复合型邻避补偿政策框架建构及运作机制研究
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摘要
我国邻避治理路径逐步由"事件控制"向"风险治理"转型,对理论研究产生了新需求,特别期待行之有效的政策供给和机制设计。本文以邻避补偿政策为切入点,研究在风险、利益、信任等因素交织的复杂情景中,如何设计货币补偿与非货币补偿、直接补偿与间接补偿、个体补偿与社区补偿等多种形式复合的补偿政策及构建配套运作机制,以回应我国邻避治理中补偿方案设计的实践需求。研究发现,邻避补偿的作用具有很强的情景依赖性,受到邻避风险类型和决策程序的影响。本文建立了"风险-利益-程序"分析框架,以邻避补偿有效性为核心,围绕政策设计讨论了补偿形式及组合、对象和时机等政策要素,并从邻避类型的匹配性和补偿决策的参与性两个方面探讨了保障补偿政策有效运行的机制。
Effective policy supply and mechanism design are urgently expected when NIMBY conflict governance has been experienced a dramatic transition from "conflict control" to "risk governance". This article discusses how to design an effective combined compensation policy for NIMBY facility siting in complex scenarios where risks, interests and trusts are intertwined. The combined compensation policy may include monetary or non-monetary compensation, direct or indirect compensation, and individual or community compensation. The effectiveness of compensation policy depends on risk types of NIMBY facility and policy-making procedure of siting. This article established a contingency framework with the dimensions of "risk-benefit-procedure" and discussed the main compensation policy elements, including compensation content, forms, combination and timing. In order to realize the positive effect, this article discussed the operation mechanism of NIMBY compensation policy.It suggested that operation mechanism should solve the two problems: match to risk types and participate in policy-making procedure.
Effective policy supply and mechanism design are urgently expected when NIMBY conflict governance has been experienced a dramatic transition from "conflict control" to "risk governance". This article discusses how to design an effective combined compensation policy for NIMBY facility siting in complex scenarios where risks, interests and trusts are intertwined. The combined compensation policy may include monetary or non-monetary compensation, direct or indirect compensation, and individual or community compensation. The effectiveness of compensation policy depends on risk types of NIMBY facility and policy-making procedure of siting. This article established a contingency framework with the dimensions of "risk-benefit-procedure" and discussed the main compensation policy elements, including compensation content, forms, combination and timing. In order to realize the positive effect, this article discussed the operation mechanism of NIMBY compensation policy.It suggested that operation mechanism should solve the two problems: match to risk types and participate in policy-making procedure.
引文
[1]王佃利,王玉龙,于棋.从“邻避管控”到“邻避治理”:中国邻避问题治理路径转型[J].中国行政管理,2017(5).
[2][31][41]王慧敏,江南.杭州解开了“邻避”这个结[N].人民日报,2017-03-24.
[3][32][45]Kunreuther,H.,D.Easterling.The Role of Compensation in Siting Hazardous Facilities.Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,1996,15(4).
[4]周亚越,俞海山.邻避冲突、外部性及其政府治理的经济手段研究[J].浙江社会科学,2015(2).
[5][16]何艳玲.对“别在我家后院”的制度化回应探析--城镇化中的“邻避冲突”与“环境正义”[J].人民论坛·学术前沿,2014(6).
[6][17]陶鹏,童星.邻避型群体性事件及其治理[J].南京社会科学,2010(8).
[7]张效羽.环境公害设施选址的困境及其化解--以宁波市镇海PX项目争议为例[J].行政管理改革,2012(12).
[8]王佃利,王庆歌,韩婷.“应得”正义观:分配正义视角下邻避风险的化解思路[J].山东社会科学,2017(3).
[9][15][18]黄峥.金钱、公园还是养老保障:邻避设施的补偿效应研究[J].中国行政管理,2017(10).
[10][20]汤汇浩.邻避效应:公益性项目的补偿机制与公民参与[J].中国行政管理,2011(7).
[11][21][43]杨磊,陈璐,刘海宁.空间正义视角下的邻避冲突与邻避设施供给要件探析--以武汉某临终关怀医院抗争事件为例[J].华中科技大学学报(社会科学版),2018(1).
[12]刘海龙.邻避冲突的生成与化解:环境正义的视角[J].吉首大学学报(社会科学版),2018(2).
[13]钱坤,黄忠全,刘小峰.基于演化博弈视角的邻避设施环境补偿机理[J].系统工程,2017(3).
[14]刘小峰.邻避设施的选址与环境补偿研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2013(12).
[19]Renn,O,P.-J.Schweizer.Inclusive Risk Governance:Concepts and Application to Environmental Policy Making.Environmental Policy and Governance,2009.19(3).
[22]Bacot,H.,T.Bowen,M.R.Fitzgerald,Managing the Solid Waste Crisis.Policy Studies Journal,1994,22(2).
[23]Jenkins-Smith,H,H.Kunreuther.Mitigation and Compensation as Policy Tools for Siting:Evidence from Field Survey Data,University of New Mexico Institute for Public Policy:Albuquerque,1998.
[24]Gravelle,T.B,E.Lachapelle.Politics,Proximity and the Pipeline:Mapping Public Attitudes Toward Keystone XL.Energy Policy,2015(83).
[25][29][49]Kermagoret,C.,et al.,Individual Preferences Regarding Environmental Offset and Welfare Compensation:a Choice Experiment Application to an Offshore Wind Farm Project.Ecological Economics,2016(129).
[26]Frey,B.S.,F.Oberholzer-Gee,and R.Eichenberger,The Old Lady Visits Your Backyard:A Tale of Morals and Markets.Journal of Political Economy,1996.104(6):1297-1313.
[27][42]Kunreuther,H.and D.Easterling,Are RiskBenefit Tradeoffs Possible in Siting Hazardous Facilities?The American Economic Review,1990.80(2):252-256.
[28]Claro,E.Exchange Relationships and the Environment:The Acceptability of Compensation in the Siting of Waste Disposal Facilities.Environmental Values,2007.16(2):187-208.
[30]Shaw,R..An Economic Framework for Analyzing Facility Siting Policies in Taiwan and Japan.in Energy,Environment and the Economy:Asian Perspectives.Aldershot:Edward Elgar,1996.
[31]Jenkins-Smith,H.C.,C.L.Silva.The Role of Risk Perception and Technical Information in Scientific Debates over Nuclear Waste Storage.Reliability Engineering&System Safety,1998.59(1):p.107-122.
[33]Slovic,P.,Perception of Risk[J].Science,1987.236(4799):p.280-285.
[34]Kasperson,R.E.Siting Hazardous Facilities:Searching for Effective Institutions and Process,in Managing Conflict in Facility Siting:An International Comparison,Edward Elgar Publishing,2005.
[35]刘冰,苏宏宇.邻避项目解决方案探索:西方国家危险设施选址的经验及启示[J].中国应急管理,2013(8).
[36]刘向晖,周丽娜.历史的鉴证--厦门PX事件始末[J].中国新闻周刊,2007(48).
[38]International Risk Governance Council.Risk Governance:towards an Intergrative Approach,2005.
[39]Renn,O..Risk Governance:Coping with Uncertainty in a Complex World.London:Earthscan,2008.
[40]Slovic,P..The Perception of Risk.London:Earthscan,2000.
[44]Chiou,C.-T.,J.Lee,T.Fung.Negotiated Compensation for NIMBY Facilities:Siting of Incinerators in Taiwan.Asian Geographer,2011.28(2):105-121.
[46]Lesbirel,H.S.,D.Shaw.Managing conflict in facility siting:An international comparison.Boston,MA:Edward Edgar,2005.
[47]孟天广.从因果效应到因果机制:实验政治学的中国路径[J].探索,2017(5).
[48]臧雷振.政治学研究中的实验方法--近年来的应用进展及研究议题分布[J].国外理论动态,2016(5).
[50]Terwel,B.W.,E.ter Mors.Host Community Compensation in a Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage(CCS)Context:Comparing the Preferences of Dutch Citizens and Local Government Authorities.Environmental Science&Policy,2015(50):15-23.
[2][31][41]王慧敏,江南.杭州解开了“邻避”这个结[N].人民日报,2017-03-24.
[3][32][45]Kunreuther,H.,D.Easterling.The Role of Compensation in Siting Hazardous Facilities.Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,1996,15(4).
[4]周亚越,俞海山.邻避冲突、外部性及其政府治理的经济手段研究[J].浙江社会科学,2015(2).
[5][16]何艳玲.对“别在我家后院”的制度化回应探析--城镇化中的“邻避冲突”与“环境正义”[J].人民论坛·学术前沿,2014(6).
[6][17]陶鹏,童星.邻避型群体性事件及其治理[J].南京社会科学,2010(8).
[7]张效羽.环境公害设施选址的困境及其化解--以宁波市镇海PX项目争议为例[J].行政管理改革,2012(12).
[8]王佃利,王庆歌,韩婷.“应得”正义观:分配正义视角下邻避风险的化解思路[J].山东社会科学,2017(3).
[9][15][18]黄峥.金钱、公园还是养老保障:邻避设施的补偿效应研究[J].中国行政管理,2017(10).
[10][20]汤汇浩.邻避效应:公益性项目的补偿机制与公民参与[J].中国行政管理,2011(7).
[11][21][43]杨磊,陈璐,刘海宁.空间正义视角下的邻避冲突与邻避设施供给要件探析--以武汉某临终关怀医院抗争事件为例[J].华中科技大学学报(社会科学版),2018(1).
[12]刘海龙.邻避冲突的生成与化解:环境正义的视角[J].吉首大学学报(社会科学版),2018(2).
[13]钱坤,黄忠全,刘小峰.基于演化博弈视角的邻避设施环境补偿机理[J].系统工程,2017(3).
[14]刘小峰.邻避设施的选址与环境补偿研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2013(12).
[19]Renn,O,P.-J.Schweizer.Inclusive Risk Governance:Concepts and Application to Environmental Policy Making.Environmental Policy and Governance,2009.19(3).
[22]Bacot,H.,T.Bowen,M.R.Fitzgerald,Managing the Solid Waste Crisis.Policy Studies Journal,1994,22(2).
[23]Jenkins-Smith,H,H.Kunreuther.Mitigation and Compensation as Policy Tools for Siting:Evidence from Field Survey Data,University of New Mexico Institute for Public Policy:Albuquerque,1998.
[24]Gravelle,T.B,E.Lachapelle.Politics,Proximity and the Pipeline:Mapping Public Attitudes Toward Keystone XL.Energy Policy,2015(83).
[25][29][49]Kermagoret,C.,et al.,Individual Preferences Regarding Environmental Offset and Welfare Compensation:a Choice Experiment Application to an Offshore Wind Farm Project.Ecological Economics,2016(129).
[26]Frey,B.S.,F.Oberholzer-Gee,and R.Eichenberger,The Old Lady Visits Your Backyard:A Tale of Morals and Markets.Journal of Political Economy,1996.104(6):1297-1313.
[27][42]Kunreuther,H.and D.Easterling,Are RiskBenefit Tradeoffs Possible in Siting Hazardous Facilities?The American Economic Review,1990.80(2):252-256.
[28]Claro,E.Exchange Relationships and the Environment:The Acceptability of Compensation in the Siting of Waste Disposal Facilities.Environmental Values,2007.16(2):187-208.
[30]Shaw,R..An Economic Framework for Analyzing Facility Siting Policies in Taiwan and Japan.in Energy,Environment and the Economy:Asian Perspectives.Aldershot:Edward Elgar,1996.
[31]Jenkins-Smith,H.C.,C.L.Silva.The Role of Risk Perception and Technical Information in Scientific Debates over Nuclear Waste Storage.Reliability Engineering&System Safety,1998.59(1):p.107-122.
[33]Slovic,P.,Perception of Risk[J].Science,1987.236(4799):p.280-285.
[34]Kasperson,R.E.Siting Hazardous Facilities:Searching for Effective Institutions and Process,in Managing Conflict in Facility Siting:An International Comparison,Edward Elgar Publishing,2005.
[35]刘冰,苏宏宇.邻避项目解决方案探索:西方国家危险设施选址的经验及启示[J].中国应急管理,2013(8).
[36]刘向晖,周丽娜.历史的鉴证--厦门PX事件始末[J].中国新闻周刊,2007(48).
[38]International Risk Governance Council.Risk Governance:towards an Intergrative Approach,2005.
[39]Renn,O..Risk Governance:Coping with Uncertainty in a Complex World.London:Earthscan,2008.
[40]Slovic,P..The Perception of Risk.London:Earthscan,2000.
[44]Chiou,C.-T.,J.Lee,T.Fung.Negotiated Compensation for NIMBY Facilities:Siting of Incinerators in Taiwan.Asian Geographer,2011.28(2):105-121.
[46]Lesbirel,H.S.,D.Shaw.Managing conflict in facility siting:An international comparison.Boston,MA:Edward Edgar,2005.
[47]孟天广.从因果效应到因果机制:实验政治学的中国路径[J].探索,2017(5).
[48]臧雷振.政治学研究中的实验方法--近年来的应用进展及研究议题分布[J].国外理论动态,2016(5).
[50]Terwel,B.W.,E.ter Mors.Host Community Compensation in a Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage(CCS)Context:Comparing the Preferences of Dutch Citizens and Local Government Authorities.Environmental Science&Policy,2015(50):15-23.
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