政府推广政策与新能源汽车需求:来自上海的证据
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摘要
本文采用上海市2016年1月至2018年5月125个新能源乘用车车型的月度销量数据,研究财政补贴和免费专用牌照两项政策对新能源汽车需求的影响。使用嵌套Logit需求模型估计得到两个政策变量在效用函数中的参数,并通过反事实分析推断不同的政策组合对新能源汽车需求的影响。研究发现:样本期内新能源乘用车45.57%的销量由两项推广政策同时作用所致;若仅使用一项政策,免费专用牌照政策可贡献样本期内43.09%的销量,而财政补贴政策仅贡献4.85%的销量;两项推广政策贡献了插电式混合动力乘用车以及纯电动乘用车各自50%以上的销量,但对其他类型新能源乘用车的影响很小。以上结果表明,政府推广政策的完全退出很可能导致需求的大幅下降。本文建议包括上海市在内的限牌限行城市在调整推广政策时,应继续保持免费专用牌照对新能源汽车需求的拉动作用,在此前提下,可以考虑财政补贴的加速退坡或完全退出;此外,应推动动力电池和充电桩行业的加速发展,通过降低新能源汽车的生产成本及使用成本,最终突破新能源汽车推广应用的瓶颈。
This paper studied the impact of two promotion policies including fiscal subsidy and free license plate on the demand of new-energy vehicles(NEVs hereafter) based on 125 passenger vehicle models' monthly sales data from January 2016 to May 2018 in Shanghai. We used nested logit demand model to estimate the parameters of these two policies in consumers' utility function, and inferred the effects of different policy combinations on NEV demand by counterfactual analysis. Results show that 45.57% of the total sales during the sample period are induced by these two promotion policies. Separately, free license plate policy could induce43.09% of the total sales while fiscal subsidy policy could induce only 4.85%. The two promotion policies induce more than 50% of the sales of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and battery electric vehicles, but have small effects on other types of NEVs. These results indicate that the demand of NEVs could probably drop sharply if these government promotion policies are completely withdrawn in the future. We suggest that those cities with driving restriction policies including Shanghai should keep on using the free license plate policy to support NEV demand,and under this condition, the withdrawal of subsidy programs in these cities could be taken into consideration.Meanwhile, in order to break through the bottlenecks of NEV promotion and application finally, the development of power battery and charging station industries should be accelerated to lower the NEV production cost and using cost.
This paper studied the impact of two promotion policies including fiscal subsidy and free license plate on the demand of new-energy vehicles(NEVs hereafter) based on 125 passenger vehicle models' monthly sales data from January 2016 to May 2018 in Shanghai. We used nested logit demand model to estimate the parameters of these two policies in consumers' utility function, and inferred the effects of different policy combinations on NEV demand by counterfactual analysis. Results show that 45.57% of the total sales during the sample period are induced by these two promotion policies. Separately, free license plate policy could induce43.09% of the total sales while fiscal subsidy policy could induce only 4.85%. The two promotion policies induce more than 50% of the sales of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and battery electric vehicles, but have small effects on other types of NEVs. These results indicate that the demand of NEVs could probably drop sharply if these government promotion policies are completely withdrawn in the future. We suggest that those cities with driving restriction policies including Shanghai should keep on using the free license plate policy to support NEV demand,and under this condition, the withdrawal of subsidy programs in these cities could be taken into consideration.Meanwhile, in order to break through the bottlenecks of NEV promotion and application finally, the development of power battery and charging station industries should be accelerated to lower the NEV production cost and using cost.
引文
[1]高秀平,彭月兰.我国新能源汽车财税政策效应与时变研究---基于A股新能源汽车上市公司的实证分析[J].经济问题,2018,(1):111-115.
[2]何文韬,肖兴志.新能源汽车产业推广政策对汽车企业专利活动的影响---基于企业专利申请与专利转化的研究[J].当代财经,2017,(5):103-114.
[3]李礼,杨楚婧.财政货币政策联动对新能源汽车消费的影响研究[J].科技管理研究,2017,(13):30-35.
[4]李兆友,齐晓东,刘妍.新能源汽车产业政府R&D补贴效果的实证研究[J].东北大学学报(社会科学版),2017,(4):356-370.
[5]孙晓华,徐帅.政府补贴对新能源汽车购买意愿的影响研究[J].大连理工大学学报(社会科学版),2018,(5):8-16.
[6]王皓.新产品定位决策对市场结构的影响---基于中国轿车行业产品层面数据的实证分析[J].中国工业经济,2016,(5):57-74.
[7]王维,李昊展,乔朋华,桂嘉华.政府补助方式对新能源汽车企业绩效影响研究---基于企业成长性的深入分析[J].科技进步与对策,2017,(34):114-120.
[8]肖俊极,谭诗羽.中国乘用车行业的纵向一体化与横向共谋实证分析[J].经济学(季刊),2016,(4):1387-1408.
[9]熊勇清,陈曼琳.新能源汽车市场需求培育的政策取向:供给侧抑或需求侧[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,(5):129-137.
[10]熊勇清,李小龙.新能源汽车产业供需双侧政策对潜在消费者的影响[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018,(6):52-62.
[11]熊勇清,黄恬恬,苏燕妮.新能源汽车消费促进政策对制造商激励效果的差异性---“政府采购”与“消费补贴”比较视角[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2018,(2):33-41.
[12]张长令,马犇,杜玖玉.市场开放、资金补贴与新兴产业市场演化---以新能源汽车产业为例[J].上海经济研究,2016,(5):47-57.
[13]Beresteanu,A.,and S.Li.Gasoline Price,Government Support,and Demand for Hybrid Vehicles in the United States[J].International Economic Review,2011,52(1):161-182.
[14]Berry,S.Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation[J].RAND Journal of Economics,1994,25(2):242-262.
[15]Berry,S.,J.Levinsohn,and A.Pakes.Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium[J].Econometrica,1995,60(4):841-890.
[16]Cardell,N.Variance Components Structures for the Extreme-Value and Logistic Distributions with Application to Models of Heterogeneity[J].Econometric Theory,1997,13(2):185-213.
[17]Dai,M.,and Y.Yuan.Product Differentiation and Efficiencies in the Retail Banking Industry[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2013,37(12):4907-4919.
[18]Deng,H.,and A.Ma.Market Structure and Pricing Strategy of China’s Automobile Industry[J].Journal of Industrial Economics,2010,58(4):818-845.
[19]Dick,A.Demand Estimation and Consumer Welfare in the Banking Industry[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2008,32(8):1661-1676.
[20]Ho,C.Market Structure,Welfare,and Banking Reform in China[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2012,40(2):291-313.
[21]Shen,C.The Effect of Major U.S.Domestic Airline Code Sharing and Profit Sharing Rule[J].Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,2017,26(3):590-609.
[22]Xiao,J.,X.Zhou,and W.Hu.Welfare Analysis of the Vehicle Quota System in China[J].International Economic Review,2017,58(2):617-650.
[23]Zhang,Y.,Z.Qian,F.Sprei,and B.Li.The Impact of Car Specifications,Prices and Incentives for Battery Electric Vehicles in Norway:Choices of Heterogeneous Consumers[J].Transportation Research Part C,2016,(69):386-401.
[24]Zhou,X.Welfare Analysis of Tacit Coordination in the U.S.Airline Industry[J].Frontiers of Economics in China,2017,12(1):66-93.
[25]Zhou,X.,C.Shen,Y.Wang,and J.Xiao.Tariff Protection,Product Differentiation and Market Conduct[R].SSRN Working Paper,2017.
(1)参见中国汽车工业协会网站(http://www.caam.org.cn)。
(1)具体的补贴金额计算方法见2018年2月13日财政部发布的《关于调整完善新能源汽车推广应用财政补贴政策的通知》。
(1)单位距离行驶成本,这个变量反映了消费者在做出购买决策时,对不同车型的行驶成本的衡量,这里需要把收集到的新能源汽车的百公里耗油量和百公里耗电量,按照每款新能源汽车的能源消耗特点进行计算,并整理成以人民币换算的每公里行驶成本。
(2)由于以轿车作为基准类,因此“是否轿车”这个变量在回归时不出现,工具变量的构造也就不包含该变量。
(1)文献中认为这一假设能够成立的原因是厂商先生产出来汽车,即汽车的产品特征Xj包括马力、车重、车型类型等都被决定了以后,消费者才购买和使用该产品,然后才能给出对其产品质量和口碑的评价,即ξj,也就是说Xj是先于ξj决定的,因此,可以作出不可观察到的产品特征ξj均值独立于可观察到的产品特征Xj的假设。当然,这一假设是有争论的,比如,现实中厂商可以根据消费者对产品质量和口碑的评价ξj来调整产品特征Xj,此时两者就不能很好地满足独立的假定。谢谢匿名审稿人指出这一点。正因如此,有些文献还会使用来自厂商生产或成本方面的信息,例如,投入要素价格等构造工具变量,这种工具变量能更好地满足外生性的要求。本文暂且没有找到这方面理想的工具变量,在后续研究中会继续加以关注以构造更好的工具变量。
(2)具体结果请参见《中国工业经济》网站(http://www.ciejournal.org)公开附件。
[2]何文韬,肖兴志.新能源汽车产业推广政策对汽车企业专利活动的影响---基于企业专利申请与专利转化的研究[J].当代财经,2017,(5):103-114.
[3]李礼,杨楚婧.财政货币政策联动对新能源汽车消费的影响研究[J].科技管理研究,2017,(13):30-35.
[4]李兆友,齐晓东,刘妍.新能源汽车产业政府R&D补贴效果的实证研究[J].东北大学学报(社会科学版),2017,(4):356-370.
[5]孙晓华,徐帅.政府补贴对新能源汽车购买意愿的影响研究[J].大连理工大学学报(社会科学版),2018,(5):8-16.
[6]王皓.新产品定位决策对市场结构的影响---基于中国轿车行业产品层面数据的实证分析[J].中国工业经济,2016,(5):57-74.
[7]王维,李昊展,乔朋华,桂嘉华.政府补助方式对新能源汽车企业绩效影响研究---基于企业成长性的深入分析[J].科技进步与对策,2017,(34):114-120.
[8]肖俊极,谭诗羽.中国乘用车行业的纵向一体化与横向共谋实证分析[J].经济学(季刊),2016,(4):1387-1408.
[9]熊勇清,陈曼琳.新能源汽车市场需求培育的政策取向:供给侧抑或需求侧[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,(5):129-137.
[10]熊勇清,李小龙.新能源汽车产业供需双侧政策对潜在消费者的影响[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018,(6):52-62.
[11]熊勇清,黄恬恬,苏燕妮.新能源汽车消费促进政策对制造商激励效果的差异性---“政府采购”与“消费补贴”比较视角[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2018,(2):33-41.
[12]张长令,马犇,杜玖玉.市场开放、资金补贴与新兴产业市场演化---以新能源汽车产业为例[J].上海经济研究,2016,(5):47-57.
[13]Beresteanu,A.,and S.Li.Gasoline Price,Government Support,and Demand for Hybrid Vehicles in the United States[J].International Economic Review,2011,52(1):161-182.
[14]Berry,S.Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation[J].RAND Journal of Economics,1994,25(2):242-262.
[15]Berry,S.,J.Levinsohn,and A.Pakes.Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium[J].Econometrica,1995,60(4):841-890.
[16]Cardell,N.Variance Components Structures for the Extreme-Value and Logistic Distributions with Application to Models of Heterogeneity[J].Econometric Theory,1997,13(2):185-213.
[17]Dai,M.,and Y.Yuan.Product Differentiation and Efficiencies in the Retail Banking Industry[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2013,37(12):4907-4919.
[18]Deng,H.,and A.Ma.Market Structure and Pricing Strategy of China’s Automobile Industry[J].Journal of Industrial Economics,2010,58(4):818-845.
[19]Dick,A.Demand Estimation and Consumer Welfare in the Banking Industry[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2008,32(8):1661-1676.
[20]Ho,C.Market Structure,Welfare,and Banking Reform in China[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2012,40(2):291-313.
[21]Shen,C.The Effect of Major U.S.Domestic Airline Code Sharing and Profit Sharing Rule[J].Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,2017,26(3):590-609.
[22]Xiao,J.,X.Zhou,and W.Hu.Welfare Analysis of the Vehicle Quota System in China[J].International Economic Review,2017,58(2):617-650.
[23]Zhang,Y.,Z.Qian,F.Sprei,and B.Li.The Impact of Car Specifications,Prices and Incentives for Battery Electric Vehicles in Norway:Choices of Heterogeneous Consumers[J].Transportation Research Part C,2016,(69):386-401.
[24]Zhou,X.Welfare Analysis of Tacit Coordination in the U.S.Airline Industry[J].Frontiers of Economics in China,2017,12(1):66-93.
[25]Zhou,X.,C.Shen,Y.Wang,and J.Xiao.Tariff Protection,Product Differentiation and Market Conduct[R].SSRN Working Paper,2017.
(1)参见中国汽车工业协会网站(http://www.caam.org.cn)。
(1)具体的补贴金额计算方法见2018年2月13日财政部发布的《关于调整完善新能源汽车推广应用财政补贴政策的通知》。
(1)单位距离行驶成本,这个变量反映了消费者在做出购买决策时,对不同车型的行驶成本的衡量,这里需要把收集到的新能源汽车的百公里耗油量和百公里耗电量,按照每款新能源汽车的能源消耗特点进行计算,并整理成以人民币换算的每公里行驶成本。
(2)由于以轿车作为基准类,因此“是否轿车”这个变量在回归时不出现,工具变量的构造也就不包含该变量。
(1)文献中认为这一假设能够成立的原因是厂商先生产出来汽车,即汽车的产品特征Xj包括马力、车重、车型类型等都被决定了以后,消费者才购买和使用该产品,然后才能给出对其产品质量和口碑的评价,即ξj,也就是说Xj是先于ξj决定的,因此,可以作出不可观察到的产品特征ξj均值独立于可观察到的产品特征Xj的假设。当然,这一假设是有争论的,比如,现实中厂商可以根据消费者对产品质量和口碑的评价ξj来调整产品特征Xj,此时两者就不能很好地满足独立的假定。谢谢匿名审稿人指出这一点。正因如此,有些文献还会使用来自厂商生产或成本方面的信息,例如,投入要素价格等构造工具变量,这种工具变量能更好地满足外生性的要求。本文暂且没有找到这方面理想的工具变量,在后续研究中会继续加以关注以构造更好的工具变量。
(2)具体结果请参见《中国工业经济》网站(http://www.ciejournal.org)公开附件。
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