财政压力会降低地方政府环境治理效率吗——一个被调节的中介模型
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摘要
近年来,尽管中央对地方政府的环保考核持续保持高压态势,但地方政府在环境治理中"重发展,轻环保"的现象仍然屡见不鲜,究其原因,是地方政府在环境治理中面临了公共价值冲突。基于公共价值理论和环境联邦主义理论,采用我国206个地级市2012—2016年的面板数据,构建了一个被调节的中介模型实证分析了财政压力、公共价值冲突与地方政府环境治理效率间的关系。本文使用DEA方法中的Super-SBM模型测量了地方政府环境治理效率,采用文本分析方法和Griffin公式测量并计算了地方政府在环境治理中面临的公共价值冲突程度,最后使用Bootstrap方法对所提假设进行了检验。研究发现:财政压力会显著降低地方政府的环境治理效率,财政压力越大,地方政府环境治理效率越低;财政压力影响地方政府环境治理效率的作用机制在于公共价值冲突所扮演的中介作用,即财政压力首先诱发地方政府出现了公共价值冲突,使地方政府陷入了一个该做什么、不该做什么的公共价值困境中,进而负面影响了其环境治理效率。研究同时发现,环保垂直管理可以有效缓解公共价值冲突在财政压力与地方政府环境治理效率间的中介作用,若地方政府实施了环保垂直管理,则公共价值冲突所扮演的中介作用可以得到有效弱化。研究结论对于理解地方政府环境治理困境,打开公共价值"黑箱",分析公共价值冲突的来源和作用机理,探索公共价值冲突的应对策略有一定的理论和现实意义,可为中央环保垂直管理改革的持续推进提供支持性证据。
In recent years,although the central government has enforced huge pressures upon local governments on environmental protect assessment,it is still common for local governments to attach more attention to economic development than environmental protection. Based on the theory of public value and environmental federalism,this paper uses the panel data of 206 cities in China from~2012 to 2016 to empirically analyze the relationship between fiscal pressure,public value conflict and environmental governance efficiency of local governments. In this paper,the super-SBM model in DEA method was used to measure the environmental governance efficiency of local governments. Text analysis method and Griffin formula were used to measure and calculate the degree of public value conflict faced by local governments in environmental governance. Finally,the proposed hypothesis was tested by Bootstrap method. The study found that fiscal pressure can significantly reduce the environmental governance efficiency of local governments,and the transmission mechanism of this relationship lie in the mediating role of public value conflict. Fiscal pressure produces the public value conflict in local governments firstly,local governments are trapped in a dilemma of public values about what to do and what not to do,and then,it negatively affects the environmental governance efficiency. The study also found that vertical environmental management can effectively alleviate the mediating effect of public value conflict between fiscal pressure and environmental governance efficiency of local governments. The conclusion helps us understand the dilemma of environmental governance of local governments,open the'black box'of public value,and analyze the source and mechanism of public value conflict. It also has certain theoretical and practical significance on exploring the strategies to cope with public value conflict and providing proof for the environment's vertical management reform.
In recent years,although the central government has enforced huge pressures upon local governments on environmental protect assessment,it is still common for local governments to attach more attention to economic development than environmental protection. Based on the theory of public value and environmental federalism,this paper uses the panel data of 206 cities in China from~2012 to 2016 to empirically analyze the relationship between fiscal pressure,public value conflict and environmental governance efficiency of local governments. In this paper,the super-SBM model in DEA method was used to measure the environmental governance efficiency of local governments. Text analysis method and Griffin formula were used to measure and calculate the degree of public value conflict faced by local governments in environmental governance. Finally,the proposed hypothesis was tested by Bootstrap method. The study found that fiscal pressure can significantly reduce the environmental governance efficiency of local governments,and the transmission mechanism of this relationship lie in the mediating role of public value conflict. Fiscal pressure produces the public value conflict in local governments firstly,local governments are trapped in a dilemma of public values about what to do and what not to do,and then,it negatively affects the environmental governance efficiency. The study also found that vertical environmental management can effectively alleviate the mediating effect of public value conflict between fiscal pressure and environmental governance efficiency of local governments. The conclusion helps us understand the dilemma of environmental governance of local governments,open the'black box'of public value,and analyze the source and mechanism of public value conflict. It also has certain theoretical and practical significance on exploring the strategies to cope with public value conflict and providing proof for the environment's vertical management reform.
引文
[1]王瑞,诸大建.中国环境效率及污染物减排潜力研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018,28(6):149-159.
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[3]王学军,张弘.公共价值的研究路径与前沿问题[J].公共管理学报,2013,10(2):126-136.
[4]BOZEMAN B. Public value failure:when efficient markets may not do[J]. Public administration review,2002,62(2):145-161.
[5]BOZEMAN B. Public values and public interest:counterbalancing economic individualism[M]. Washington DC:Georgetown University Press,2007.
[6]MOORE M H. Creating public value:strategic management in government[M]. Cambridge MA:Harvard University Press,1995.
[7]GRAAF D G,VANDER W Z. Managing conflicting public values:governing with integrity and effectiveness[J]. The American review of public administration,2010,40(6):623-630.
[8]GRAAF D G,HUBERTS L,SMULDERS R. Coping with public value conflicts[J]. Administration&society,2016,48(9):1101-1127.
[9]MARTINSEN D S, J?RGENSEN T B. Accountability as a differentiated value in supranational governance[J]. The American review of public administration,2010,40(6):742-760.
[10]BAILEY S J. Local government economics:principles and practice[M]. Berlin:Springer-Verlag,1999.
[11]陈晓光.财政压力、税收征管与地区不平等[J].中国社会科学,2016(4):53-70.
[12]LIANG J,LANGBEIN L. Performance management,high-powered incentives,and environmental policies in China[J]. International public management journal,2015,18(3):346-385.
[13]YOUNG O R. On environmental governance:sustainability,efficiency,and equity[M]. London:Routledge,2016.
[14]董秀海,胡颖廉,李万新.中国环境治理效率的国际比较和历史分析——基于DEA模型的研究[J].科学学研究,2008,26(6):1221-1230.
[15]SCOTT TA. Is collaboration a good investment? modeling the link between funds given to collaborative watershed councils and water quality[J]. Journal of public administration research and theory,2016,26(4):769-786.
[16]席鹏辉,梁若冰,谢贞发.税收分成调整、财政压力与工业污染[J].世界经济,2017(10):170-192.
[17]席鹏辉.财政激励、环境偏好与垂直式环境管理——纳税大户议价能力的视角[J].中国工业经济,2017(11):100-117.
[18]YEE W H,TANG S Y,LOCW H. Regulatory compliance when the rule of law is weak:evidence from China’s environmental reform[J]. Journal of public administration research and theory,2014,26(1):95-112.
[19]BERLIN I. Four essays on liberty[M]. New York:Oxford University Press,1969.
[20]何文盛.转型期我国公共价值冲突的内涵辨析、机理生成与治理策略[J].南京社会科学,2015(4):47-56.
[21]J?RGENSEN T B,BOZEMAN B. Public values:an inventory[J]. Administration&society,2007,39(3):354-381.
[22]VANDER W Z,GRAAF D G,LAWTON A. Competing values in public management:introduction to the symposium issue[J].Public management review,2011,13(3):331-341.
[23]HUBERTS L. The integrity of governance:what it is,what we know,what is done and where to go[M]. New York:Springer,2014.
[24]JACOBS L R. The contested politics of public value[J]. Public administration review,2014,74(4):480-494.
[25]GRANDY C. The‘efficient’public administrator:pareto and a wellrounded approach to public administration[J]. Public administration review,2009,69(6):1115-1123.
[26]张华.地区间环境规制的策略互动研究——对环境规制非完全执行普遍性的解释[J].中国工业经济,2016(7):74-90.
[27]OLDENHOF L,POSTMA J,PUTTERS K. On justification work:how compromising enables public managers to deal with conflicting values[J]. Public administration review,2014,74(1):52-63.
[28]GRAAF D G,MEIJER A. Social media and value conflicts:an explorative study of the dutch police[J]. Public administration review,2018,78(2):1-11.
[29]THACHER D,REIN M. Managing value conflict in public policy[J]. Governance,2004,17(4):457-486.
[30]BANZHAF H S,CHUPP B A. Fiscal federalism and interjurisdictional externalities:new results and an application to US air pollution[J]. Journal of public economics,2012,91(10):449-464.
[31]CAI H,CHEN Y,GONG Q. Polluting thy neighbor:unintended consequences of China’s pollution reduction mandates[J]. Journal of environmental economics and management,2016(76):86-104.
[32]OATES W E. An essay on fiscal federalism[J]. Journal of economic literature,1999,37(3):1120-1149.
[33]韩超,刘鑫颖,王海.规制官员激励与行为偏好——独立性缺失下环境规制失效新解[J].管理世界,2016(2):82-94.
[34]STEWART R B. Pyramids of sacrifice? problems of federalism in mandating state implementation of national environmental policy[J]. The Yale law journal,1977,86(6):1196-1272.
[35]JUNG J,MAKOWSKY M D. The determinants of federal and state enforcement of workplace safety regulations:OSHA inspections1990-2010[J]. Journal of regulatory economics,2014,45(1):1-33.
[36]赵文哲,杨继东.地方政府财政缺口与土地出让方式——基于地方政府与国有企业互利行为的解释[J].管理世界,2015(4):11-24.
[37]于文超,殷华,梁平汉.税收征管、财政压力与企业融资约束[J].中国工业经济,2018(1):100-118.
[38]BOZEMAN B, JOHNSON J. The political economy of public values:a case for the public sphere and progressive opportunity[J].The American review of public administration,2015,45(1):61-85.
[39]LAVER M,BENOIT K,GARRY J. Extracting policy positions from political texts using words as data[J]. American political science review,2003,97(2):311-331.
[40]FISHER E,SLADE C P,ANDERSON D,et al. The public value of nanotechnology?[J]. Scientometrics,2010,85(1):29-39.
[41]王学军,王子琦.政民互动、公共价值与政府绩效改进——基于北上广政务微博的实证分析[J].公共管理学报,2017,14(3):31-43.
[42]LEVY O. The influence of top management team attention patterns on global strategic posture of firms[J]. Journal of organizational behavior,2005,26(7):797-819.
[43]吴建祖,关斌.高管团队特征对企业国际市场进入模式的影响研究——注意力的中介作用[J].管理评论,2015,27(11):118-131.
[44]THOMPSON M M, ZANNA M P. The conflicted individual:personality-based and domain specific antecedents of ambivalent social attitudes[J]. Journal of personality,1995,63(2):259-288.
[45]KAPLAN K J. On the ambivalence-indifference problem in attitude theory and measurement:a suggested modification of the semantic differential technique[J]. Psychological bulletin,1972,77(5):361-372.
[46]JONAS K,BROEMER P,DIEHL M. Attitudinal ambivalence[J].European review of social psychology,2000,11(1):35-74.
[47]EDWARDS J R, LAMBERT L S. Methods for integrating moderation and mediation:a general analytical framework using moderated path analysis[J]. Psychological methods,2007,12(1):1-22.
[48]BARON R M,KENNY D A. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research:conceptual,strategic,and statistical considerations[J]. Journal of personality and social psychology,1986,51(6):1173-1182.
[49]温忠麟,叶宝娟.有调节的中介模型检验方法:竞争还是替补?[J].心理学报,2014,46(5):714-726.
[2]尹传斌,朱方明,邓玲.西部大开发十五年环境效率评价及其影响因素分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(3):82-89.
[3]王学军,张弘.公共价值的研究路径与前沿问题[J].公共管理学报,2013,10(2):126-136.
[4]BOZEMAN B. Public value failure:when efficient markets may not do[J]. Public administration review,2002,62(2):145-161.
[5]BOZEMAN B. Public values and public interest:counterbalancing economic individualism[M]. Washington DC:Georgetown University Press,2007.
[6]MOORE M H. Creating public value:strategic management in government[M]. Cambridge MA:Harvard University Press,1995.
[7]GRAAF D G,VANDER W Z. Managing conflicting public values:governing with integrity and effectiveness[J]. The American review of public administration,2010,40(6):623-630.
[8]GRAAF D G,HUBERTS L,SMULDERS R. Coping with public value conflicts[J]. Administration&society,2016,48(9):1101-1127.
[9]MARTINSEN D S, J?RGENSEN T B. Accountability as a differentiated value in supranational governance[J]. The American review of public administration,2010,40(6):742-760.
[10]BAILEY S J. Local government economics:principles and practice[M]. Berlin:Springer-Verlag,1999.
[11]陈晓光.财政压力、税收征管与地区不平等[J].中国社会科学,2016(4):53-70.
[12]LIANG J,LANGBEIN L. Performance management,high-powered incentives,and environmental policies in China[J]. International public management journal,2015,18(3):346-385.
[13]YOUNG O R. On environmental governance:sustainability,efficiency,and equity[M]. London:Routledge,2016.
[14]董秀海,胡颖廉,李万新.中国环境治理效率的国际比较和历史分析——基于DEA模型的研究[J].科学学研究,2008,26(6):1221-1230.
[15]SCOTT TA. Is collaboration a good investment? modeling the link between funds given to collaborative watershed councils and water quality[J]. Journal of public administration research and theory,2016,26(4):769-786.
[16]席鹏辉,梁若冰,谢贞发.税收分成调整、财政压力与工业污染[J].世界经济,2017(10):170-192.
[17]席鹏辉.财政激励、环境偏好与垂直式环境管理——纳税大户议价能力的视角[J].中国工业经济,2017(11):100-117.
[18]YEE W H,TANG S Y,LOCW H. Regulatory compliance when the rule of law is weak:evidence from China’s environmental reform[J]. Journal of public administration research and theory,2014,26(1):95-112.
[19]BERLIN I. Four essays on liberty[M]. New York:Oxford University Press,1969.
[20]何文盛.转型期我国公共价值冲突的内涵辨析、机理生成与治理策略[J].南京社会科学,2015(4):47-56.
[21]J?RGENSEN T B,BOZEMAN B. Public values:an inventory[J]. Administration&society,2007,39(3):354-381.
[22]VANDER W Z,GRAAF D G,LAWTON A. Competing values in public management:introduction to the symposium issue[J].Public management review,2011,13(3):331-341.
[23]HUBERTS L. The integrity of governance:what it is,what we know,what is done and where to go[M]. New York:Springer,2014.
[24]JACOBS L R. The contested politics of public value[J]. Public administration review,2014,74(4):480-494.
[25]GRANDY C. The‘efficient’public administrator:pareto and a wellrounded approach to public administration[J]. Public administration review,2009,69(6):1115-1123.
[26]张华.地区间环境规制的策略互动研究——对环境规制非完全执行普遍性的解释[J].中国工业经济,2016(7):74-90.
[27]OLDENHOF L,POSTMA J,PUTTERS K. On justification work:how compromising enables public managers to deal with conflicting values[J]. Public administration review,2014,74(1):52-63.
[28]GRAAF D G,MEIJER A. Social media and value conflicts:an explorative study of the dutch police[J]. Public administration review,2018,78(2):1-11.
[29]THACHER D,REIN M. Managing value conflict in public policy[J]. Governance,2004,17(4):457-486.
[30]BANZHAF H S,CHUPP B A. Fiscal federalism and interjurisdictional externalities:new results and an application to US air pollution[J]. Journal of public economics,2012,91(10):449-464.
[31]CAI H,CHEN Y,GONG Q. Polluting thy neighbor:unintended consequences of China’s pollution reduction mandates[J]. Journal of environmental economics and management,2016(76):86-104.
[32]OATES W E. An essay on fiscal federalism[J]. Journal of economic literature,1999,37(3):1120-1149.
[33]韩超,刘鑫颖,王海.规制官员激励与行为偏好——独立性缺失下环境规制失效新解[J].管理世界,2016(2):82-94.
[34]STEWART R B. Pyramids of sacrifice? problems of federalism in mandating state implementation of national environmental policy[J]. The Yale law journal,1977,86(6):1196-1272.
[35]JUNG J,MAKOWSKY M D. The determinants of federal and state enforcement of workplace safety regulations:OSHA inspections1990-2010[J]. Journal of regulatory economics,2014,45(1):1-33.
[36]赵文哲,杨继东.地方政府财政缺口与土地出让方式——基于地方政府与国有企业互利行为的解释[J].管理世界,2015(4):11-24.
[37]于文超,殷华,梁平汉.税收征管、财政压力与企业融资约束[J].中国工业经济,2018(1):100-118.
[38]BOZEMAN B, JOHNSON J. The political economy of public values:a case for the public sphere and progressive opportunity[J].The American review of public administration,2015,45(1):61-85.
[39]LAVER M,BENOIT K,GARRY J. Extracting policy positions from political texts using words as data[J]. American political science review,2003,97(2):311-331.
[40]FISHER E,SLADE C P,ANDERSON D,et al. The public value of nanotechnology?[J]. Scientometrics,2010,85(1):29-39.
[41]王学军,王子琦.政民互动、公共价值与政府绩效改进——基于北上广政务微博的实证分析[J].公共管理学报,2017,14(3):31-43.
[42]LEVY O. The influence of top management team attention patterns on global strategic posture of firms[J]. Journal of organizational behavior,2005,26(7):797-819.
[43]吴建祖,关斌.高管团队特征对企业国际市场进入模式的影响研究——注意力的中介作用[J].管理评论,2015,27(11):118-131.
[44]THOMPSON M M, ZANNA M P. The conflicted individual:personality-based and domain specific antecedents of ambivalent social attitudes[J]. Journal of personality,1995,63(2):259-288.
[45]KAPLAN K J. On the ambivalence-indifference problem in attitude theory and measurement:a suggested modification of the semantic differential technique[J]. Psychological bulletin,1972,77(5):361-372.
[46]JONAS K,BROEMER P,DIEHL M. Attitudinal ambivalence[J].European review of social psychology,2000,11(1):35-74.
[47]EDWARDS J R, LAMBERT L S. Methods for integrating moderation and mediation:a general analytical framework using moderated path analysis[J]. Psychological methods,2007,12(1):1-22.
[48]BARON R M,KENNY D A. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research:conceptual,strategic,and statistical considerations[J]. Journal of personality and social psychology,1986,51(6):1173-1182.
[49]温忠麟,叶宝娟.有调节的中介模型检验方法:竞争还是替补?[J].心理学报,2014,46(5):714-726.
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