环保督察下的超标排放污染物企业退出机制研究
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摘要
通过分析当今环境保护政策和超标排放污染物企业实际情况,将利润率、综合税率、惩罚性罚款基数和环保督察成本等影响因素,融入到地方政府与超标排放污染物企业间的演化博弈过程中,用以模拟退出决策过程。研究表明:在不同的初始状态下,当地方政府选择的环保督察力度较小时,超标排放污染物企业采取不退出的策略;当地方政府选择的环保督察力度较大时,超标排放污染物企业采取退出的策略。当初始状态一定时,地方政府可以通过降低超标排放污染物企业利润率、增大综合税率、加大惩罚性罚款数额等方法,促使超标排放污染物企业退出市场。
By analyzing the current environmental protection policies and the exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises' actual situation,the influencing factors,such as profit rate,comprehensive tax rate,punitive penalty base and environmental protection supervision are integrated into the evolutionary game between local governments and exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises,are used to simulate exit decision process.It is concluded that,under different initial conditions,the enterprises adopt not exit strategy when the local government environmental protection inspectors are small;when the local government environmental protection inspectors are strong,the enterprises adopt exit strategy.When the initial state is certain,local governments can take measures such as reducing the profit margin of exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises,increasing the comprehensive tax rate,increasing the punitive penalty base,which will push the exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises to exit the market.
By analyzing the current environmental protection policies and the exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises' actual situation,the influencing factors,such as profit rate,comprehensive tax rate,punitive penalty base and environmental protection supervision are integrated into the evolutionary game between local governments and exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises,are used to simulate exit decision process.It is concluded that,under different initial conditions,the enterprises adopt not exit strategy when the local government environmental protection inspectors are small;when the local government environmental protection inspectors are strong,the enterprises adopt exit strategy.When the initial state is certain,local governments can take measures such as reducing the profit margin of exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises,increasing the comprehensive tax rate,increasing the punitive penalty base,which will push the exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises to exit the market.
引文
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[30]卢瑶.环保督察与地方政府履责行为的博弈分析[J].管理世界,2017(11):174-175.
[31]孟凡生,韩冰.基于演化博弈理论的装备制造企业低碳技术创新动力机制研究[J].预测,2018,37(3):69-74.
[2]ZIROGIANNIS N,HOLLINGSWORTH A J,KONI-SKY D M.Understanding Excess Emissions from Industrial Facilities:Evidence from Texas[J].Environmental Science&Technology,2018,52(5):2 482-2 490.
[3]ZHONG Z M,ZHENG J Y,ZHU M N,et al.Recent Developments of Anthropogenic Air Pollutant Emission Inventories in Guangdong Province,China[J].Science of the Total Environment,2018,627:1 080-1 092.
[4]BACENETTI J,LOVARELLI D,FACCHINETTID,et al.An Environmental Comparison of Techniques to Reduce Pollutants Emissions Related to Agricultural Tractors[J].Biosystems Engineering,2018,171:30-40.
[5]MAZZEO A,HUNEEUS N,ORDOEZ C,et al.Impact of Residential Combustion and Transport Emissions on Air Pollution in Santiago During Winter[J].Atmospheric Environment,2018,190:195-208.
[6]赵国浩,马明.地方政府环境规制竞争背景下地区间的企业污染排放行为[J].北京理工大学学报:社会科学版,2018,20(5):1-9.
[7]杨玉香,吴增源,黄祖庆.考虑技术投资的供应链网络下可交易污染排放许可均衡问题[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(4):74-82.
[8]王惠文,顾杰,陈梅玲.污染行业集中度与大气污染排放综合评价[J].系统工程,2016,34(11):59-63.
[9]赵伟中,贺华平.常州市关于污水超标排放及污水处理收费的探索与实践[J].价格理论与实践,2015(3):40-41.
[10]赵蓓蓓.一种在线监测机动车尾气超标排放的有效方法[J].工业安全与环保,2012,38(2):21-23.
[11]王章名,王成璋.研发投入对环境污染影响的实证研究[J].管理学报,2016,13(11):1 710-1 717.
[12]杨洪涛,李瑞,李桂君.环境规制类型与设计特征的交互对企业生态创新的影响[J].管理学报,2018,15(10):1 019-1 027.
[13]陈海嵩.环保督察制度法治化:定位、困境及其出路[J].法学评论,2013,35(3):176-187.
[14]胡锦涛.中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会报告[EB/OL].(2012-11-08)[2018-08-07].http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1118/c64094-19612151.html.
[15]张璐晶,李永华,刘照普.中央肯定、地方支持、百姓点赞、成效显著中央环保督察威力大[J].中国经济周刊,2017(43):17-29.
[16]SMITH J M.The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflicts[J].Journal of Theory Biology,1974,47(1):209-221.
[17]KLESHNINA M,FILAR J A,EJOV V,et al.Evolutionary Games under Incompetence[J].Journal of Mathematical Biology,2018,77(3):627-646.
[18]BABU S,MOHAN U.An Integrated Approach to Evaluating Sustainability in Supply Chains Using Evolutionary Game Theory[J].Computers&Operations Research,2018,89:269-283.
[19]LUO C,JIANG Z P.Coevolving Allocation of Resources and Cooperation in Spatial Evolutionary Games[J].Applied Mathematics and Computation,2017,311:47-57.
[20]KOLOKOLTSOV V.The Evolutionary Game of Pressure(or Interference),Resistance and Collaboration[J].Mathematics of Operations Research,2017,42(4):915-944.
[21]HADZIBEGANOVIC T,STAUFFER D,HAN XP.Interplay between Cooperation Enhancing Mechanisms in Evolutionary Games with Tag-Mediated Interactions[J].Physica A:Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications,2018,496:676-690.
[22]LIU X S,PAN Q H,HE M F.Promotion of Cooperation in Evolutionary Game Dynamics with Local Information[J].Journal of Theoretical Biology,2018,437:1-8.
[23]王洪利.基于演化博弈的共享经济参与主体的行为分析[J].经济与管理,2018,32(2):75-80.
[24]曹飞.基于演化博弈的建设用地集约利用制度研究[J].重庆大学学报:社会科学版,2018,24(1):1-10.
[25]葛晓鹏,张艺,赵晋宇.基于演化博弈理论的农村客运服务供给行为分析[J].公路交通科技,2018,35(5):151-158.
[26]王欢明,陈洋愉,李鹏.基于演化博弈理论的雾霾治理中政府环境规制策略研究[J].环境科学研究,2017,30(4):621-627.
[27]钱坤,黄忠全,刘小峰.基于演化博弈视角的邻避设施环境补偿机理[J].系统工程,2017,35(3):88-94.
[28]贾向峰,程逸飞,戈晓燕.环境管制下的海洋工程装备企业退出机制研究[J].科技管理研究,2014(13):209-213.
[29]郭海本,方志耕,刘卿.基于演化博弈的区域高耗能产业退出机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(4):79-85.
[30]卢瑶.环保督察与地方政府履责行为的博弈分析[J].管理世界,2017(11):174-175.
[31]孟凡生,韩冰.基于演化博弈理论的装备制造企业低碳技术创新动力机制研究[J].预测,2018,37(3):69-74.