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Modeling and solution based on stochastic games for development of COA under uncertainty
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  • 英文篇名:Modeling and solution based on stochastic games for development of COA under uncertainty
  • 作者:CHEN ; Chao ; DU ; Zhengjun ; LIANG ; Xingxing ; SHI ; Jianmai ; ZHANG ; Hao
  • 英文作者:CHEN Chao;DU Zhengjun;LIANG Xingxing;SHI Jianmai;ZHANG Hao;Science and Technology on Information Systems Engineering Laboratory,National University of Defense Technology;Unit 61683 of the PLA;Naval War Gaming Center,Naval Command College;
  • 英文关键词:course of action(COA);;uncertainty of antagonism outcomes;;stochastic games
  • 中文刊名:XTGJ
  • 英文刊名:系统工程与电子技术(英文版)
  • 机构:Science and Technology on Information Systems Engineering Laboratory,National University of Defense Technology;Unit 61683 of the PLA;Naval War Gaming Center,Naval Command College;
  • 出版日期:2019-04-15
  • 出版单位:Journal of Systems Engineering and Electronics
  • 年:2019
  • 期:v.30
  • 基金:supported by the Natural Science Foundation of China(71471174)
  • 语种:英文;
  • 页:XTGJ201902009
  • 页数:9
  • CN:02
  • ISSN:11-3018/N
  • 分类号:70-78
摘要
Developing a course of action(COA) is a key step in military planning. In most extant studies on the COA development,only the unilateral actions of friendly forces are considered. Based on stochastic games, we propose models that could deal with the complexities and uncertainties of wars. By analyzing the equilibrium state of both opponent sides, outcomes preferable to one side could be achieved by adopting the methods obtained from the proposed models. This research could help decision makers take the right COA in a state of uncertainty.
        Developing a course of action(COA) is a key step in military planning. In most extant studies on the COA development,only the unilateral actions of friendly forces are considered. Based on stochastic games, we propose models that could deal with the complexities and uncertainties of wars. By analyzing the equilibrium state of both opponent sides, outcomes preferable to one side could be achieved by adopting the methods obtained from the proposed models. This research could help decision makers take the right COA in a state of uncertainty.
引文
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