班子机构,提高领导干部的素质和能力,加强党风廉政建设,促进经济社会发展,根据《中华人民共和国公务员法》、《党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例》和有关法律法规,制定本规定。”交流的对象主要是下列人员:(1)因工作需要交流的;(2)需要通过锻炼提高领导能力的;(3)在一个地区或者部门工作时间较长的;(4)按照规定需要回避的;(5)其他原因需要交流的。
(1)http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71591/4855056.html。
(1)http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64094/11445260.html。
(2)见湖南省人民政府网站。
(1)见湖北省人民政府网站。
(2)http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0515/c117092-29275304.html。
(3)http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/102565/182144/10994167。
(1)原观察数为14 006,由于本文回归采用滞后一期值,参与回归的样本数为11 076。
(2)本文主要针对省委书记的异地交流,虽然不能代表“政府”的全部,但在中国条块管理的模式下,领导决策体制又强调“一元化”领导,我们认为其作为一个省的第一领导人,对于辖区的政治影响力应该是最大的。
(1)为了更直接地反映股权投资是政企联系的桥梁,我们以CSMAR数据库数据为基础,结合《中国统计年鉴》,分地区手工统计了长期股权投资净增加额(以省为单位),并与该地区获得的政府补助额进行匹配,利用模型(1)再次回归。
(2)表6的回归结果同论文“治理环境、股权投资与政府补助”(本文作者2017年10月发表在《金融研究》上),因与本文内容密切相关,所以再次列出。
(3)表头括号内为样本数,下表同。
[2]步丹璐,黄杰.企业寻租与政府的利益输送——基于京东方的案例分析[J].中国工业经济,2013,(6):135-147.
[3]陈刚,李树.官员交流、任期与反腐败[J].世界经济,2012,(2):120-142.
[4]陈晓,李静.地方政府财政行为在提升上市公司业绩中的作用探析[J].会计研究,2001,(12):20-28.
[5]陈绪群,赵立群.试论实行领导干部交流制度的理论依据[J].党建研究,1996,(4):31-33.
[6]付文林,沈坤荣.均等化转移支付与地方财政支出结构[J].经济研究,2012,(5):45-57.
[7]郭剑花,杜兴强.政治联系、预算软约束与政府补助的配置效率——基于中国民营上市公司的经验研究[J].金融研究,2011,(2):114-128.
[8]过勇.集体腐败:一种危险的不良趋势[J].人民论坛,2008,(20):38-39.
[9]洪银兴.地方政府行为和中国市场经济的发展[J].经济学家,1997,(1):42-50.
[10]姜少勇.警惕腐败新动向:腐败犯罪群体化[J].廉政瞭望,2007,(1):42-43.
[11]金智.官员异地交流、政绩诉求与公司会计政策选择[J].会计研究,2013,(11):31-37.
[12]李敬涛.财政分权、信息公开与官员腐败——基于宏微观制度环境的双重考察[J].会计与经济研究,2016,(5):25-44.
[13]陆铭,李爽.社会资本、非正式制度与经济发展[J].管理世界,2008,(9):161-165.
[14]潘红波,周颖,陈世来.地方官员任期考核与企业盈余管理[J].会计与经济研究,2018,(5):3-26.
[15]王文剑.中国的财政分权与地方政府规模及其结构——基于经验的假说与解释[J].世界经济文汇,2010,(5):105-119.
[16]王小鲁,樊纲.中国地区差距的变动趋势和影响因素[J].经济研究,2004,(1):33-44.
[17]魏建,王安.反腐败水平的决定:官员交流与独立性[J].经济与管理研究,2014,(11):98-107.
[18]徐现祥,李郇,王美今.区域一体化、经济增长与政治晋升[J].经济学(季刊),2007,(4):1075-1096.
[19]徐现祥,王贤彬,舒元.地方官员与经济增长——来自中国省长、省委书记交流的证据[J].经济研究,2007,(9):18-31.
[20]杨海生,陈少凌,罗党论,等.政策不稳定性与经济增长——来自中国地方官员变更的经验证据[J].管理世界,2014,(9):13-28.
[21]张军,高远.官员任期、异地交流与经济增长——来自省级经验的证据[J].经济研究,2007,(11):91-103.
[22]周黎安,罗凯.企业规模与创新:来自中国省级水平的经验证据[J].经济学(季刊),2005,(2):623-638.
[23]朱红军,何贤杰,陈信元.金融发展、预算软约束与企业投资[J].会计研究,2006,(10):64-71.
[24]邹薇,钱雪松.融资成本、寻租行为和企业内部资本配置[J].经济研究,2005,(5):64-74.
[25]Bebchuk L A,Stole L A.Do short-term objectives lead to under-or overinvestment in long-term projects[J].Journal of Finance,1993,48(2):719-729.
[26]Chen C J P,Li Z Q,Su X J,et al.Rent-seeking incentives,corporate political connections,and the control structure of private firms:Chinese evidence[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):229-243.
[27]Faccio M,Masulis R W,Mcconnell J J.Political connections and corporate bailouts[J].Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2597-2635.
[28]Huang Y S.Managing Chinese bureaucrats:An institutional economics perspective[J].Political Studies,2002,50(1):61-79.
[29]Shleifer A.State versus private ownership[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,1998,12(4):133-150.
[30]Zhang J J,Keh H T.Interorganizational exchanges in China:Organizational forms and governance mechanisms[J].Management and Organization Review,2010,6(1):123-147.
(1)见中国新闻网。我们手工整理了历届人大会议对于经济建设的定位和具体指标,限于篇幅未列示,如有需要可向作者索取。
(1)见十九大报告。
(2)根据人民网相关资料整理而得。
(3)如鼓励发展服装产业,在工程建设方面出台各项减免政策,为新疆企业IPO、再融资开辟绿色通道,借助资本市场实现跨越式增长;成立新疆发展商会,加大对外宣传力度,促进新疆与内地的交往交流,鼓励内地企业到新疆投资、旅游以促进新疆的繁荣发展。
(4)见中华人民共和国商务部网站。
(1)摘自十一届三中全会会议报告。
(1)见十八大报告。
(2)见十九大报告。
(3)见十九大报告。
(1)即职位低者回避职位较高者。
(2)即后任命者回避任职在先者。
(3)即晚辈回避尊亲长辈。
(4)即官员品阶不变,仅改调其他地区或部门。
(5)该规定明确指出:“为了推进干部交流工作,进一步优化领导班子机构,提高领导干部的素质和能力,加强党风廉政建设,促进经济社会发展,根据《中华人民共和国公务员法》、《党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例》和有关法律法规,制定本规定。”交流的对象主要是下列人员:(1)因工作需要交流的;(2)需要通过锻炼提高领导能力的;(3)在一个地区或者部门工作时间较长的;(4)按照规定需要回避的;(5)其他原因需要交流的。
(1)http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71591/4855056.html。
(1)http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64094/11445260.html。
(2)见湖南省人民政府网站。
(1)见湖北省人民政府网站。
(2)http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0515/c117092-29275304.html。
(3)http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/102565/182144/10994167。
(1)原观察数为14 006,由于本文回归采用滞后一期值,参与回归的样本数为11 076。
(2)本文主要针对省委书记的异地交流,虽然不能代表“政府”的全部,但在中国条块管理的模式下,领导决策体制又强调“一元化”领导,我们认为其作为一个省的第一领导人,对于辖区的政治影响力应该是最大的。
(1)为了更直接地反映股权投资是政企联系的桥梁,我们以CSMAR数据库数据为基础,结合《中国统计年鉴》,分地区手工统计了长期股权投资净增加额(以省为单位),并与该地区获得的政府补助额进行匹配,利用模型(1)再次回归。
(2)表6的回归结果同论文“治理环境、股权投资与政府补助”(本文作者2017年10月发表在《金融研究》上),因与本文内容密切相关,所以再次列出。
(3)表头括号内为样本数,下表同。
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