翻新产品竞争下闭环供应链决策及政府政策作用分析
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摘要
基于电器电子行业,考虑翻新产品竞争及废旧产品可再利用率,构建由制造商与回收处理商组成的闭环供应链,建立无政府政策、财政政策与环境规制政策三种情形下的博弈模型,比较分析三种模型下新产品、翻新产品的产量与价格最优决策,讨论决策及利润与主要参数间的关系。研究表明:产品翻新制造成本存在某一阈值,当制造成本大于阈值上限时翻新产品产量为零,低于阈值下限时翻新产品产量为最大产能,属于三种模型下成本区间的交集时,财政政策下新产品产量更低、翻新产品产量更高,两类产品价格更高。财政政策使制造商利润下降,两种政策均使回收处理商利润增长。
Based on the electrical and electronic industry, considering the competition of refurbished product and renewable rate of waste products, this paper establishes three game models under different situations, there are anarchy policy, government finance and environmental regulation policy, and then, it discusses the optimal decisions of new and refurbished products, and the relationship between optimal strategies and various factors. Results show that, there is a certain threshold for the cost of product refurbishment. When the cost is greater than the upper limit of the threshold, the refurbished product production is zero, and the production is the maximum capacity when the cost is smaller than the lower limit. Besides, the finance policy will reduce new products' production and increase refurbished product production, and the price of two products will increase. The manufacturer's profit will decline under finance policy, and the recycling processor's profit will increase fewer than two policies.
Based on the electrical and electronic industry, considering the competition of refurbished product and renewable rate of waste products, this paper establishes three game models under different situations, there are anarchy policy, government finance and environmental regulation policy, and then, it discusses the optimal decisions of new and refurbished products, and the relationship between optimal strategies and various factors. Results show that, there is a certain threshold for the cost of product refurbishment. When the cost is greater than the upper limit of the threshold, the refurbished product production is zero, and the production is the maximum capacity when the cost is smaller than the lower limit. Besides, the finance policy will reduce new products' production and increase refurbished product production, and the price of two products will increase. The manufacturer's profit will decline under finance policy, and the recycling processor's profit will increase fewer than two policies.
引文
[1] 郑艳芳,周文慧,刘春会.回收渠道竞争下的中国EPR制度设计研究[J].管理科学学报,2017,20(10):103-115.
[2] 肖露,王先甲,钱桂生,等.基于产品设计的再制造激励以及政府干预的影响[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(5):1229-1242.
[3] Esenduran G, Kemahlio?luilu-Ziya E, Swaminathan J M. Impact of Take-Back Regulation on the Remanufacturing Industry[J]. Production & Operations Management, 2017, 26(5): 924-944.
[4] Sheu J B. Bargaining Framework for Competitive Green Supply Chains under Governmental Financial Intervention [J]. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2011, 47(5): 573-592.
[5] Shu T, Peng Z Z, Chen S, et al. Government Subsidy for Remanufacturing or Carbon Tax Rebate: Which Is Better for Firms and a Low-Carbon Economy[J]. Sustainability, 2017, 9(1):156.
[6] 张汉江,余华英,李聪颖.闭环供应链上的回收激励契约设计与政府补贴再制造政策的优化[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(8):71-78.
[7] 程发新,马方星,邵汉青.回收补贴下废旧产品质量不确定的闭环供应链定价决策及协调[J].软科学,2018,32(7):139-144.
[8] 田一辉,朱庆华.政府价格补贴下绿色供应链管理扩散博弈模型[J].系统工程学报,2016,31(4):526-535.
[9] 胡强,曹柬,贺小刚,等.基于政府补贴的制造企业生产战略决策研究[J].管理工程学报,2017,31(1):111-117.
[10] 夏西强,朱庆华,赵森林.政府补贴下制造/再制造竞争机理研究[J].管理科学学报,2017,20(4):71-83.
[11] 赵敬华,林杰.不同补贴对象下的闭环供应链定价模型[J].管理工程学报,2017,31(1):85-92.
[12] 赵晓敏,朱贺,谈成薇.政府财政干预对OEM厂商绿色再制造的影响[J].软科学,2016,30(6):30-34.
[13] 曹柬,胡强,吴晓波,等.基于EPR制度的政府与制造商激励契约设计[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(3):610-621.
[14] Sheu J B, Chen Y J. Impact of Government Financial Intervention on Competition among Green Supply Chains [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2012, 138(1): 201-213.
[15] 王文宾,邓雯雯.逆向供应链的政府奖惩机制与税收-补贴机制比较研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(4):102-110.
[16] 钟华.国际电器电子产品再制造的经验及对我国的启示[J].资源再生,2015(3):17-20.
[17] Ferrer G, Swaminathan J M. Managing New and Remanufactured Products [J]. Management Science, 2006, 52(1): 15-26.
[18] 朱庆华,夏西强,李幻云.政府补贴与专利费用下制造与再制造博弈模型[J].系统工程学报,2017,32(1):8-18.
①当(2bξ+b+τ-2)/2=0时,利润函数与产品产量呈线性关系;当(2bξv+b+τ-2)/2>0时,利润函数为凸函数,随着产品产量的增加,利润先降后增;显然(2bξv+b+τ-2)/2<0的情况更符合实际。
[2] 肖露,王先甲,钱桂生,等.基于产品设计的再制造激励以及政府干预的影响[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(5):1229-1242.
[3] Esenduran G, Kemahlio?luilu-Ziya E, Swaminathan J M. Impact of Take-Back Regulation on the Remanufacturing Industry[J]. Production & Operations Management, 2017, 26(5): 924-944.
[4] Sheu J B. Bargaining Framework for Competitive Green Supply Chains under Governmental Financial Intervention [J]. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2011, 47(5): 573-592.
[5] Shu T, Peng Z Z, Chen S, et al. Government Subsidy for Remanufacturing or Carbon Tax Rebate: Which Is Better for Firms and a Low-Carbon Economy[J]. Sustainability, 2017, 9(1):156.
[6] 张汉江,余华英,李聪颖.闭环供应链上的回收激励契约设计与政府补贴再制造政策的优化[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(8):71-78.
[7] 程发新,马方星,邵汉青.回收补贴下废旧产品质量不确定的闭环供应链定价决策及协调[J].软科学,2018,32(7):139-144.
[8] 田一辉,朱庆华.政府价格补贴下绿色供应链管理扩散博弈模型[J].系统工程学报,2016,31(4):526-535.
[9] 胡强,曹柬,贺小刚,等.基于政府补贴的制造企业生产战略决策研究[J].管理工程学报,2017,31(1):111-117.
[10] 夏西强,朱庆华,赵森林.政府补贴下制造/再制造竞争机理研究[J].管理科学学报,2017,20(4):71-83.
[11] 赵敬华,林杰.不同补贴对象下的闭环供应链定价模型[J].管理工程学报,2017,31(1):85-92.
[12] 赵晓敏,朱贺,谈成薇.政府财政干预对OEM厂商绿色再制造的影响[J].软科学,2016,30(6):30-34.
[13] 曹柬,胡强,吴晓波,等.基于EPR制度的政府与制造商激励契约设计[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(3):610-621.
[14] Sheu J B, Chen Y J. Impact of Government Financial Intervention on Competition among Green Supply Chains [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2012, 138(1): 201-213.
[15] 王文宾,邓雯雯.逆向供应链的政府奖惩机制与税收-补贴机制比较研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(4):102-110.
[16] 钟华.国际电器电子产品再制造的经验及对我国的启示[J].资源再生,2015(3):17-20.
[17] Ferrer G, Swaminathan J M. Managing New and Remanufactured Products [J]. Management Science, 2006, 52(1): 15-26.
[18] 朱庆华,夏西强,李幻云.政府补贴与专利费用下制造与再制造博弈模型[J].系统工程学报,2017,32(1):8-18.
①当(2bξ+b+τ-2)/2=0时,利润函数与产品产量呈线性关系;当(2bξv+b+τ-2)/2>0时,利润函数为凸函数,随着产品产量的增加,利润先降后增;显然(2bξv+b+τ-2)/2<0的情况更符合实际。