买方抗衡势力条件下的特许费、通道费研究
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摘要
同样是上下游企业之间的交易,在有些行业中是下游企业向上游企业支付特许费,而在另一些行业中却是上游企业向下游企业支付通道费。对这种交易形式和交易费用的差异及其产生原因,多数观点认为是下游买方抗衡势力不同导致的,当买方抗衡势力较小时,下游向上游支付特许费;当买方抗衡势力较大时,上游向下游支付通道费。通过构建连续垄断和双边双寡头的纵向市场模型,探讨这种观点成立的条件以及背后的机理,在合作博弈的框架下研究不同竞争形式中买方抗衡势力与特许费、通道费的关系。研究结果发现:上述观点不总是成立的,只有在双边双寡头市场结构且零售商进行差异化Bertrand竞争的情况下,上述观点才成立。而在连续垄断和双边双寡头Cournot竞争的情况下,无论买方抗衡势力多大都不会出现通道费。买方抗衡势力不是出现通道费的充分条件,通道费的出现还与市场结构、竞争形式等因素有关。
For the same transactions between upstream and downstream,in some industries downstream must pay franchise fees to upstream,while in other industries upstream need pay slotting allowances to the downstream. Why is there such a difference in transactions form? Most think that it is caused by the differences in countervailing power,and when the countervailing power is small,the retailers will pay franchise fees to the manufacturers. However,when the countervailing power is large,the manufacturers have to pay slotting allowances to retailers. This paper discusses the conditions for the establishment of this view and the mechanism behind it. We study the impact of countervailing power on the transactions between upstream and downstream in different forms of competition by constructing a continuous monopoly and bilateral duopoly vertical relationship model. We find that: The above points are not always right,and only in bilateral duopoly structure,and retailers doing Bertrand competition,the above point is correct. In the case of continuous monopoly,bilateral duopoly structure and retailers doing Cournot competition,slotting allowance will never appear no matter how big the countervailing power is. The buyer countervailing power is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of slotting allowances,and whether the manufacturers will pay slotting allowances to retailers or not also depends on the other factors,such as market structure,competition form.
For the same transactions between upstream and downstream,in some industries downstream must pay franchise fees to upstream,while in other industries upstream need pay slotting allowances to the downstream. Why is there such a difference in transactions form? Most think that it is caused by the differences in countervailing power,and when the countervailing power is small,the retailers will pay franchise fees to the manufacturers. However,when the countervailing power is large,the manufacturers have to pay slotting allowances to retailers. This paper discusses the conditions for the establishment of this view and the mechanism behind it. We study the impact of countervailing power on the transactions between upstream and downstream in different forms of competition by constructing a continuous monopoly and bilateral duopoly vertical relationship model. We find that: The above points are not always right,and only in bilateral duopoly structure,and retailers doing Bertrand competition,the above point is correct. In the case of continuous monopoly,bilateral duopoly structure and retailers doing Cournot competition,slotting allowance will never appear no matter how big the countervailing power is. The buyer countervailing power is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of slotting allowances,and whether the manufacturers will pay slotting allowances to retailers or not also depends on the other factors,such as market structure,competition form.
引文
[1]李怀东.中国加油站特许经营现状与发展环境分析[D].北京:对外经济贸易大学,2006.
[2]李飞,胡赛全,詹正茂.零售通道费形成机理——基于中国市场情境的多业态、多案例研究[J].中国工业经济,2013,(3):124-136.
[3]Marx,L.,Shaffer,G..Slotting Allowances and Scarce Shelf Space[J].Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,2010,19(3):575-603.
[4]李骏阳.对收取通道费原因的分析——基于我国零售企业的赢利模式研究[J].管理学报,2009,6(12):1691-1695.
[5]李伟,李凯.零售商买方势力一定会导致通道费吗?——基于纵向市场结构的合作博弈分析[J].产经评论,2014,5(6):92-103.
[6]Tirole,J..The Theory of Industrial Organization[M].Massachusetts:MIT press,1988.
[7]Rey,P.,Tirole,J..The Logic of Vertical Restraints[J].The American Economic Review,1985,76(5):921-939.
[8]Irmen,A..Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains[J].Journal of Economic Surveys,1998,12(4):333-359.
[9]Colangelo,G..Whole Price When Buyer are Asymmetric Cournout Competitors[J].The Manchester School,2006,74(2):156-169.
[10]Kelly,K..The Antitrust Analysis of Grocery Slotting Allowances:The Procompetitive Case[J].Journal of Public Policy&Marketing,1991,10(1):187-198.
[11]Chu,W..Demand Signalling and Screening in Channels of Distribution[J].Marketing Science,1992,11(4):327-347.
[12]Sullivan,M.W..Slotting Allowances and the Market for New Products[J].The Journal of Law and Economics,1997,40(2):461-494.
[13]Lariviere,M.A.,Padmanabhan,V..Slotting Allowances and New Product Introductions[J].Marketing Science,1997,16(2):112-128.
[14]Shaffer,G..Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance:A Comparison of Facilitating Practices[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,1991,22(1):120-135.
[15]Mac Avoy,C.J..Antitrust Treatment of Slotting Allowances[J].ABA Section of Antitrust Law,1997,45:9-11.
[16]汪浩.通道费与零售商市场力量[J].经济评论,2006,(1):29-34.
[17]Dhar,T..Can Margin Differences in Vertical Marketing Channels Lead to Contracts with Slotting Fees?[J].Management Science,2013,59(12):4-6.
[18]郑栋伟,陈宏民,杨剑侠.基于谈判机制的优质货架与通道费[J].管理评论,2012,24(1):99-107.
[19]Achrol,R.S..Slotting Allowances:A Time Series Analysis of Aggregate Effects over Three Decades[J].Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,2012,40(5):673-694.
[20]董烨然.通道费:大零售商挖掘市场效率的一种机制设计[J].财贸经济,2012,(3):94-102.
[21]孟卫东,代建生,熊维勤等.基于纳什谈判的供应商-销售商联合促销线性合约设计[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(4):870-877.
[22]Foros,.,Kind,H.J.,Sand,J.Y..Slotting Allowances and Manufacturers'Retail Sales Effort[J].Southern Economic Journal,2009,76(1):266-282.
[23]Symeonidis,G..Downstream Merger and Welfare in a Bilateral Oligopoly[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2010,28(3):230-243.
[24]Chen,Z..Dominant Retailers and the Countervailing-power Hypothesis[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,2003,34(4):612-625.
[25]Spengler,J.J..Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy[J].The Journal of Political Economy,1950,58(4):347-352.
[26]Horn,H.,Wolinsky,A..Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,1988,19(3):408-419.
[27]Gal-Or,E..Duopolistic Vertical Restraints[J].European Economic Review,1991,35(6):1237-1253.
[28]Winter,R.A..Vertical Control and Price versus Nonprice Competition[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1993,108(1):61-76.
[29]Hotelling,H..Stability in Competition[J].The Economic Journal,1929,39(153):41-57.
[30]Schulz,N..Does the Service Argument Justify Resale Price Maintenance?[J].Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,2007,163(2):236-255.
[31]马丁.高级产业经济学[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2003.
[32]Bonanno,G.,Vickers,J..Vertical Separation[J].The Journal of Industrial Economics,1988,36(3):257-265.
[33]Vickers,J..Delegation and the Theory of the Firm[J].The Economic Journal,1985,95(377):138-147.
[34]Sklivas,S.D..The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives[J].The Rand Journal of Economics,1987,18(3):452-458.
[35]Fershtman,C.,Judd,K.L..Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly[J].The American Economic Review,1987,77(5):927-940.
[36]Milliou,C.,Petrakis,E..Upstream Horizontal Mergers,Vertical Contracts,and Bargaining[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2007,25(5):963-987.
[37]Hunter,A..Notes on Countervailing Power[J].The Economic Journal,1958,68(269):89-103.
[38]Stigler,G.J..The Economist Plays with Blocs[J].The American Economic Review,1954,44(2):7-14.
①李怀东(2006)[1]指出中石化一般先向加油站一次性收取1-5万元的加盟费,然后每月收取销售收入的0.2%-0.5%作为特许权使用费。特许权使用费加上制造商的边际成本,就是制造商向零售商收取的批发价格,因此,特许权使用费和批发价格二者在本质上是等价的。
①买方抗衡势力的概念最早由加尔布雷斯提出,它是指下游买方企业相对于上游卖方企业具有一定的市场势力,可以和上游讨价还价,获得更加优惠的交易条款。
②传统的纵向约束文献使用更多的是两部收费制的概念,而不是特许费。因为这类文献在进行理论建模时都假设制造商和零售商使用两部收费制进行交易,均衡的结果都是制造商向零售商收取特许费,因此这类文献中的两部收费制就等同于制造商向零售商收取特许费。为了与原文的表述相一致,本文在对这类文献进行综述时使用两部收费制的概念,而不使用特许费的概念。
①关于通道费研究更加详细的综述可以参见李伟和李凯(2014)[5]。
①纳什讨价还价本质上是一个合作博弈,它要求合作双方首先将联合利润最大化作为双方谈判的共同目标。随着市场竞争的加剧,制造商与零售商之间通过合作谈判签订交易合约已逐渐成为行业发展的趋势,详细内容可以参见http://lgpt.ccfa.org.cn/newsinfocontent?id=1642,这也是本文合作谈判假设的现实依据。
①也可以假设零售商是同质的,而制造商生产的产品存在横向差异,这种假设更加符合现实。现实产业中有很多产品都是横向差异化的产品,比如相同功能不同颜色的产品。为了便于叙述,后文中均认为零售商的产品是差异化的而不再强调差异化的来源。
②虽然本文中制造商之间不存在直接的竞争,但是由于假设制造商和零售商之间进行一对一的交易,所以零售商之间的竞争可以向上游传导,形成制造商之间的竞争。因此,可以认为是制造商和零售商组成的两个谈判组合之间进行竞争。
①策略性效应与间接效应的区别在于:在Bertrand竞争的情况下,提高批发价格的直接效应对企业自身是不利的,在没有策略性效应的情况下企业不会提高批发价格。而在Cournot竞争的情况下,降低批发价格的直接效应对企业就是有利的,即使没有间接效应企业也会降低批发价格,间接效应只是加强了直接效应的作用,使批发价格降低得更多。
①加尔布雷斯在《美国资本主义:抗衡势力概念》一书中指出大型零售组织由于具有买方抗衡势力可以降低支付给供应商的批发价格,获得成本的节约,并把这种成本的节约传递给消费者,降低零售价格,增加消费者剩余。后来经济学家把这种观点称为“加尔布雷斯假说”。
①这主要是因为特许人一般拥有某种品牌或者技术专利,因此在与被特许人进行交易时就具有较大的外部选择价值,即若交易不成功,特许人通过选择其他被特许人依然可以获得更高的利润。而相对来说,被特许人的外部选择价值要小得多。正是较高的外部选择价值造成了特许人具有较大的势力。
[2]李飞,胡赛全,詹正茂.零售通道费形成机理——基于中国市场情境的多业态、多案例研究[J].中国工业经济,2013,(3):124-136.
[3]Marx,L.,Shaffer,G..Slotting Allowances and Scarce Shelf Space[J].Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,2010,19(3):575-603.
[4]李骏阳.对收取通道费原因的分析——基于我国零售企业的赢利模式研究[J].管理学报,2009,6(12):1691-1695.
[5]李伟,李凯.零售商买方势力一定会导致通道费吗?——基于纵向市场结构的合作博弈分析[J].产经评论,2014,5(6):92-103.
[6]Tirole,J..The Theory of Industrial Organization[M].Massachusetts:MIT press,1988.
[7]Rey,P.,Tirole,J..The Logic of Vertical Restraints[J].The American Economic Review,1985,76(5):921-939.
[8]Irmen,A..Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains[J].Journal of Economic Surveys,1998,12(4):333-359.
[9]Colangelo,G..Whole Price When Buyer are Asymmetric Cournout Competitors[J].The Manchester School,2006,74(2):156-169.
[10]Kelly,K..The Antitrust Analysis of Grocery Slotting Allowances:The Procompetitive Case[J].Journal of Public Policy&Marketing,1991,10(1):187-198.
[11]Chu,W..Demand Signalling and Screening in Channels of Distribution[J].Marketing Science,1992,11(4):327-347.
[12]Sullivan,M.W..Slotting Allowances and the Market for New Products[J].The Journal of Law and Economics,1997,40(2):461-494.
[13]Lariviere,M.A.,Padmanabhan,V..Slotting Allowances and New Product Introductions[J].Marketing Science,1997,16(2):112-128.
[14]Shaffer,G..Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance:A Comparison of Facilitating Practices[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,1991,22(1):120-135.
[15]Mac Avoy,C.J..Antitrust Treatment of Slotting Allowances[J].ABA Section of Antitrust Law,1997,45:9-11.
[16]汪浩.通道费与零售商市场力量[J].经济评论,2006,(1):29-34.
[17]Dhar,T..Can Margin Differences in Vertical Marketing Channels Lead to Contracts with Slotting Fees?[J].Management Science,2013,59(12):4-6.
[18]郑栋伟,陈宏民,杨剑侠.基于谈判机制的优质货架与通道费[J].管理评论,2012,24(1):99-107.
[19]Achrol,R.S..Slotting Allowances:A Time Series Analysis of Aggregate Effects over Three Decades[J].Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,2012,40(5):673-694.
[20]董烨然.通道费:大零售商挖掘市场效率的一种机制设计[J].财贸经济,2012,(3):94-102.
[21]孟卫东,代建生,熊维勤等.基于纳什谈判的供应商-销售商联合促销线性合约设计[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(4):870-877.
[22]Foros,.,Kind,H.J.,Sand,J.Y..Slotting Allowances and Manufacturers'Retail Sales Effort[J].Southern Economic Journal,2009,76(1):266-282.
[23]Symeonidis,G..Downstream Merger and Welfare in a Bilateral Oligopoly[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2010,28(3):230-243.
[24]Chen,Z..Dominant Retailers and the Countervailing-power Hypothesis[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,2003,34(4):612-625.
[25]Spengler,J.J..Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy[J].The Journal of Political Economy,1950,58(4):347-352.
[26]Horn,H.,Wolinsky,A..Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,1988,19(3):408-419.
[27]Gal-Or,E..Duopolistic Vertical Restraints[J].European Economic Review,1991,35(6):1237-1253.
[28]Winter,R.A..Vertical Control and Price versus Nonprice Competition[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1993,108(1):61-76.
[29]Hotelling,H..Stability in Competition[J].The Economic Journal,1929,39(153):41-57.
[30]Schulz,N..Does the Service Argument Justify Resale Price Maintenance?[J].Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,2007,163(2):236-255.
[31]马丁.高级产业经济学[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2003.
[32]Bonanno,G.,Vickers,J..Vertical Separation[J].The Journal of Industrial Economics,1988,36(3):257-265.
[33]Vickers,J..Delegation and the Theory of the Firm[J].The Economic Journal,1985,95(377):138-147.
[34]Sklivas,S.D..The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives[J].The Rand Journal of Economics,1987,18(3):452-458.
[35]Fershtman,C.,Judd,K.L..Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly[J].The American Economic Review,1987,77(5):927-940.
[36]Milliou,C.,Petrakis,E..Upstream Horizontal Mergers,Vertical Contracts,and Bargaining[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2007,25(5):963-987.
[37]Hunter,A..Notes on Countervailing Power[J].The Economic Journal,1958,68(269):89-103.
[38]Stigler,G.J..The Economist Plays with Blocs[J].The American Economic Review,1954,44(2):7-14.
①李怀东(2006)[1]指出中石化一般先向加油站一次性收取1-5万元的加盟费,然后每月收取销售收入的0.2%-0.5%作为特许权使用费。特许权使用费加上制造商的边际成本,就是制造商向零售商收取的批发价格,因此,特许权使用费和批发价格二者在本质上是等价的。
①买方抗衡势力的概念最早由加尔布雷斯提出,它是指下游买方企业相对于上游卖方企业具有一定的市场势力,可以和上游讨价还价,获得更加优惠的交易条款。
②传统的纵向约束文献使用更多的是两部收费制的概念,而不是特许费。因为这类文献在进行理论建模时都假设制造商和零售商使用两部收费制进行交易,均衡的结果都是制造商向零售商收取特许费,因此这类文献中的两部收费制就等同于制造商向零售商收取特许费。为了与原文的表述相一致,本文在对这类文献进行综述时使用两部收费制的概念,而不使用特许费的概念。
①关于通道费研究更加详细的综述可以参见李伟和李凯(2014)[5]。
①纳什讨价还价本质上是一个合作博弈,它要求合作双方首先将联合利润最大化作为双方谈判的共同目标。随着市场竞争的加剧,制造商与零售商之间通过合作谈判签订交易合约已逐渐成为行业发展的趋势,详细内容可以参见http://lgpt.ccfa.org.cn/newsinfocontent?id=1642,这也是本文合作谈判假设的现实依据。
①也可以假设零售商是同质的,而制造商生产的产品存在横向差异,这种假设更加符合现实。现实产业中有很多产品都是横向差异化的产品,比如相同功能不同颜色的产品。为了便于叙述,后文中均认为零售商的产品是差异化的而不再强调差异化的来源。
②虽然本文中制造商之间不存在直接的竞争,但是由于假设制造商和零售商之间进行一对一的交易,所以零售商之间的竞争可以向上游传导,形成制造商之间的竞争。因此,可以认为是制造商和零售商组成的两个谈判组合之间进行竞争。
①策略性效应与间接效应的区别在于:在Bertrand竞争的情况下,提高批发价格的直接效应对企业自身是不利的,在没有策略性效应的情况下企业不会提高批发价格。而在Cournot竞争的情况下,降低批发价格的直接效应对企业就是有利的,即使没有间接效应企业也会降低批发价格,间接效应只是加强了直接效应的作用,使批发价格降低得更多。
①加尔布雷斯在《美国资本主义:抗衡势力概念》一书中指出大型零售组织由于具有买方抗衡势力可以降低支付给供应商的批发价格,获得成本的节约,并把这种成本的节约传递给消费者,降低零售价格,增加消费者剩余。后来经济学家把这种观点称为“加尔布雷斯假说”。
①这主要是因为特许人一般拥有某种品牌或者技术专利,因此在与被特许人进行交易时就具有较大的外部选择价值,即若交易不成功,特许人通过选择其他被特许人依然可以获得更高的利润。而相对来说,被特许人的外部选择价值要小得多。正是较高的外部选择价值造成了特许人具有较大的势力。