盈余管理、金融市场化与公司超额银行借款
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摘要
公司在获取银行信贷的过程中会通过盈余管理以满足会计业绩审核要求的行为已得到学者们的关注,但现有文献尚未研究公司在获得一定的银行借款后是否会继续进行盈余管理以获得超额银行借款.本文基于该问题,以2003年～2016年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,从应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理两个维度,考察了盈余管理行为与公司超额银行借款之间的关系.研究结果表明,应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理均与公司超额银行借款正相关;进一步,在考虑地区金融市场化程度之后,发现金融市场化弱化了应计盈余管理与公司超额银行借款的正相关关系,但增强了公司通过真实盈余管理获得更多超额银行借款的行为.本文从公司超额银行借款行为出发,同时结合金融市场化程度,拓展了会计信息质量与信贷资源配置的研究视角.
Firms' managing earnings to get more bank loans have attracted academic attentions. While,when firms reach the bank loans targets,would they continue to manage earnings to get excess bank loans? This paper studies this question from the aspects of real and accrual-based earnings management using the data of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2003 to 2016. The results show that real and accrual-based earnings management both are positively related to the excess bank loans. In addition,when taking the financial marketization into account,the positive relation between accrual-based earnings management and excess bank loans is weakened,but the relation between real earnings management and excess bank loans is enhanced. This paper expands the study perspectives of earnings quality and credit resources allocation from excess bank loans and enriches the research of the macro environments' influences on firm behaviors.
Firms' managing earnings to get more bank loans have attracted academic attentions. While,when firms reach the bank loans targets,would they continue to manage earnings to get excess bank loans? This paper studies this question from the aspects of real and accrual-based earnings management using the data of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2003 to 2016. The results show that real and accrual-based earnings management both are positively related to the excess bank loans. In addition,when taking the financial marketization into account,the positive relation between accrual-based earnings management and excess bank loans is weakened,but the relation between real earnings management and excess bank loans is enhanced. This paper expands the study perspectives of earnings quality and credit resources allocation from excess bank loans and enriches the research of the macro environments' influences on firm behaviors.
引文
[1]Healy P M,Palepu K G. Information asymmetry,corporate disclosure,and the capital markets:A review of the empirical disclosure literature[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,31(1):405-440.
[2]Dyreng S D,Vashishtha R,Weber J. Direct evidence on the informational properties of earnings in loan contracts[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2017,55(2):371-406.
[3]Mafrolla E,D’Amico E. Borrowing capacity and earnings management:An analysis of private loans in private firms[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2017,36(4):284-301.
[4]Bharath S T,Sunder J,Sunder S V. Accounting quality and debt contracting[J]. Accounting Review,2008,83(1):1-28.
[5]孙铮,李增泉,王景斌.所有权性质、会计信息与债务契约———来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2006,(10):100-107.Sun Zheng,Li Zengquan,Wang Jingbin. The ownership nature,the accounting information and debt contracts:Empirical evidence from China’s listed companies[J]. Management World,2006,(10):100-107.(in Chinese)
[6]陆正飞,祝继高,孙便霞.盈余管理、会计信息与银行债务契约[J].管理世界,2008,(3):152-158.Lu Zhengfei,Zhu Jigao,Sun Bianxia. Earnings management,accounting information and bank debt contracts[J]. Management World,2008,(3):152-158.(in Chinese)
[7]马永强,赖黎,曾建光.盈余管理方式与信贷资源配置[J].会计研究,2014,(12):39-45.Ma Yongqiang,Lai Li,Zeng Jianguang. Earnings management and the credit allocation[J]. Accounting Research,2014,(12):39-45.(in Chinese)
[8]邓路,刘瑞琪,廖明情.宏观环境、所有制与公司超额银行借款[J].管理世界,2016,(9):149-160.Deng Lu,Liu Ruiqi,Liao Mingqing. Macro environments,property and excess bank loans[J]. Management World,2016,(9):149-160.(in Chinese)
[9]邓路,刘瑞琪,江萍.公司超额银行借款会导致过度投资吗[J].金融研究,2017,(10):115-129.Deng Lu,Liu Ruiqi,Jiang Ping. Do corporate’s excess bank loans lead to over-investment?[J]. Journal of Financial Research,2017,(10):115-129.(in Chinese)
[10]Graham J R,Harvey C R,Rajgopal S. The economic implications of corporate financial reporting[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,40(1):3-73.
[11]Roychowdhury S. Earnings management through real activities manipulation[J]. Journal of Accounting&Economics,2006,42(3):335-370.
[12]Zang A Y. Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management[J]. Accounting Review,2012,87(2):675-703.
[13]李平,曾勇,朱晓林.中国银行业改革对中资银行效率变化的影响[J].管理科学学报,2013,16(8):47-53.Li Ping,Zeng Yong,Zhu Xiaolin. Impact of the reform of China’s banking sector on the changes in efficiency of Chinese banks[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China,2013,16(8):47-53.(in Chinese)
[14]孙亮,柳建华.银行业改革、市场化与信贷资源的配置[J].金融研究,2011,(1):94-109.Sun Liang,Liu Jianhua. Banking system reform,marketization and bank credit allocation[J]. Journal of Financial Research,2011,(1):94-109.(in Chinese)
[15]孙会霞,陈金明,陈运森.银行信贷配置、信用风险定价与企业融资效率[J].金融研究,2013,(11):55-67.Sun Huixia,Chen Jinming,Chen Yunsen. Bank allocation behavior,credit pricing and firm financing efficiency[J]. Journal of Financial Research,2013,(11):55-67.(in Chinese)
[16]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数:各地区市场化相对进程2010年报告[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2011.Fan Gang,Wang Xiaolu,Zhu Hengpeng. NERI Index of Marketization of China’s Provinces 2011 Report[M]. Beijing:Economic Science Press,2011.(in Chinese)
[17]饶艳超,胡奕明.银行信贷中会计信息的使用情况调查与分析[J].会计研究,2005,(4):36-41.Rao Yanchao,Hu Yiming. A study on the survey of the accounting information used by the bank lenders[J]. Accounting Research,2005,(4):36-41.(in Chinese)
[18]姚树洁,姜春霞,冯根福.中国银行业的改革与效率:1995-2008[J].经济研究,2011,(8):4-14.Yao Shujie,Jiang Chunxia,Feng Genfu. Banking reform and efficiency in China:1995-2008[J]. Economic Research Journal,2011,(8):4-14.(in Chinese)
[19]程六兵,刘峰.银行监管与信贷歧视———从会计稳健性的视角[J].会计研究,2013,(1):28-34.Cheng Liubing,Liu Feng. Bank supervision and discrimination:From the perspective of accounting conservatism[J]. Accounting Research,2013,(1):28-34.(in Chinese)
[20]Jensen M C. Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers[J]. American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[21]Jensen M C,Meckling W H. Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[22]Smith Jr C W,Warner J B. On financial contracting:An analysis of bond covenants[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1979,7(2):117-161.
[23]胥朝阳,刘睿智.提高会计信息可比性能抑制盈余管理吗?[J].会计研究,2014,(7):50-57.Xu Chaoyang,Liu Ruizhi. Can accounting comparability reduce earnings management?[J]. Accounting Research,2014,(7):50-57.(in Chinese)
[24]Cohen D A,Zarowin P. Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50(1):2-19.
[25]龚启辉,吴联生,王亚平.两类盈余管理之间的部分替代[J].经济研究,2015,(6):175-188.Gong Qihui,Wu Liansheng,Wang Yaping. The partial substitution effect of the two types of earnings management[J]. Economic Research Journal,2015,(6):175-188.(in Chinese)
[26]Firth M,Lin C,Liu P,et al. Inside the black box:Bank credit allocation in China’s private sector[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,2009,33(6):1144-1155.
[27]陈耿,刘星,辛清泉.信贷歧视、金融发展与民营企业银行借款期限结构[J].会计研究,2015,(4):40-46.Chen Geng,Liu Xing,Xin Qingquan. Credit discrimination,financial development and private-owned enterprise’bank loan term structure[J]. Accounting Research,2015,(4):40-46.(in Chinese)
[28]王伟,杨娇辉,汪玲.金融竞争力、信贷过度扩张与经济增长[J].管理科学学报,2018,21(1):58-71.Wang Wei,Yang Jiaohui,Wang Ling. Financial competitiveness,excessive credit and economic growth[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China,2018,21(1):58-71.(in Chinese)
[29]李延喜,陈克兢.终极控制人、外部治理环境与盈余管理[J].管理科学学报,2014,17(9):56-71.Li Yanxi,Chen Kejing. Ultimate controller,external governance environment and earnings management:Analysis based on dynamic panel data with system GMM estimation[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China,2014,17(9):56-71.(in Chinese)
[30]Flannery M J,Rangan K P. Partial adjustment toward target capital structures[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(3):469-506.
[31]陆正飞,杨德明.商业信用:替代性融资,还是买方市场?[J].管理世界,2011,(4):6-14.Lu Zhengfei,Yang Deming. The commercial credit:Alternative financing or buyers’markets?[J]. Management World,2011,(4):6-14.(in Chinese)
[32]Dechow P M,Sloan R G,Sweeney A P. Detecting earnings management[J]. Accounting Review,1995,70(2):193-225.
[33]王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017.Wang Xiaolu,Fan Gang,Yu Jingwen. Marketization Index of China’s Provinces:NERI Report 2016[M]. Beijing:Social Science Academic Press,2017.(in Chinese)
[34]Wu W,Rui O M,Wu C. Trade credit,cash holdings,and financial deepening:Evidence from a transitional economy[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2012,36(11):2868-2883.
[35]陈德球,魏刚,肖泽忠.法律制度效率、金融深化与家族控制权偏好[J].经济研究,2013,(10):55-68.Chen Deqiu,Wei Gang,Xiao Zezhong. Law efficiency,financial deepening and family control preferences[J]. Economic Research Journal,2013,(10):55-68.(in Chinese)
[36]Venet B,Hurlin C. Granger causality tests in panel data models with fixed coefficients[J]. Document De Recherche Leo,2001.
(2)此处2003年~2007年的金融市场化指数与2008年~2014年的金融市场化指数统计口径略有差异,后段指数整体低于前一段.为了消除统计口径差异带来的影响,我们在回归中控制了年度效应.控制年度效应后,市场化指数回归系数更多地体现样本横截面之间的差异对于超额银行借款的影响,缓解不同年度统计口径不一致的问题.此外,本文在稳健性检验中选取了公司所在地区银行贷款总额与地区GDP的比值(BankG DP)作为金融市场化发展程度的度量指标再次进行回归,结果并无差异.对于2015年~2016年的指数,根据2008年~2014年的指数,对各个省份回归得到指数与年度之间的线性变化关系,然后根据回归得到的模型,计算2015年~2016年各省份的指数.
[2]Dyreng S D,Vashishtha R,Weber J. Direct evidence on the informational properties of earnings in loan contracts[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2017,55(2):371-406.
[3]Mafrolla E,D’Amico E. Borrowing capacity and earnings management:An analysis of private loans in private firms[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2017,36(4):284-301.
[4]Bharath S T,Sunder J,Sunder S V. Accounting quality and debt contracting[J]. Accounting Review,2008,83(1):1-28.
[5]孙铮,李增泉,王景斌.所有权性质、会计信息与债务契约———来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2006,(10):100-107.Sun Zheng,Li Zengquan,Wang Jingbin. The ownership nature,the accounting information and debt contracts:Empirical evidence from China’s listed companies[J]. Management World,2006,(10):100-107.(in Chinese)
[6]陆正飞,祝继高,孙便霞.盈余管理、会计信息与银行债务契约[J].管理世界,2008,(3):152-158.Lu Zhengfei,Zhu Jigao,Sun Bianxia. Earnings management,accounting information and bank debt contracts[J]. Management World,2008,(3):152-158.(in Chinese)
[7]马永强,赖黎,曾建光.盈余管理方式与信贷资源配置[J].会计研究,2014,(12):39-45.Ma Yongqiang,Lai Li,Zeng Jianguang. Earnings management and the credit allocation[J]. Accounting Research,2014,(12):39-45.(in Chinese)
[8]邓路,刘瑞琪,廖明情.宏观环境、所有制与公司超额银行借款[J].管理世界,2016,(9):149-160.Deng Lu,Liu Ruiqi,Liao Mingqing. Macro environments,property and excess bank loans[J]. Management World,2016,(9):149-160.(in Chinese)
[9]邓路,刘瑞琪,江萍.公司超额银行借款会导致过度投资吗[J].金融研究,2017,(10):115-129.Deng Lu,Liu Ruiqi,Jiang Ping. Do corporate’s excess bank loans lead to over-investment?[J]. Journal of Financial Research,2017,(10):115-129.(in Chinese)
[10]Graham J R,Harvey C R,Rajgopal S. The economic implications of corporate financial reporting[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,40(1):3-73.
[11]Roychowdhury S. Earnings management through real activities manipulation[J]. Journal of Accounting&Economics,2006,42(3):335-370.
[12]Zang A Y. Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management[J]. Accounting Review,2012,87(2):675-703.
[13]李平,曾勇,朱晓林.中国银行业改革对中资银行效率变化的影响[J].管理科学学报,2013,16(8):47-53.Li Ping,Zeng Yong,Zhu Xiaolin. Impact of the reform of China’s banking sector on the changes in efficiency of Chinese banks[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China,2013,16(8):47-53.(in Chinese)
[14]孙亮,柳建华.银行业改革、市场化与信贷资源的配置[J].金融研究,2011,(1):94-109.Sun Liang,Liu Jianhua. Banking system reform,marketization and bank credit allocation[J]. Journal of Financial Research,2011,(1):94-109.(in Chinese)
[15]孙会霞,陈金明,陈运森.银行信贷配置、信用风险定价与企业融资效率[J].金融研究,2013,(11):55-67.Sun Huixia,Chen Jinming,Chen Yunsen. Bank allocation behavior,credit pricing and firm financing efficiency[J]. Journal of Financial Research,2013,(11):55-67.(in Chinese)
[16]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数:各地区市场化相对进程2010年报告[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2011.Fan Gang,Wang Xiaolu,Zhu Hengpeng. NERI Index of Marketization of China’s Provinces 2011 Report[M]. Beijing:Economic Science Press,2011.(in Chinese)
[17]饶艳超,胡奕明.银行信贷中会计信息的使用情况调查与分析[J].会计研究,2005,(4):36-41.Rao Yanchao,Hu Yiming. A study on the survey of the accounting information used by the bank lenders[J]. Accounting Research,2005,(4):36-41.(in Chinese)
[18]姚树洁,姜春霞,冯根福.中国银行业的改革与效率:1995-2008[J].经济研究,2011,(8):4-14.Yao Shujie,Jiang Chunxia,Feng Genfu. Banking reform and efficiency in China:1995-2008[J]. Economic Research Journal,2011,(8):4-14.(in Chinese)
[19]程六兵,刘峰.银行监管与信贷歧视———从会计稳健性的视角[J].会计研究,2013,(1):28-34.Cheng Liubing,Liu Feng. Bank supervision and discrimination:From the perspective of accounting conservatism[J]. Accounting Research,2013,(1):28-34.(in Chinese)
[20]Jensen M C. Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers[J]. American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[21]Jensen M C,Meckling W H. Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[22]Smith Jr C W,Warner J B. On financial contracting:An analysis of bond covenants[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1979,7(2):117-161.
[23]胥朝阳,刘睿智.提高会计信息可比性能抑制盈余管理吗?[J].会计研究,2014,(7):50-57.Xu Chaoyang,Liu Ruizhi. Can accounting comparability reduce earnings management?[J]. Accounting Research,2014,(7):50-57.(in Chinese)
[24]Cohen D A,Zarowin P. Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50(1):2-19.
[25]龚启辉,吴联生,王亚平.两类盈余管理之间的部分替代[J].经济研究,2015,(6):175-188.Gong Qihui,Wu Liansheng,Wang Yaping. The partial substitution effect of the two types of earnings management[J]. Economic Research Journal,2015,(6):175-188.(in Chinese)
[26]Firth M,Lin C,Liu P,et al. Inside the black box:Bank credit allocation in China’s private sector[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,2009,33(6):1144-1155.
[27]陈耿,刘星,辛清泉.信贷歧视、金融发展与民营企业银行借款期限结构[J].会计研究,2015,(4):40-46.Chen Geng,Liu Xing,Xin Qingquan. Credit discrimination,financial development and private-owned enterprise’bank loan term structure[J]. Accounting Research,2015,(4):40-46.(in Chinese)
[28]王伟,杨娇辉,汪玲.金融竞争力、信贷过度扩张与经济增长[J].管理科学学报,2018,21(1):58-71.Wang Wei,Yang Jiaohui,Wang Ling. Financial competitiveness,excessive credit and economic growth[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China,2018,21(1):58-71.(in Chinese)
[29]李延喜,陈克兢.终极控制人、外部治理环境与盈余管理[J].管理科学学报,2014,17(9):56-71.Li Yanxi,Chen Kejing. Ultimate controller,external governance environment and earnings management:Analysis based on dynamic panel data with system GMM estimation[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China,2014,17(9):56-71.(in Chinese)
[30]Flannery M J,Rangan K P. Partial adjustment toward target capital structures[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(3):469-506.
[31]陆正飞,杨德明.商业信用:替代性融资,还是买方市场?[J].管理世界,2011,(4):6-14.Lu Zhengfei,Yang Deming. The commercial credit:Alternative financing or buyers’markets?[J]. Management World,2011,(4):6-14.(in Chinese)
[32]Dechow P M,Sloan R G,Sweeney A P. Detecting earnings management[J]. Accounting Review,1995,70(2):193-225.
[33]王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017.Wang Xiaolu,Fan Gang,Yu Jingwen. Marketization Index of China’s Provinces:NERI Report 2016[M]. Beijing:Social Science Academic Press,2017.(in Chinese)
[34]Wu W,Rui O M,Wu C. Trade credit,cash holdings,and financial deepening:Evidence from a transitional economy[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2012,36(11):2868-2883.
[35]陈德球,魏刚,肖泽忠.法律制度效率、金融深化与家族控制权偏好[J].经济研究,2013,(10):55-68.Chen Deqiu,Wei Gang,Xiao Zezhong. Law efficiency,financial deepening and family control preferences[J]. Economic Research Journal,2013,(10):55-68.(in Chinese)
[36]Venet B,Hurlin C. Granger causality tests in panel data models with fixed coefficients[J]. Document De Recherche Leo,2001.
(2)此处2003年~2007年的金融市场化指数与2008年~2014年的金融市场化指数统计口径略有差异,后段指数整体低于前一段.为了消除统计口径差异带来的影响,我们在回归中控制了年度效应.控制年度效应后,市场化指数回归系数更多地体现样本横截面之间的差异对于超额银行借款的影响,缓解不同年度统计口径不一致的问题.此外,本文在稳健性检验中选取了公司所在地区银行贷款总额与地区GDP的比值(BankG DP)作为金融市场化发展程度的度量指标再次进行回归,结果并无差异.对于2015年~2016年的指数,根据2008年~2014年的指数,对各个省份回归得到指数与年度之间的线性变化关系,然后根据回归得到的模型,计算2015年~2016年各省份的指数.