CEO贫困出身、薪酬激励与企业风险承担
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摘要
本文利用2007—2017年沪深A股上市公司数据,考察CEO的贫困出身对企业风险承担的影响,并基于薪酬异质性和薪酬公平性两个维度进一步探究薪酬激励在其中的调节作用,研究发现:(1) CEO的贫困出身显著抑制企业风险承担,表现出风险规避型性格特征;(2)将薪酬激励细化为股权激励和货币薪酬,非国有企业中,股权激励显著提高贫困出身CEO的风险承担意愿,而高额的货币薪酬则显著加剧贫困出身CEO的风险规避倾向,但国有企业贫困出身CEO的风险承担意愿与薪酬激励不存在显著相关关系;(3)基于薪酬公平性视角,非国有企业中,贫困出身CEO的薪酬总额低于行业平均水平越多,其风险承担意愿提升越显著,但若其薪酬总额高于行业平均越多,则会显著加剧其风险规避倾向,并且这种效应不存在于国有企业样本中。上述结论在考虑内生性影响后依然稳健。
This paper examines the relationship between CEOs who were born poor and corporate risk-taking,and further explores moderating effects of compensation heterogeneity and compensation equality with the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2017. It is found that,firstly,firms with CEOs born in poverty counties significantly undertake less risk. Secondly,for CEOs born in poverty counties,equity compensation can increase the willingness for their risk-taking,while monetary compensation can aggravate the risk aversion tendency,but these moderating effects are significant only existing in non-state-owned firms. Thirdly,from the perspective of the compensation equality,when the wages of the CEOs born in poverty counties are lower than that of industrial average,it would increase the willingness for their risk-taking,but there is no significant relation between compensation equality and corporate risk-taking for state-owned firms. The results are still robust after considering the endogenous problem.
This paper examines the relationship between CEOs who were born poor and corporate risk-taking,and further explores moderating effects of compensation heterogeneity and compensation equality with the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2017. It is found that,firstly,firms with CEOs born in poverty counties significantly undertake less risk. Secondly,for CEOs born in poverty counties,equity compensation can increase the willingness for their risk-taking,while monetary compensation can aggravate the risk aversion tendency,but these moderating effects are significant only existing in non-state-owned firms. Thirdly,from the perspective of the compensation equality,when the wages of the CEOs born in poverty counties are lower than that of industrial average,it would increase the willingness for their risk-taking,but there is no significant relation between compensation equality and corporate risk-taking for state-owned firms. The results are still robust after considering the endogenous problem.
引文
[1]马草原,李成.国有经济效率、增长目标硬约束与货币政策超调[J].经济研究,2013(7):76-89,160.
[2]毛捷,吉黎,赵忠秀.亏损抵扣,风险分担与企业投资---“沉睡合伙人”假说的经验证据[J].金融研究,2016(10):174-189.
[3]JOHN K,LITOV L,YEUNG B.Corporate governance and risk-taking[J].The Journal of Finance,2008,63(4):1679-1728.
[4]HILARY G,HUI K W.Does religion matter in corporate decision making in American[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,93(3):455-473.
[5]余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.管理者过度自信与企业风险承担[J].金融研究,2013(1):149-163.
[6]ACEMOGLU D,ZILIBOTTI F.Was Prometheus unbound by chance?Risk,diversification,and growth[J].Journal of Political Economy,1997,105(4):709-751.
[7]HAMBRICK D C,MASON P A.Upper echelons:the organization as a reflection of its top managers[J].Academy of Management Review,1984,9(2):193-206.
[8]MIHET R.Effects of culture on firm risk-taking:a cross-country and cross-industry analysis[J].Journal of Cultural Economics,2013,37(1):109-151.
[9]SCHOAR A,ZUO L.Shaped by booms and busts:how the economy impacts CEO careers and management styles[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2017,30(5):1425-1456.
[10]CRONQVIST H,YU F.Shaped by their daughters:executives,female socialization,and corporate social responsibility[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2017,126(3):543-562.
[11]FREUD S.A general introduction to psychoanalysis[M].New York:Boni and Liveright,1920.
[12]MEHTA D,KLENGEL T,CONNEELY K N,et al.Childhood maltreatment is associated with distinct genomic and epigenetic profiles in posttraumatic stress disorder[J].Proceedings of The National Academy of Sciences,2013,110(20):8302-8307.
[13]JENSEN M C,MURPHY K J.Performance pay and top-management incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(2):225-264.
[14]CORE J E,HOLTHAUSEN R W,LARCKER D F.Corporate governance,chief executive officer compensation,and firm performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,51(3):371-406.
[15]CHOY H,LIN J,OFFICER M S.Does freezing a defined benefit pension plan affect firm risk?[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2014,57(1):1-21.
[16]LOW A.Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,92(3):470-490.
[17]SHUE K,TOWNSEND R R.How do quasi-random option grants affect CEO risk-taking?[J].The Journal of Finance,2017,72(6):2551-2588.
[18]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2):92-101.
[19]黎文靖,岑永嗣,胡玉明.外部薪酬差距激励了高管吗---基于中国上市公司经理人市场与产权性质的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,2014(4):24-35.
[20]LI K,GRIFFIN D,YUE H,et al.How does culture influence corporate risk-taking?[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2013,23:1-22.
[21]杨瑞龙,章逸然,杨继东.制度能缓解社会冲突对企业风险承担的冲击吗?[J].经济研究,2017(8):140-154.
[22]BOUBAKRI N,MANSI S A,SAFFAR W.Political institutions,connectedness,and corporate risk-taking[J].Journal of International Business Studies,2013,44(3):195-215.
[23]余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.民营化、产权保护与企业风险承担[J].经济研究,2013(9):112-124.
[24]SAUNDERS A,SONG K.Bank monitoring and CEO risk-taking incentives[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2018,88(c):225-240.
[25]GRAHAM J R,HARVEY C R,PURI M.Capital allocation and delegation of decision-making authority within firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2015,115(3):449-470.
[26]BUSHMAN R M,DAVIDSON R H,DEY A,et al.Bank CEO materialism:risk controls,culture and tail risk[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2018,65(1):191-220.
[27]MALMENDIER U,NAGEL S.Depression babies:do macroeconomic experiences affect risk taking?[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2011,126(1):373-416.
[28]BENMELECH E,FRYDMAN C.Military CEOs[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2015,117(1):43-59.
[29]BERNILE G,BHAGWAT V,RAU P R.What doesn't kill you will only make you more risk-loving:early-life disasters and CEO behavior[J].The Journal of Finance,2017,72(1):167-205.
[30]WU X,TREIMAN D J.The household registration system and social stratification in China:1955-1996[J].Demography,2004,41(2):363-384.
[31]CLARK A E,D’AMBROSIO C,GHISLANDI S.Poverty profiles and well-being:panel evidence from Germany[Z].SOEP Papers No.739,2015.
[32]徐富明,张慧,马红宇,等.贫困问题:基于心理学的视角[J].心理科学进展,2017(8):1431-1440.
[33]CIALDINI R B.Influence:the psychology of persuasion:the psychology of persuasion[M].New York:William Morrow,1987.
[34]DENRELL J,MARCH J G.Adaptation as information restriction:the hot stove effect[J].Organization Science,2001,12(5):523-538.
[35]DITTMAR A,DUCHIN R.Looking in the rearview mirror:the effect of managers'professional experience on corporate financial policy[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2016,29(3):565-602.
[36]ELDER G H.Children of the great depression[M].Colorado:Westview Press,1998.
[37]CAMPBELL C A.A decision theory model for entrepreneuri al acts[J].Entrepreneurship:Theory and Practice,1992,17(1):21-28.
[38]肖斌卿,张龙耀,孙天一.农户心理与储蓄决策行为---基于江苏省821户农户调查数据的实证分析[J].农业技术经济,2016(1):60-70.
[39]JENSEN M C.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers[J].The American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[40]JENSEN M C,MECKLING W.Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[41]KEMPF A,RUENZI S,THIELE T.Employment risk,compensation incentives,and managerial risk taking:evidence from the mutual fund industry[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,92(1):92-108.
[42]KERR J,BETTIS R A.Boards of directors,top management compensation and shareholder returns[J].Academy of Management Journal,1987,30(4):645-664.
[43]KAHNEMAN D,KNETSCH J L,THALER R H.Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem[J].Journal of political Economy,1990,98(6):1325-1348.
[44]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7):36-50.
[45]ADAMS J S.Inequity in social exchange[J].Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,1965,2:267-299.
[46]李实,刘小玄.攀比行为和攀比效应[J].经济研究,1986(8):74-78.
[47]吴联生,林景艺,王亚平.薪酬外部公平性、股权性质与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2010(3):117-126,188.
[48]罗宏,曾永良,宛玲羽.薪酬攀比,盈余管理与高管薪酬操纵[J].南开管理评论,2016(2):19-31,74.
[49]康育文,陈青萍.贫困大学生心身健康与自尊、人际关系、成就动机的相关[J].中国临床心理学杂志,2006(5):510-512.
[50]林少惠,陈俊.贫困大学生的逆境商与成就动机[J].中国心理卫生杂志,2011(9):691-694.
[51]许年行,李哲.高管贫困经历与企业慈善捐赠[J].经济研究,2016(12):133-146.
[52]肖星,陈婵.激励水平、约束机制与上市公司股权激励计划[J].南开管理评论,2013(1):24-32.
[53]汪平,邹颖,黄丽凤.高管薪酬激励的核心重构:资本成本约束观[J].中国工业经济,2014(5):109-121.
[54]洪正,申宇,吴玮.高管薪酬激励会导致银行过度冒险吗?---来自中国房地产信贷市场的证据[J].经济学(季刊),2014(4):1585-1614.
[55]王铁男,王宇,赵凤.环境因素、CEO过度自信与IT投资绩效[J].管理世界,2017(9):116-128.
[56]FACCIO M,MARCHICA M,MURA R.CEO gender,corporate risk-taking,and the efficiency of capital allocation[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,39:193-209.
[57]LENNOX C S,FRANCIS J R,WANG Z.Selection models in accounting research[J].The Accounting Review,2011,87(2):589-616.
[58]SRINIDHI B,GUL F A,TSUI J.Female directors and earnings quality[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2011,28(5):1610-1644.
[59]BARGERON L L,LEHN K M,ZUTTER C J.Sarbanes-Oxley and corporate risk-taking[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,49(1-2):34-52.
(1)由于风险承担指标(Risktaking)采用企业前瞻3期的盈利波动率衡量,因而2015年的企业风险承担指标用到了2015、2016和2017年的盈利数据,即数据选取区间为2007—2017年,实际衡量的是2007—2015年的企业风险承担指标。
(1)限于版面,本文未展示稳健性检验的结果,如有需要可向作者索要。
[2]毛捷,吉黎,赵忠秀.亏损抵扣,风险分担与企业投资---“沉睡合伙人”假说的经验证据[J].金融研究,2016(10):174-189.
[3]JOHN K,LITOV L,YEUNG B.Corporate governance and risk-taking[J].The Journal of Finance,2008,63(4):1679-1728.
[4]HILARY G,HUI K W.Does religion matter in corporate decision making in American[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,93(3):455-473.
[5]余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.管理者过度自信与企业风险承担[J].金融研究,2013(1):149-163.
[6]ACEMOGLU D,ZILIBOTTI F.Was Prometheus unbound by chance?Risk,diversification,and growth[J].Journal of Political Economy,1997,105(4):709-751.
[7]HAMBRICK D C,MASON P A.Upper echelons:the organization as a reflection of its top managers[J].Academy of Management Review,1984,9(2):193-206.
[8]MIHET R.Effects of culture on firm risk-taking:a cross-country and cross-industry analysis[J].Journal of Cultural Economics,2013,37(1):109-151.
[9]SCHOAR A,ZUO L.Shaped by booms and busts:how the economy impacts CEO careers and management styles[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2017,30(5):1425-1456.
[10]CRONQVIST H,YU F.Shaped by their daughters:executives,female socialization,and corporate social responsibility[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2017,126(3):543-562.
[11]FREUD S.A general introduction to psychoanalysis[M].New York:Boni and Liveright,1920.
[12]MEHTA D,KLENGEL T,CONNEELY K N,et al.Childhood maltreatment is associated with distinct genomic and epigenetic profiles in posttraumatic stress disorder[J].Proceedings of The National Academy of Sciences,2013,110(20):8302-8307.
[13]JENSEN M C,MURPHY K J.Performance pay and top-management incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(2):225-264.
[14]CORE J E,HOLTHAUSEN R W,LARCKER D F.Corporate governance,chief executive officer compensation,and firm performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,51(3):371-406.
[15]CHOY H,LIN J,OFFICER M S.Does freezing a defined benefit pension plan affect firm risk?[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2014,57(1):1-21.
[16]LOW A.Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,92(3):470-490.
[17]SHUE K,TOWNSEND R R.How do quasi-random option grants affect CEO risk-taking?[J].The Journal of Finance,2017,72(6):2551-2588.
[18]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2):92-101.
[19]黎文靖,岑永嗣,胡玉明.外部薪酬差距激励了高管吗---基于中国上市公司经理人市场与产权性质的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,2014(4):24-35.
[20]LI K,GRIFFIN D,YUE H,et al.How does culture influence corporate risk-taking?[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2013,23:1-22.
[21]杨瑞龙,章逸然,杨继东.制度能缓解社会冲突对企业风险承担的冲击吗?[J].经济研究,2017(8):140-154.
[22]BOUBAKRI N,MANSI S A,SAFFAR W.Political institutions,connectedness,and corporate risk-taking[J].Journal of International Business Studies,2013,44(3):195-215.
[23]余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.民营化、产权保护与企业风险承担[J].经济研究,2013(9):112-124.
[24]SAUNDERS A,SONG K.Bank monitoring and CEO risk-taking incentives[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2018,88(c):225-240.
[25]GRAHAM J R,HARVEY C R,PURI M.Capital allocation and delegation of decision-making authority within firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2015,115(3):449-470.
[26]BUSHMAN R M,DAVIDSON R H,DEY A,et al.Bank CEO materialism:risk controls,culture and tail risk[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2018,65(1):191-220.
[27]MALMENDIER U,NAGEL S.Depression babies:do macroeconomic experiences affect risk taking?[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2011,126(1):373-416.
[28]BENMELECH E,FRYDMAN C.Military CEOs[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2015,117(1):43-59.
[29]BERNILE G,BHAGWAT V,RAU P R.What doesn't kill you will only make you more risk-loving:early-life disasters and CEO behavior[J].The Journal of Finance,2017,72(1):167-205.
[30]WU X,TREIMAN D J.The household registration system and social stratification in China:1955-1996[J].Demography,2004,41(2):363-384.
[31]CLARK A E,D’AMBROSIO C,GHISLANDI S.Poverty profiles and well-being:panel evidence from Germany[Z].SOEP Papers No.739,2015.
[32]徐富明,张慧,马红宇,等.贫困问题:基于心理学的视角[J].心理科学进展,2017(8):1431-1440.
[33]CIALDINI R B.Influence:the psychology of persuasion:the psychology of persuasion[M].New York:William Morrow,1987.
[34]DENRELL J,MARCH J G.Adaptation as information restriction:the hot stove effect[J].Organization Science,2001,12(5):523-538.
[35]DITTMAR A,DUCHIN R.Looking in the rearview mirror:the effect of managers'professional experience on corporate financial policy[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2016,29(3):565-602.
[36]ELDER G H.Children of the great depression[M].Colorado:Westview Press,1998.
[37]CAMPBELL C A.A decision theory model for entrepreneuri al acts[J].Entrepreneurship:Theory and Practice,1992,17(1):21-28.
[38]肖斌卿,张龙耀,孙天一.农户心理与储蓄决策行为---基于江苏省821户农户调查数据的实证分析[J].农业技术经济,2016(1):60-70.
[39]JENSEN M C.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers[J].The American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[40]JENSEN M C,MECKLING W.Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[41]KEMPF A,RUENZI S,THIELE T.Employment risk,compensation incentives,and managerial risk taking:evidence from the mutual fund industry[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,92(1):92-108.
[42]KERR J,BETTIS R A.Boards of directors,top management compensation and shareholder returns[J].Academy of Management Journal,1987,30(4):645-664.
[43]KAHNEMAN D,KNETSCH J L,THALER R H.Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem[J].Journal of political Economy,1990,98(6):1325-1348.
[44]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7):36-50.
[45]ADAMS J S.Inequity in social exchange[J].Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,1965,2:267-299.
[46]李实,刘小玄.攀比行为和攀比效应[J].经济研究,1986(8):74-78.
[47]吴联生,林景艺,王亚平.薪酬外部公平性、股权性质与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2010(3):117-126,188.
[48]罗宏,曾永良,宛玲羽.薪酬攀比,盈余管理与高管薪酬操纵[J].南开管理评论,2016(2):19-31,74.
[49]康育文,陈青萍.贫困大学生心身健康与自尊、人际关系、成就动机的相关[J].中国临床心理学杂志,2006(5):510-512.
[50]林少惠,陈俊.贫困大学生的逆境商与成就动机[J].中国心理卫生杂志,2011(9):691-694.
[51]许年行,李哲.高管贫困经历与企业慈善捐赠[J].经济研究,2016(12):133-146.
[52]肖星,陈婵.激励水平、约束机制与上市公司股权激励计划[J].南开管理评论,2013(1):24-32.
[53]汪平,邹颖,黄丽凤.高管薪酬激励的核心重构:资本成本约束观[J].中国工业经济,2014(5):109-121.
[54]洪正,申宇,吴玮.高管薪酬激励会导致银行过度冒险吗?---来自中国房地产信贷市场的证据[J].经济学(季刊),2014(4):1585-1614.
[55]王铁男,王宇,赵凤.环境因素、CEO过度自信与IT投资绩效[J].管理世界,2017(9):116-128.
[56]FACCIO M,MARCHICA M,MURA R.CEO gender,corporate risk-taking,and the efficiency of capital allocation[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,39:193-209.
[57]LENNOX C S,FRANCIS J R,WANG Z.Selection models in accounting research[J].The Accounting Review,2011,87(2):589-616.
[58]SRINIDHI B,GUL F A,TSUI J.Female directors and earnings quality[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2011,28(5):1610-1644.
[59]BARGERON L L,LEHN K M,ZUTTER C J.Sarbanes-Oxley and corporate risk-taking[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,49(1-2):34-52.
(1)由于风险承担指标(Risktaking)采用企业前瞻3期的盈利波动率衡量,因而2015年的企业风险承担指标用到了2015、2016和2017年的盈利数据,即数据选取区间为2007—2017年,实际衡量的是2007—2015年的企业风险承担指标。
(1)限于版面,本文未展示稳健性检验的结果,如有需要可向作者索要。