技术内部董事、财务冗余与研发投资——来自中国高新技术企业的经验证据
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摘要
财务冗余作为未被吸收的超额储备,管理者对其配置具有很强的自由裁决力,是极其关键的创新资源,财务冗余下创新投资不足对高新技术企业是更严重的代理问题。文章以2012-2016年沪深两市高新技术企业面板数据为样本,运用系统GMM估计实证检验技术内部董事对财务冗余和创新投资关系的调节作用。研究发现:(1)财务冗余能够促进高新技术企业的研发投资;(2)技术内部董事能够增强财务冗余与研发投资之间的正相关关系;(3)当高新技术企业受到负面冲击时,技术内部董事能够确保财务冗余持续分配给研发投资,减轻风险规避下的创新投资不足。文章进一步拓展代理理论,强调在企业创新投资中,技术内部董事在抑制CEO的风险规避决策和减轻独立董事的信息不对称方面所发挥的关键作用。
Financial redundancy as an excess reserve that has not been absorbed is the most critical innovation resource, managers have strong discretion in their allocation, the lack of innovative investment under financial redundancy is a more serious agent problem for hi-tech enterprises. Using a panel-data set of hi-tech enterprises in R&D-intensive industries from 2012 to 2016, this paper examines the effect of technical internal directors on financial redundancy and R&D investment relationship by GMM estimation method. The findings are as follows:(1) financial redundancy can promote the R&D investment of hi-tech enterprises;(2) the technical internal directors can enhance the positive correlation between financial redundancy and R&D investment;(3) when the hi-tech enterprises encounter negative shocks, the technical internal directors can ensure the financial redundancy continuously allocated to R&D investment during periods of negative shocks. This paper expands the agency theory and emphasizes the key role of the technical internal directors in reducing the risk aversion decision of CEO and reducing the information asymmetry of independent directors in the innovation investment of hi-tech enterprises.
Financial redundancy as an excess reserve that has not been absorbed is the most critical innovation resource, managers have strong discretion in their allocation, the lack of innovative investment under financial redundancy is a more serious agent problem for hi-tech enterprises. Using a panel-data set of hi-tech enterprises in R&D-intensive industries from 2012 to 2016, this paper examines the effect of technical internal directors on financial redundancy and R&D investment relationship by GMM estimation method. The findings are as follows:(1) financial redundancy can promote the R&D investment of hi-tech enterprises;(2) the technical internal directors can enhance the positive correlation between financial redundancy and R&D investment;(3) when the hi-tech enterprises encounter negative shocks, the technical internal directors can ensure the financial redundancy continuously allocated to R&D investment during periods of negative shocks. This paper expands the agency theory and emphasizes the key role of the technical internal directors in reducing the risk aversion decision of CEO and reducing the information asymmetry of independent directors in the innovation investment of hi-tech enterprises.
引文
[1]Dan,M.,Geiger,S.W.A Rexamination of the Oganizational Sack and Inovation Relationship[J].Journal of Business Research,2015,68(12):2683-2690.
[2]毕晓方,翟淑萍,姜宝强.政府补贴、财务冗余对高新技术企业双元创新的影响[J].会计研究,2017(1):46-52.Bi X F,Zhai S P,Jiang B Q.Government Subsidies,Financial Slack and Ambidextrous Innovation[J].Accounting Research,2017(1):46-52.
[3]He,Z.,Wintoki,M.B.The Cost of Innovation:R&D and High Cash Holdings in U.S.Firms.[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,41,280-303.
[4]Tan,J.,Peng,M.W.Organizational Slack and Firm Performance during Economic Transitions:Two Studies from an Emerging Economy[J].Strategic Management Journal,2003,249(13):1249-1263.
[5]Lee,S.Slack and Innovation:Investigating the Relationship in Korea[J].Journal of Business Research,2015,68(9):1895-1905.
[6]Herold,D.M.,Jayaraman,N.,Narayanaswamy,C.R.What is the Relationship between Organizational Slack and Innovation?[J].Journal of Managerial Issues,2006,18(3):372-392.
[7]Hall,B.H.The Financing of Research and Development[J].Oxford Review of Economic Policy,2002,18(1):35-51.
[8]Wang,H.,Choi,.J,Wan,G.,et al.Slack Resources and the Rent-generating Potential of Firm-Specific Knowledge[J].Journal of Management,2016,42(2).
[9]Brown,J.R.,Petersen,B.C.Cash Holdings and R&D Smoothing.[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(3):694-709.
[10]Kor,Y.Y.Direct and Interaction Effects of Top Management Team and Board Compositions on R&D Investment Strategy[J].Strategic Management Journal,2006,27(11):1081-1099.
[11]Masulis,R.W.,Mobbs,S.Are All Inside Directors the Same?Evidence from the External Directorship Market[J].Journal of Finance,2011,66(3):823-872.
[12]Marcel,J.J.,Cowen,A.P.Cleaning House or Jumping Ship?Understanding Board Upheaval Following Financial Fraud[J].Strategic Management Journal,2014,35(6):926-937.
[13]Shen,W.,Cannella,A.A.Power Dynamics within Top Management and Their Impacts on CEO Dismissal Followed by Inside Succession[J].Academy of Management Journal,2002,45(6):1195-1206.
[14]毕晓方,翟淑萍,何琼枝.财务冗余降低了企业的创新效率吗?--兼议股权制衡的治理作用[J].研究与发展管理,2017,29(2):82-92.Bi X F,Zhai S P,He Q Z.Does Financial Slack Reduce Enterprises Innovation Efficiency:Discussing the Governance Effect of Balance of Ownership Structure[J].Research and Development Management,2017,29(2):82-92.
[15]刘波,李志生,王泓力.现金流不确定性与企业创新[J].经济研究,2017(3):166-180.Liu B,Li Z S,Wang H L.Cash Flow Uncertainty and Corporate Innovation[J].Economics Research,2017(3):166-180.
[16]Hoegl,M.,Gibbert,M.,Mazursky,D.Financial Constraints in Innovation Projects:When is Less More?[J].Research Policy,2008,37(8):1382-1391.
[17]甄建斌,赵选民,翟丽.非沉淀性冗余资源能够平滑企业创新投资吗?--基于融资约束视角的实证研究[J].金融论坛,2017(7):53-66.Zhen J B,Zhao X M,Zhai Li.Can Unabsorbed Slack Resources Smooth Corporate Innovation Investment:An Empirical Research Based on Financing Constraints[J].Finance Forum,2017(7):53-66.
[18]Martin,J.A.Lone-insider Boards:Improved Monitoring or a Recipe for Disaster?[J].Journal of Managerial Issues,2008,24.
[19]Hoskisson,R.E.,Castleton,M.W.,Withers,M.C.Complementarity in Monitoring and Bonding:More Intense Monitoring Leads to Higher Executive Compensation[J].Academy of Management Perspectives,2009,23(2):57-74.
[20]朱丽娜,贺小刚,贾植涵.“穷困”促进了企业的研发投入?--环境不确定性与产权保护力度的调节效应[J].经济管理,2017(11):67-84.Zhu L N,He X G,Jia Z H.Does“Poverty”Gives Rise to Firms R&D Investment:The Moderating Effect of Environmental Uncertainty and Property Right Protection[J].Economics Management,2017(11):67-84.
[21]Mudambi,R.,Swift,T.Knowing When to Leap:Transitioning between Exploitative and Explorative R&D[J].Strategic Management Journal,2014,35(1):126-145.
[22]Joseph,J.,Ocasio,W.,Mcdonnell,M.H.The Structural Elaboration of Board Independence:Executive Power,Institutional Logics,and the Adoption of CEO-only Board Structures in U.S.Corporate Governance[J].Academy of Management Journal,2014,57(6):1834-1858.
[23]胡元木,刘佩,纪端.技术独立董事能有效抑制真实盈余管理吗?--基于可操控R&D费用视角[J].会计研究,2016(3):29-35.Hu Y M,Liu P,Ji D.Can Technology Independent Directors Constrain Real Earnings Management:Based on R&D Spending Manipulation[J].Accounting Research,2016(3):29-35.
[24]Manso,G.Motivating Innovation[J].Journal of Finance,2011,66(5):1823-1860.
[25]Mobbs,S.CEOs Under Fire:The Effects of Competition from Inside Directors on Forced CEO Turnover and CEO Compensation[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2013,48(3):669-698.
[26]孙光国,郭睿.CFO内部董事有助于董事会履行监督职能吗?[J].会计研究,2015(11):27-33.Sun G G,Guo R.Can CFO Inside Directors Help Board Supervision?[J].Accounting Research,2015(11):27-33.
[27]Taewon,K.,Chulwoo,B.,Jeong-Dong,L.The Persistency and Volatility of the Firm R&DInvestment:Revisited from the Perspective of Technological Capability,2017,46:1570-1579.
[28]Altman,E.I.Financial Ratios,Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy[J].Journal of Finance,1968,23(4):589-609.
[29]申慧慧,于鹏,吴联生.国有股权、环境不确定性与投资效率[J].经济研究,2012(7):113-126.Shen,H.H.,Yu,P.,Wu,L.S.State Ownership,Environment Uncertainty and Investment Efficiency[J].Economic Research Journal,2012(7):113-126.
[30]Dawson,J.F.,Richter,A.W.Probing Three-way Interactions in Moderated Multiple Regression:Development and Application of a Slope Difference T-test.[J].Journal of Applied Psychology,2006,91(4):917-26.
(1)前期企业积累的财务资源储备,在企业面临资源瓶颈时起到“资源缓冲池”作用。
(1)由于大胆创新并承担了不确定性风险所产生的租金
(2)技术内部董事指具有技术专长且担任公司高管的非CEO的董事会成员,技术独立董事指具有技术专长的非公司雇员的董会成员。
(1) Altman Z-score模型计算得分越高,企业陷入财务危机的可能越小。
(1) Blundell&Bond(1998)提出系统GMM方法,该方法的优点是可提高估计的效率,且可估计不随时间变化的变量的系数。
(1)高于均值一个标准差定义为高值(H-Altman和H-TEInsider),低于均值一个标准差定义为低值(L-Altman和L-TEInsider)。
[2]毕晓方,翟淑萍,姜宝强.政府补贴、财务冗余对高新技术企业双元创新的影响[J].会计研究,2017(1):46-52.Bi X F,Zhai S P,Jiang B Q.Government Subsidies,Financial Slack and Ambidextrous Innovation[J].Accounting Research,2017(1):46-52.
[3]He,Z.,Wintoki,M.B.The Cost of Innovation:R&D and High Cash Holdings in U.S.Firms.[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,41,280-303.
[4]Tan,J.,Peng,M.W.Organizational Slack and Firm Performance during Economic Transitions:Two Studies from an Emerging Economy[J].Strategic Management Journal,2003,249(13):1249-1263.
[5]Lee,S.Slack and Innovation:Investigating the Relationship in Korea[J].Journal of Business Research,2015,68(9):1895-1905.
[6]Herold,D.M.,Jayaraman,N.,Narayanaswamy,C.R.What is the Relationship between Organizational Slack and Innovation?[J].Journal of Managerial Issues,2006,18(3):372-392.
[7]Hall,B.H.The Financing of Research and Development[J].Oxford Review of Economic Policy,2002,18(1):35-51.
[8]Wang,H.,Choi,.J,Wan,G.,et al.Slack Resources and the Rent-generating Potential of Firm-Specific Knowledge[J].Journal of Management,2016,42(2).
[9]Brown,J.R.,Petersen,B.C.Cash Holdings and R&D Smoothing.[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(3):694-709.
[10]Kor,Y.Y.Direct and Interaction Effects of Top Management Team and Board Compositions on R&D Investment Strategy[J].Strategic Management Journal,2006,27(11):1081-1099.
[11]Masulis,R.W.,Mobbs,S.Are All Inside Directors the Same?Evidence from the External Directorship Market[J].Journal of Finance,2011,66(3):823-872.
[12]Marcel,J.J.,Cowen,A.P.Cleaning House or Jumping Ship?Understanding Board Upheaval Following Financial Fraud[J].Strategic Management Journal,2014,35(6):926-937.
[13]Shen,W.,Cannella,A.A.Power Dynamics within Top Management and Their Impacts on CEO Dismissal Followed by Inside Succession[J].Academy of Management Journal,2002,45(6):1195-1206.
[14]毕晓方,翟淑萍,何琼枝.财务冗余降低了企业的创新效率吗?--兼议股权制衡的治理作用[J].研究与发展管理,2017,29(2):82-92.Bi X F,Zhai S P,He Q Z.Does Financial Slack Reduce Enterprises Innovation Efficiency:Discussing the Governance Effect of Balance of Ownership Structure[J].Research and Development Management,2017,29(2):82-92.
[15]刘波,李志生,王泓力.现金流不确定性与企业创新[J].经济研究,2017(3):166-180.Liu B,Li Z S,Wang H L.Cash Flow Uncertainty and Corporate Innovation[J].Economics Research,2017(3):166-180.
[16]Hoegl,M.,Gibbert,M.,Mazursky,D.Financial Constraints in Innovation Projects:When is Less More?[J].Research Policy,2008,37(8):1382-1391.
[17]甄建斌,赵选民,翟丽.非沉淀性冗余资源能够平滑企业创新投资吗?--基于融资约束视角的实证研究[J].金融论坛,2017(7):53-66.Zhen J B,Zhao X M,Zhai Li.Can Unabsorbed Slack Resources Smooth Corporate Innovation Investment:An Empirical Research Based on Financing Constraints[J].Finance Forum,2017(7):53-66.
[18]Martin,J.A.Lone-insider Boards:Improved Monitoring or a Recipe for Disaster?[J].Journal of Managerial Issues,2008,24.
[19]Hoskisson,R.E.,Castleton,M.W.,Withers,M.C.Complementarity in Monitoring and Bonding:More Intense Monitoring Leads to Higher Executive Compensation[J].Academy of Management Perspectives,2009,23(2):57-74.
[20]朱丽娜,贺小刚,贾植涵.“穷困”促进了企业的研发投入?--环境不确定性与产权保护力度的调节效应[J].经济管理,2017(11):67-84.Zhu L N,He X G,Jia Z H.Does“Poverty”Gives Rise to Firms R&D Investment:The Moderating Effect of Environmental Uncertainty and Property Right Protection[J].Economics Management,2017(11):67-84.
[21]Mudambi,R.,Swift,T.Knowing When to Leap:Transitioning between Exploitative and Explorative R&D[J].Strategic Management Journal,2014,35(1):126-145.
[22]Joseph,J.,Ocasio,W.,Mcdonnell,M.H.The Structural Elaboration of Board Independence:Executive Power,Institutional Logics,and the Adoption of CEO-only Board Structures in U.S.Corporate Governance[J].Academy of Management Journal,2014,57(6):1834-1858.
[23]胡元木,刘佩,纪端.技术独立董事能有效抑制真实盈余管理吗?--基于可操控R&D费用视角[J].会计研究,2016(3):29-35.Hu Y M,Liu P,Ji D.Can Technology Independent Directors Constrain Real Earnings Management:Based on R&D Spending Manipulation[J].Accounting Research,2016(3):29-35.
[24]Manso,G.Motivating Innovation[J].Journal of Finance,2011,66(5):1823-1860.
[25]Mobbs,S.CEOs Under Fire:The Effects of Competition from Inside Directors on Forced CEO Turnover and CEO Compensation[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2013,48(3):669-698.
[26]孙光国,郭睿.CFO内部董事有助于董事会履行监督职能吗?[J].会计研究,2015(11):27-33.Sun G G,Guo R.Can CFO Inside Directors Help Board Supervision?[J].Accounting Research,2015(11):27-33.
[27]Taewon,K.,Chulwoo,B.,Jeong-Dong,L.The Persistency and Volatility of the Firm R&DInvestment:Revisited from the Perspective of Technological Capability,2017,46:1570-1579.
[28]Altman,E.I.Financial Ratios,Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy[J].Journal of Finance,1968,23(4):589-609.
[29]申慧慧,于鹏,吴联生.国有股权、环境不确定性与投资效率[J].经济研究,2012(7):113-126.Shen,H.H.,Yu,P.,Wu,L.S.State Ownership,Environment Uncertainty and Investment Efficiency[J].Economic Research Journal,2012(7):113-126.
[30]Dawson,J.F.,Richter,A.W.Probing Three-way Interactions in Moderated Multiple Regression:Development and Application of a Slope Difference T-test.[J].Journal of Applied Psychology,2006,91(4):917-26.
(1)前期企业积累的财务资源储备,在企业面临资源瓶颈时起到“资源缓冲池”作用。
(1)由于大胆创新并承担了不确定性风险所产生的租金
(2)技术内部董事指具有技术专长且担任公司高管的非CEO的董事会成员,技术独立董事指具有技术专长的非公司雇员的董会成员。
(1) Altman Z-score模型计算得分越高,企业陷入财务危机的可能越小。
(1) Blundell&Bond(1998)提出系统GMM方法,该方法的优点是可提高估计的效率,且可估计不随时间变化的变量的系数。
(1)高于均值一个标准差定义为高值(H-Altman和H-TEInsider),低于均值一个标准差定义为低值(L-Altman和L-TEInsider)。
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