官员来源、本地信息与地区经济增长——基于地级市数据的新证据
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摘要
通常认为地方官员在地区经济发展中扮演着重要角色。文章基于1994-2012年中国24个省、自治区241个城市市委书记与城市的匹配数据,采用"倍差法"系统地考察了地方官员来源方式对地区经济增长的影响。研究发现,官员外调使得流入地的经济增长速度降低了0.98个百分点,外调官员对本地信息的缺乏是造成这一现象的重要原因。以地方官员前后任职地区之间的地理距离作为本地信息的代理变量,进一步发现,对一个外调官员而言,前后任职地区之间的地理距离越远,当前任职地区的经济表现越差。此外,官员横向交流和纵向交流对当地经济增长绩效并无显著的差异。研究结果对中国官员交流制度的进一步完善具有重要的政策参考价值。
It's commonly believed that local government leaders play a significant role in regional economic development,as suggested by the promotion championship theory which states that the local government leaders are incentivized to promote economic growth.Following this stream of literature,this paper investigates whether the regional economic growth depends on the source of local government leaders.Since the 1990s,a series of measures have been introduced by the central committee of the communist party to promote the exchange of local government leaders.Consequently,in addition to promotion of leaders from the same region,exchange of leaders from different regions or from superior party/government departments has become a common way of appointment of leaders.Therefore,in this paper the leaders are divided into two types,the internally promoted and the externally exchanged.An internally promoted leader is from the same region where she/he has served,such as a municipal party secretary who has been working as the mayor in the same city.In contrast,an externally exchanged leader is appointed from another region(horizontally exchanged)or from a superior party/government department(vertically exchanged).Apparently,beyond work experience and other personal characteristics,different amounts of local information are possessed by leaders from different sources,whichis supposed to impact local economic development.The externally exchanged leaders may have some advantage over their internally promoted counterparts.For instance,the vertically exchanged leaders can bring project and/or policy support to the local economy due to their strong connection with superior departments.Nevertheless,compared with the internally promoted leaders,they may lack the necessary information on local resource endowment,industrial development and geographical advantage,which is critical to the local economy.For example,when a mayor is promoted as a municipal party secretary,the information she/he possesses could help to reduce misallocation of resources and increase production.By contrast,such information cannot be instantly obtained and utilized by an externally exchanged leader.The comparison give rise to the following questions:Does the leader exchange system actually affect the local economic growth?And if so,why?Based on the city-leader pair data collected for 241 cities in China's 24 provinces during the period 1994-2012,this paper examines the effects of leader sources on local economic growth with difference-in-difference method.The results reveal that the GDP growth rate is lowered by 0.98 percentage point on average in cities with their party secretaries transferred from other places.Furthermore,to proxy for the local information of a leader we exploit the geographic distance between her/his currently and previously served cities,and we find that the economic performance is negatively associated with the geographic distance for exchanged leaders.In addition,no significant difference is observed between the leaders exchanged vertically and those exchanged horizontally.Therefore,the loweconomic growth rate associated with an exchanged leader can be attributed to her/his lack of local information.Our results are also robust to exclusion of abnormal observations and placebo tests.The paper has important policy implications on further improvement of leader exchange system.
It's commonly believed that local government leaders play a significant role in regional economic development,as suggested by the promotion championship theory which states that the local government leaders are incentivized to promote economic growth.Following this stream of literature,this paper investigates whether the regional economic growth depends on the source of local government leaders.Since the 1990s,a series of measures have been introduced by the central committee of the communist party to promote the exchange of local government leaders.Consequently,in addition to promotion of leaders from the same region,exchange of leaders from different regions or from superior party/government departments has become a common way of appointment of leaders.Therefore,in this paper the leaders are divided into two types,the internally promoted and the externally exchanged.An internally promoted leader is from the same region where she/he has served,such as a municipal party secretary who has been working as the mayor in the same city.In contrast,an externally exchanged leader is appointed from another region(horizontally exchanged)or from a superior party/government department(vertically exchanged).Apparently,beyond work experience and other personal characteristics,different amounts of local information are possessed by leaders from different sources,whichis supposed to impact local economic development.The externally exchanged leaders may have some advantage over their internally promoted counterparts.For instance,the vertically exchanged leaders can bring project and/or policy support to the local economy due to their strong connection with superior departments.Nevertheless,compared with the internally promoted leaders,they may lack the necessary information on local resource endowment,industrial development and geographical advantage,which is critical to the local economy.For example,when a mayor is promoted as a municipal party secretary,the information she/he possesses could help to reduce misallocation of resources and increase production.By contrast,such information cannot be instantly obtained and utilized by an externally exchanged leader.The comparison give rise to the following questions:Does the leader exchange system actually affect the local economic growth?And if so,why?Based on the city-leader pair data collected for 241 cities in China's 24 provinces during the period 1994-2012,this paper examines the effects of leader sources on local economic growth with difference-in-difference method.The results reveal that the GDP growth rate is lowered by 0.98 percentage point on average in cities with their party secretaries transferred from other places.Furthermore,to proxy for the local information of a leader we exploit the geographic distance between her/his currently and previously served cities,and we find that the economic performance is negatively associated with the geographic distance for exchanged leaders.In addition,no significant difference is observed between the leaders exchanged vertically and those exchanged horizontally.Therefore,the loweconomic growth rate associated with an exchanged leader can be attributed to her/his lack of local information.Our results are also robust to exclusion of abnormal observations and placebo tests.The paper has important policy implications on further improvement of leader exchange system.
引文
陈刚、李树,2012,“官员交流、任期与反腐败”,《世界经济》,第2期,第120-142页。
董志强、周敏丹、魏下海,2012,“地市级官员交流与地方经济发展——基于广东省(1988-2009)的经验研究”,《南方经济》,第10期,第32-42页。
杜兴强、曾泉、吴洁雯,2012,“官员历练、经济增长与政治擢升——基于1978-2008年中国省级官员的经验数据”,《金融研究》,第2期,第30-47页。
刘苓玲、任斌、任文晨,2015,“官员交流对社会保障事业发展的影响——来自省长、省委书记交流的经验证据”,《南方经济》,第10期,第64-84页。
刘瑞明、金田林,2015,“政绩考核、交流效应与经济发展——兼论地方政府行为短期化”,《当代经济科学》,第3期,第9-19页。
罗党论、佘国满、陈杰,2015,“经济增长业绩与地方官员晋升的关联性再审视——新理论和基于地市级数据的新证据”,《经济学(季刊)》,第3期,第1145-1172页。
吕朝凤、陈霄,2015,“地方官员会影响FDI的区位选择吗——基于倍差法的实证研究”,《国际贸易问题》,第5期,第115-123页。
史卫、杨海生,2010,“官员交流与FDI区位选择——基于省级区域FDI的空间计量分析”,《社会科学战线》,第11期,第35-43页。
陶然、苏福兵、陆曦、朱昱铭,2010,“经济增长能够带来晋升吗?”,《管理世界》,第12期,第13-26页。
王贤彬、徐现祥,2008,“地方官员来源:去向、任期与经济增长——来自中国省长省委书记的证据”,《管理世界》,第3期,第16-26页。
王贤彬、徐现祥,2010,“地方官员晋升竞争与经济增长”,《经济科学》,第6期,第42-58页。
王贤彬、张莉、徐现祥,2011,“辖区经济增长绩效与生长省委书记晋升”,《经济社会体制比较》,第1期,第110-122 页。
熊波、张惠、卢盛峰,2016,“官员交流与环境保护——来自省长、省委书记交流的经验证据”,《中国地质大学学报(社会科学版)》,第6期,第64-75页。
徐现祥、王贤彬,2010,“晋升激励与经济增长:来自中国省级官员的证据”,《世界经济》,第2期,第15-36页。
徐现祥、王贤彬、舒元,2007,“地方官员与经济增长——来自中国省长、省委书记交流的证据”,《经济研究》,第9期,第18-31页。
杨海生、罗党论、陈少凌,2010,“资源禀赋、官员交流与经济增长”,《管理世界》,第5期,第17-26页。
藏传琴、初帅,2016,“地方官员特征、官员交流与环境治理——基于2003-2013年中国25个省级单位的经验证据”,《财经论丛》,第11期,第105-112页。
张军、高远,2007,“官员任期、异地交流与经济增长——来自省级经验的证据”,《经济研究》,第11期,第91-103 页。
张楠、卢洪友,2016,“官员垂直交流与环境治理——来自中国109个城市市委书记(市长)的经验证据”,《公共管理学报》,第1期,第31-43页。
周黎安、赵鹰妍、李力雄,2013,“资源错配与政治周期”,《金融研究》,第3期,第15-29页。
周黎安,2007,“中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究”,《经济研究》,第7期,第36-50页。
踪家峰、岳耀民,2013,“官员交流改变了什么?——经济增长、地区差距还是基础设施水平”,《北京师范大学学报(社会科学版)》,第6期,第119-131页。
Bo,Z. Y., 1996,“Economic Performance and Political Mobility:Chinese Provincial Leaders”, Journal of Contemporary China,5(12):135-154.
Coval,J. D. and T. J. Moskowitz,1999,“Home Bias at Home:Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios”,Journal of Finance,54(6):2045-2074.
Giroud,X.,2013,“Proximity and Investment:Evidence from Plant-level Data”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,128(2):861-915.
Li,H. B. and L. A. Zhou,2005,“Political Turnover and Economic Performance:the Incentive Role of Personel Control in China”,Journal of Public Economics,89(9-10):1743-1762.
Oates,W.,1999,“An Essay on Fiscal Federalism”,Journal of Economic Literature,37(3):1120-1149.
Opper,S. and S. Brehm,2007,“Networks versus Performance:Political Leadership Promotion in China”,Department of Economics,Lund University.
Yao,Y. and M. Y. Zhang,2015,“Subnational leaders and economic growth:evidence from Chinese cities”,Journal of Economic Growth,20(4):405-436.
Huang,Z. K.,L. X. Li,G. R. Ma and L. X. Xu,2017,“Hayek,Local Information,and Commanding Heights:Decentralizing Stata-Owned Enterprises in China”,American Economic Review,Forthcoming.
(1)参照Li and Zhou(2005)和罗党论等(2015)的做法,我们可以认定由省长(市长)升迁至省委书记(市委书记)属于晋升的范畴。徐现祥、王贤彬(2010)发现在1978-2006年间,省长晋升为省委书记不仅是常态,而且中国有2/3以上的省区市都发生了这类晋升。
(2)中国官员文件称之为“干部交流”。鉴于后文研究的需要,当涉及官方文件的规定时,我们使用“干部交流”,否则,我们使用“官员外调”或“官员交流”一词。
(1)对国家部委领导来说,他们交流到地方任职很大情况是出于经济增长之外的因素考虑的,一来可能是为了历练,二来可能是为了解决专门的问题(杨海生等,2010)。
(1)在本文中,时间并不是简单的年度,而是官员的任期。由于各城市官员变更并不同时,各官员任期也并不一致,因此很难对时间固定效应进行控制。就必要性而言,正是由于官员任期相互交错,同一期的数据并不会表现出系统性的时间固定效应,所以本文并未对时间固定效应进行控制。
(1)本文的逻辑可能更适用于对市委书记的分析。在中国市级官员中,虽然市长一般由副市长、副书记、市委常委等升任,但副市长、副书记和市委常委有多位,并且很可能并不负责经济方面的工作。因此,从本地晋升官员和外调官员所拥有的本地信息量可能并无较大差异。
(2)本文“内升官员”主要是指由本市市长升任市委书记这类官员,虽然样本期内有极少数官员从副市长或副书记直接升任市委书记,我们把这类官员也划归为“内升官员”,去掉这部分样本,实证结果并无差别。
(1)首批沿海开放城市主要包括:秦皇岛、烟台、连云港、南通、温州、湛江、北海、营口、威海等9个地级市。“较大的市”专指经国务院批准、拥有与省会(自治区首府)城市相同的地方性法规和规章制定权的城市,主要包括以下15个地级市:唐山、大同、包头、鞍山、抚顺、吉林、齐齐哈尔、无锡、淮南、洛阳、淄博、邯郸、本溪、徐州、苏州。同时,本文把珠海、汕头两个经济特区并入到首批沿海开放城市。
董志强、周敏丹、魏下海,2012,“地市级官员交流与地方经济发展——基于广东省(1988-2009)的经验研究”,《南方经济》,第10期,第32-42页。
杜兴强、曾泉、吴洁雯,2012,“官员历练、经济增长与政治擢升——基于1978-2008年中国省级官员的经验数据”,《金融研究》,第2期,第30-47页。
刘苓玲、任斌、任文晨,2015,“官员交流对社会保障事业发展的影响——来自省长、省委书记交流的经验证据”,《南方经济》,第10期,第64-84页。
刘瑞明、金田林,2015,“政绩考核、交流效应与经济发展——兼论地方政府行为短期化”,《当代经济科学》,第3期,第9-19页。
罗党论、佘国满、陈杰,2015,“经济增长业绩与地方官员晋升的关联性再审视——新理论和基于地市级数据的新证据”,《经济学(季刊)》,第3期,第1145-1172页。
吕朝凤、陈霄,2015,“地方官员会影响FDI的区位选择吗——基于倍差法的实证研究”,《国际贸易问题》,第5期,第115-123页。
史卫、杨海生,2010,“官员交流与FDI区位选择——基于省级区域FDI的空间计量分析”,《社会科学战线》,第11期,第35-43页。
陶然、苏福兵、陆曦、朱昱铭,2010,“经济增长能够带来晋升吗?”,《管理世界》,第12期,第13-26页。
王贤彬、徐现祥,2008,“地方官员来源:去向、任期与经济增长——来自中国省长省委书记的证据”,《管理世界》,第3期,第16-26页。
王贤彬、徐现祥,2010,“地方官员晋升竞争与经济增长”,《经济科学》,第6期,第42-58页。
王贤彬、张莉、徐现祥,2011,“辖区经济增长绩效与生长省委书记晋升”,《经济社会体制比较》,第1期,第110-122 页。
熊波、张惠、卢盛峰,2016,“官员交流与环境保护——来自省长、省委书记交流的经验证据”,《中国地质大学学报(社会科学版)》,第6期,第64-75页。
徐现祥、王贤彬,2010,“晋升激励与经济增长:来自中国省级官员的证据”,《世界经济》,第2期,第15-36页。
徐现祥、王贤彬、舒元,2007,“地方官员与经济增长——来自中国省长、省委书记交流的证据”,《经济研究》,第9期,第18-31页。
杨海生、罗党论、陈少凌,2010,“资源禀赋、官员交流与经济增长”,《管理世界》,第5期,第17-26页。
藏传琴、初帅,2016,“地方官员特征、官员交流与环境治理——基于2003-2013年中国25个省级单位的经验证据”,《财经论丛》,第11期,第105-112页。
张军、高远,2007,“官员任期、异地交流与经济增长——来自省级经验的证据”,《经济研究》,第11期,第91-103 页。
张楠、卢洪友,2016,“官员垂直交流与环境治理——来自中国109个城市市委书记(市长)的经验证据”,《公共管理学报》,第1期,第31-43页。
周黎安、赵鹰妍、李力雄,2013,“资源错配与政治周期”,《金融研究》,第3期,第15-29页。
周黎安,2007,“中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究”,《经济研究》,第7期,第36-50页。
踪家峰、岳耀民,2013,“官员交流改变了什么?——经济增长、地区差距还是基础设施水平”,《北京师范大学学报(社会科学版)》,第6期,第119-131页。
Bo,Z. Y., 1996,“Economic Performance and Political Mobility:Chinese Provincial Leaders”, Journal of Contemporary China,5(12):135-154.
Coval,J. D. and T. J. Moskowitz,1999,“Home Bias at Home:Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios”,Journal of Finance,54(6):2045-2074.
Giroud,X.,2013,“Proximity and Investment:Evidence from Plant-level Data”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,128(2):861-915.
Li,H. B. and L. A. Zhou,2005,“Political Turnover and Economic Performance:the Incentive Role of Personel Control in China”,Journal of Public Economics,89(9-10):1743-1762.
Oates,W.,1999,“An Essay on Fiscal Federalism”,Journal of Economic Literature,37(3):1120-1149.
Opper,S. and S. Brehm,2007,“Networks versus Performance:Political Leadership Promotion in China”,Department of Economics,Lund University.
Yao,Y. and M. Y. Zhang,2015,“Subnational leaders and economic growth:evidence from Chinese cities”,Journal of Economic Growth,20(4):405-436.
Huang,Z. K.,L. X. Li,G. R. Ma and L. X. Xu,2017,“Hayek,Local Information,and Commanding Heights:Decentralizing Stata-Owned Enterprises in China”,American Economic Review,Forthcoming.
(1)参照Li and Zhou(2005)和罗党论等(2015)的做法,我们可以认定由省长(市长)升迁至省委书记(市委书记)属于晋升的范畴。徐现祥、王贤彬(2010)发现在1978-2006年间,省长晋升为省委书记不仅是常态,而且中国有2/3以上的省区市都发生了这类晋升。
(2)中国官员文件称之为“干部交流”。鉴于后文研究的需要,当涉及官方文件的规定时,我们使用“干部交流”,否则,我们使用“官员外调”或“官员交流”一词。
(1)对国家部委领导来说,他们交流到地方任职很大情况是出于经济增长之外的因素考虑的,一来可能是为了历练,二来可能是为了解决专门的问题(杨海生等,2010)。
(1)在本文中,时间并不是简单的年度,而是官员的任期。由于各城市官员变更并不同时,各官员任期也并不一致,因此很难对时间固定效应进行控制。就必要性而言,正是由于官员任期相互交错,同一期的数据并不会表现出系统性的时间固定效应,所以本文并未对时间固定效应进行控制。
(1)本文的逻辑可能更适用于对市委书记的分析。在中国市级官员中,虽然市长一般由副市长、副书记、市委常委等升任,但副市长、副书记和市委常委有多位,并且很可能并不负责经济方面的工作。因此,从本地晋升官员和外调官员所拥有的本地信息量可能并无较大差异。
(2)本文“内升官员”主要是指由本市市长升任市委书记这类官员,虽然样本期内有极少数官员从副市长或副书记直接升任市委书记,我们把这类官员也划归为“内升官员”,去掉这部分样本,实证结果并无差别。
(1)首批沿海开放城市主要包括:秦皇岛、烟台、连云港、南通、温州、湛江、北海、营口、威海等9个地级市。“较大的市”专指经国务院批准、拥有与省会(自治区首府)城市相同的地方性法规和规章制定权的城市,主要包括以下15个地级市:唐山、大同、包头、鞍山、抚顺、吉林、齐齐哈尔、无锡、淮南、洛阳、淄博、邯郸、本溪、徐州、苏州。同时,本文把珠海、汕头两个经济特区并入到首批沿海开放城市。
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