考虑“双积分”交易的双寡头新能源车企研发博弈
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摘要
"双积分"政策的推行,对社会福利函数以及新能源车企的生产研发决策函数都产生了重要的影响。本文通过三阶段博弈,对双寡头新能源车企在研发竞争以及研发合作两种情形中的最优产量、最优续航里程研发值以及政府关于"企业平均燃料消耗量"的最优核算优惠力度进行了计算,分析研发合作以及研发竞争两种情形下的企业总研发值、总利润、社会福利函数的变化趋势,从而为政府新能源汽车产业政策的制定以及新能源车企的研发决策提供建议。
The implementation of CAFC(Corporate Average Fuel Consumption) and NEV(New Energy Vehicle) integrals policy has exerted an important influence on both social welfare function and the production function of NEV enterprises.Through a three-stage game,this paper firstly calculates the optimal output of NEVs,the optimal R&D value of mileage range in one charge,and the optimal accounting discount of CAFC in both R&D competition and cooperation scenarios. This is followed by an analysis of the total R&D value and profit of NEV enterprises,as well as the variation tendency of social welfare function,which is a good reference for the policy making from governments and the decision making of NEV enterprises.
The implementation of CAFC(Corporate Average Fuel Consumption) and NEV(New Energy Vehicle) integrals policy has exerted an important influence on both social welfare function and the production function of NEV enterprises.Through a three-stage game,this paper firstly calculates the optimal output of NEVs,the optimal R&D value of mileage range in one charge,and the optimal accounting discount of CAFC in both R&D competition and cooperation scenarios. This is followed by an analysis of the total R&D value and profit of NEV enterprises,as well as the variation tendency of social welfare function,which is a good reference for the policy making from governments and the decision making of NEV enterprises.
引文
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[16]周亚虹,蒲余路,陈诗一,等.政府扶持与新型产业发展——以新能源为例[J].经济研究,2015,50(6):147~161.
[2] Chao Lu,Hu-Chen Liu,Jie Tao,et al. A Key Stakeholderbased Financial Subsidy Stimulation for Chinese EV Industrialization:A System Dynamics Simulation[J]. Technological Forecasting&Social Change,2017,118:1~14.
[3]徐晨曦.从鼓励先进到制约落后“双积分”政策折射我国新能源汽车产业发展新思路[J].中国战略新兴产业,2017,(33):20~23.
[4]王维,李昊展,乔朋华,等.政府补助方式对新能源汽车企业绩效影响研究——基于企业成长性的深入分析[J].科技进步与对策,2017,34(23):114~120.
[5]政策法规司.工信部解读双积分管理办法[N].政府采购信息报,2017-10-02,(13).
[6] Zhao D,Yu R,Ren H,et al. A Power,Economy and Space Trade-off Analysis on Passenger Vehicles Controlled with China CAFC Requirement[J]. Energy Procedia,2017,107:327~331.
[7]王江,王光辉.中国电动汽车技术演进分析:行动者网络视角[J].科技进步与对策,35(11):60~68.
[8]刘颖琦,王静宇,Kokko Ari.产业联盟中知识转移、技术创新对中国新能源汽车产业发展的影响[J].中国软科学,2016,(5):1~11.
[9]刘宗巍,刘斐齐,王悦,等. CAFC、NEV双积分与碳配额法规综合研究与组合政策思考[J].汽车工程学报,2017,7(1):1~9.
[10] Wang Y,Zhao F,Yuan Y,et al. Analysis of Typical Automakers'Strategies for Meeting the Dual-Credit Regulations Regarding CAFC and NEVs[J]. Automotive Innovation, 2018,(3):1~9.
[11]赵道致,原白云,夏良杰,等.碳排放约束下考虑制造商竞争的供应链动态博弈[J].工业工程与管理,2014,19(1):65~71.
[12] Du S,Ma F,Fu Z,et al. Game-theoretic Analysis for an Emission-dependent Supply Chain in a ‘Cap-and-Trade’ System[J]. Annals of Operations Research,2015,228(1):135~149.
[13]马俊,张杰.不完全信息采购环境下的供应链协调问题:拍卖机制的应用[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(6):70~77.
[14] Cohen CM,Klepper S. The Anatomy of Industry R&D Intensity Distributions[J]. The American Economic Review,1992,82(4):773~799.
[15]董雪兵,史晋川.累积创新框架下的知识产权保护研究[J].经济研究,2006,(5):97~105.
[16]周亚虹,蒲余路,陈诗一,等.政府扶持与新型产业发展——以新能源为例[J].经济研究,2015,50(6):147~161.