向家乡投资:信息、熟悉还是代理问题?
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摘要
本文探讨公司投资中是否存在CEO的"家乡偏好",并且在信息、熟悉假说之外,基于身份认同经济学进一步提出代理问题假说,以检验中国情景下公司投资的家乡偏好动机。以手工整理的民营上市公司CEO家乡以及母、子公司地理数据,本文通过民营上市公司—地区—年度样本以及仅包含了异地任职CEO公司的子样本实证均发现:公司会更多在CEO的家乡建立异地子公司,该结论在经过多种稳健性测试之后仍然成立;并且CEO家乡的子公司相比其他异地子公司绩效更差。这说明公司投资中确实存在CEO的"家乡偏好",并且其更适合以代理问题假说来解释,而非信息和熟悉假说。进一步研究发现,CEO自身代理问题越轻(CEO持股、年轻CEO)和外部治理越强(机构投资者持股高、分析师跟踪多)均会抑制公司向CEO家乡的投资;代理问题假说解释的"家乡偏好"投资并不存在于董事长个体中,我们虽然也发现公司会更多向董事长家乡投资,但这种投资的绩效并无显著差异,相对更适合以熟悉假说解释。本文从家乡偏好视角将身份认同引入经理人代理行为,不仅在公司投资层面丰富了家乡偏好的经济后果,也以经理人个人偏好拓展和丰富了经理人代理问题的相关研究,提供了中国情景下经理人代理问题的新证据。
This study investigates whether CEOs exhibit home bias in corporate investment. Based on identity economics, we put forward agency conflicts hypothesis beyond the information and familiarity hypothesis to test the motivation of home bias in corporate investment under the background of China. We manually search for hometown of CEOs in private listed companies and geographic data of the parent company and its subsidiaries. Our sample includes both state-year sample of private listed companies and subsample of companies which CEOs work non-locally. We find that firms are likely to establish more subsidiaries in CEOs' hometown and this conclusion is valid. Besides, subsidiaries in CEOs' hometown underperform other nonlocal subsidiaries, suggesting that home bias does exist in corporate investment and it is largely driven by agency issues instead of the information and familiarity. Furthermore, we show that home biased investments will be suppressed in the companies with better external governance(higher institutional investors holdings,more analysts tracking) and weaker agency problems on CEOs(CEO holdings, young CEO), which also indirectly support agency conflicts hypothesis. This paper introduces identity in the managers' agent behavior from the perspective of home bias, thus not only enriching the economic consequences of home bias in the aspect of corporate investment, but also expanding the research on agency problem with the managers' individual preference. Its findings help to provide new evidence for agency problem in China.
This study investigates whether CEOs exhibit home bias in corporate investment. Based on identity economics, we put forward agency conflicts hypothesis beyond the information and familiarity hypothesis to test the motivation of home bias in corporate investment under the background of China. We manually search for hometown of CEOs in private listed companies and geographic data of the parent company and its subsidiaries. Our sample includes both state-year sample of private listed companies and subsample of companies which CEOs work non-locally. We find that firms are likely to establish more subsidiaries in CEOs' hometown and this conclusion is valid. Besides, subsidiaries in CEOs' hometown underperform other nonlocal subsidiaries, suggesting that home bias does exist in corporate investment and it is largely driven by agency issues instead of the information and familiarity. Furthermore, we show that home biased investments will be suppressed in the companies with better external governance(higher institutional investors holdings,more analysts tracking) and weaker agency problems on CEOs(CEO holdings, young CEO), which also indirectly support agency conflicts hypothesis. This paper introduces identity in the managers' agent behavior from the perspective of home bias, thus not only enriching the economic consequences of home bias in the aspect of corporate investment, but also expanding the research on agency problem with the managers' individual preference. Its findings help to provide new evidence for agency problem in China.
引文
(1)曹春方、张婷婷、范子英:《地区偏袒下的市场整合》,《经济研究》,2017年第12期。
(2)曹春方、周大伟、吴澄澄、张婷婷:《市场分割与异地子公司分布》,《管理世界》,2015年第9期。
(3)范子英、李欣:《部长的政治关联效应与财政转移支付分配》,《经济研究》,2014年第6期。
(4)范子英、彭飞、刘冲:《政治关联与经济增长--基于卫星灯光数据的研究》,《经济研究》,2016年第1期。
(5)胡珺、宋献中、王红建:《非正式制度、家乡认同与企业环境治理》,《管理世界》,2017年第3期。
(6)李书娟、徐现祥:《身份认同与经济增长》,《经济学(季刊)》,2016年第3期。
(7)梁漱溟:《政治的根本在文化》,载于中国文化书院学术委员会《梁漱溟全集》,1949年。
(8)潘红波、余明桂:《支持之手,掠夺之手与异地并购》,《经济研究》,2011年第9期。
(9)钱先航、曹廷求:《钱随官走:地方官员与地区间的资金流动》,《经济研究》,2017年第2期。
(10)张平、赵国昌、罗知:《中央官员来源与地方经济增长》,《经济学(季刊)》,2012年第2期。
(11)Akerlof,G.A.and R.E.Kranton,2000,“Economics and Identity”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.115(3),pp.715~753.
(12)Akerlof,G.A.and R.E.Kranton,2002,“Identity and Schooling:Some Lessons for the Economics of Education”,Journal of Economic Literature,Vol.40(4),pp.1167~1201.
(13)Akerlof,G.A.and R.E.Kranton,2010,“Identity Economics”,The Economists'Voice,Vol.7(2),pp.1~3.
(14)Alcacer,J.and W.Chung,2007,“Location Strategies and Knowledge Spillovers”,Management Science,Vol.53(5),pp.760~776.
(15)Ang,J.S.,R.A.Cole and J.W.Lin,2000,“Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”,The Journal of Finance,Vol.55(1),pp.81~106.
(16)Bebchuk,L.and J.Fried,2004,“Pay Without Performance”,Business Ethics Quarterly,Vol.20(3),pp.5~24.
(17)Bo,Z.,1998,“Provincial Power and Provincial Economic Resources in the PRC”,Issues and Studies,Vol.34(4),pp.1~18.
(18)Bodenhorn,H.and C.S.Ruebeck,2003,“The Economics of Identity and the Endogeneity of Race”,National Bureau of Economic Research.
(19)Cai,J.,Y.Liu,Y.Qian and M.Yu,2015,“Information Asymmetry and Corporate Governance”,Quarterly Journal of Finance,Vol.5(03),pp.1~32.
(20)Cartwright,S.and C.Cooper,1993,“The Role of Culture Compatibility in Successful Organizational Marriage”,Academy of Management Perspectives,Vol.7(2),pp.57~70.
(21)Chakrabarti,A.and W.Mitchell,2013,“The Persistent Effect of Geographic Distance in Acquisition Target Selection”,Organization Science,Vol.24(6),pp.1805~1826.
(22)Chen,T.,J.Harford and C.Lin,2015,“Do Analysts Matter for Governance?Evidence from Natural Experiments”,Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.115(2),pp.383~410.
(23)Chen,Z.,K.Prashant and E.H.Robert,2018,“Geographic Overlap and Acquisition Pairing”,Strategic Management Journal,Vol.39(2),pp.329~355.
(24)Cohen,L.,J.Coval and C.Malloy,2011,“Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing?”,Journal of Political Economy,Vol.119(6),pp.1015~1060.
(25)Coughlin,C.,J.Terza and V.Arromdee,1991,“State Characteristics and the Location of Foreign Direct-investment within the United States”,Review of Economic Statistics,Vol.73(4),pp.675~683.
(26)Coval,J.D.and T.J.Moskowitz,1999,“Home Bias at Home:Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios”,The Journal of Finance,Vol.54(6),pp.2045~2073.
(27)Coval,J.D.and T.J.Moskowitz,2001,“The Geography of Investment:Informed Trading and Asset Prices”,Journal of Political Economy,Vol.109(4),pp.811~841.
(28)Croson,R.and U.Gneezy,2009,“Gender Differences in Preferences”,Journal of Economic Literature,Vol.47(2),pp.448~474.
(29)Darity,W.A.,P.L.Mason and J.B.Stewart,2006,“The Economics of Identity:The Origin and Persistence of Racial Identity Norms”,Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,Vol.60(3),pp.283~305.
(30)French,K.R.and J.M.Poterba,1991,“Investor Diversification and International Equity Markets”,National Bureau of Economic Research.
(31)Gillan,S.L.and L.T.Starks,2000,“Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism:The Role of Institutional Investors”,Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.57(2),pp.275~305.
(32)Grinblatt,M.and M.Keloharju,2001,“How Distance,Language and Culture Influence Stockholdings and Trades”,The Journal of Finance,Vol.56(3),pp.1053~1073.
(33)Hodler,R.and P.A.Raschky,2014,“Regional Favoritism”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.129(2),pp.995~1033.
(34)Ivkovic,Z.and S.Weisbenner,2005,“Local Does as Local Is:Information Content of the Geography of Individual Investors’Common Stock Investments”,The Journal of Finance,Vol.60(1),pp.267~306.
(35)Jensen,M.C.and W.H.Meckling,1976,“Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”,Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.3(4),pp.305~360.
(36)Jensen,M.C.,1986,“Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance,and Takeovers”,The American Economic Review,Vol.76(2),pp.323~329.
(37)Kalnins,A.and W.Chung,2006,“Social Capital,Geography and Survival:Gujarati Immigrant Entrepreneurs in the U.S.Lodging Industry”,Management Science,Vol.52(2),pp.233~247.
(38)Kang,J.K.and R.M.Stulz,1997,“Is Bank-centered Corporate Governance Worth it?A Cross-sectional Analysis of the Performance of Japanese Firms during the Asset Price Deflation”,National Bureau of Economic Research.
(39)Knight,B.,2008,“Legislative Representation,Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds:Evidence from the U.S.Congress”,The Economic Journal,Vol.118(532),pp.1785~1803
(40)Lazarsfeld,P.F.and R.K.Merton,1954,“Friendship as a Social Process:A Substantive and Methodological Analysis”,Freedom and Control in Modern Society,Vol.18(1),pp.18~66.
(41)Li,X.,A.Low and A.K.Makhija,2014,“Career Concerns and the Busy Life of the Young CEO”,Fisher College of Business Working Paper No.2011-03-004.
(42)Lister,R.,2003,Citizenship:Feminist Perspectives,NYU Press.
(43)McCann,B.T.,J.J.Reuer and N.Lahiri,2016,“Agglomeration and the Choice between Acquisitions and Alliances:An Information Economics Perspective”,Strategic Management Journal,Vol.37(6),pp.1085~1106.
(44)Morse,A.,V.Nanda and A.Seru,2011,“Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?”,The Journal of Finance,Vol.66(5),pp.1779~1821.
(45)Parrino,R.,R.W.Sias and L.T.Starks,2003,“Voting with Their Feet:Institutional Ownership Changes Around Forced CEO Turnover”,Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.68(1),pp.3~46.
(46)Pool,V.K.,N.Stoffman and S.E.Yonker,2012,“No Place Like Home:Familiarity in Mutual Fund Manager Portfolio Choice”,The Review of Financial Studies,Vol.25(8),pp.2563~2599.
(47)Richardson,S.,2006,“Over-investment of Free Cash Flow”,Review of Accounting Studies,Vol.11(2~3),pp.159~189.
(48)Rossi,S.and P.Volpin,2004,“Cross-country Determinants of Mergers and Acquisitions”,Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.74(2),pp.277~304.
(49)Seasholes,M.S.and N.Zhu,2010,“Individual Investors and Local Bias”,The Journal of Finance,Vol.65(5),pp.1987~2010.
(50)Shin,V.,2004,“Factions Matter:Personal Networks and the Distribution of Bank Loans in China”,Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.13(38),pp.3~19.
(51)Siegel,J.I.,A.N.Licht and S.H.Schwartz,2011,“Egalitarianism and International Investment”,Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.102(3),pp.621~642.
(52)Strong,N.and X.Xu,2003,“Understanding the Equity Home Bias:Evidence from Survey Data”,The Review of Economics and Statistics,Vol.85(2),pp.307~312.
(53)Su,F.and D.Yang,2000,“Political Institutions,Provincial Interests and Resource Allocations in Reformist China”,Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.9(24),pp.215~230.
(54)Tesar,L.L.and I.M.Werner,1995,“Home Bias and High Turnover”,Journal of International Money and Finance,Vol.14(4),pp.467~492.
(1)我们也对比了民营上市公司和地方国企的CEO向家乡投资差异,发现CEO向家乡投资在民营上市公司中显著更强。
(2)2014年3月13日印发了《企业会计准则第2号——长期股权投资》修订版(财会[2014]14号),并规定自2014年7月1日起执行,在CSMAR数据库中大多数子公司转到了其他长期投资类型,无法从股权和投资类型上获得相对准确的子公司数据。
(3)我们也以Tobit模型进行了回归,原结论不变,CEO家乡在两组样本中的边际效应分别为5.02和5.20,与OLS回归系数并无重大差别。
(2)曹春方、周大伟、吴澄澄、张婷婷:《市场分割与异地子公司分布》,《管理世界》,2015年第9期。
(3)范子英、李欣:《部长的政治关联效应与财政转移支付分配》,《经济研究》,2014年第6期。
(4)范子英、彭飞、刘冲:《政治关联与经济增长--基于卫星灯光数据的研究》,《经济研究》,2016年第1期。
(5)胡珺、宋献中、王红建:《非正式制度、家乡认同与企业环境治理》,《管理世界》,2017年第3期。
(6)李书娟、徐现祥:《身份认同与经济增长》,《经济学(季刊)》,2016年第3期。
(7)梁漱溟:《政治的根本在文化》,载于中国文化书院学术委员会《梁漱溟全集》,1949年。
(8)潘红波、余明桂:《支持之手,掠夺之手与异地并购》,《经济研究》,2011年第9期。
(9)钱先航、曹廷求:《钱随官走:地方官员与地区间的资金流动》,《经济研究》,2017年第2期。
(10)张平、赵国昌、罗知:《中央官员来源与地方经济增长》,《经济学(季刊)》,2012年第2期。
(11)Akerlof,G.A.and R.E.Kranton,2000,“Economics and Identity”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.115(3),pp.715~753.
(12)Akerlof,G.A.and R.E.Kranton,2002,“Identity and Schooling:Some Lessons for the Economics of Education”,Journal of Economic Literature,Vol.40(4),pp.1167~1201.
(13)Akerlof,G.A.and R.E.Kranton,2010,“Identity Economics”,The Economists'Voice,Vol.7(2),pp.1~3.
(14)Alcacer,J.and W.Chung,2007,“Location Strategies and Knowledge Spillovers”,Management Science,Vol.53(5),pp.760~776.
(15)Ang,J.S.,R.A.Cole and J.W.Lin,2000,“Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”,The Journal of Finance,Vol.55(1),pp.81~106.
(16)Bebchuk,L.and J.Fried,2004,“Pay Without Performance”,Business Ethics Quarterly,Vol.20(3),pp.5~24.
(17)Bo,Z.,1998,“Provincial Power and Provincial Economic Resources in the PRC”,Issues and Studies,Vol.34(4),pp.1~18.
(18)Bodenhorn,H.and C.S.Ruebeck,2003,“The Economics of Identity and the Endogeneity of Race”,National Bureau of Economic Research.
(19)Cai,J.,Y.Liu,Y.Qian and M.Yu,2015,“Information Asymmetry and Corporate Governance”,Quarterly Journal of Finance,Vol.5(03),pp.1~32.
(20)Cartwright,S.and C.Cooper,1993,“The Role of Culture Compatibility in Successful Organizational Marriage”,Academy of Management Perspectives,Vol.7(2),pp.57~70.
(21)Chakrabarti,A.and W.Mitchell,2013,“The Persistent Effect of Geographic Distance in Acquisition Target Selection”,Organization Science,Vol.24(6),pp.1805~1826.
(22)Chen,T.,J.Harford and C.Lin,2015,“Do Analysts Matter for Governance?Evidence from Natural Experiments”,Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.115(2),pp.383~410.
(23)Chen,Z.,K.Prashant and E.H.Robert,2018,“Geographic Overlap and Acquisition Pairing”,Strategic Management Journal,Vol.39(2),pp.329~355.
(24)Cohen,L.,J.Coval and C.Malloy,2011,“Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing?”,Journal of Political Economy,Vol.119(6),pp.1015~1060.
(25)Coughlin,C.,J.Terza and V.Arromdee,1991,“State Characteristics and the Location of Foreign Direct-investment within the United States”,Review of Economic Statistics,Vol.73(4),pp.675~683.
(26)Coval,J.D.and T.J.Moskowitz,1999,“Home Bias at Home:Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios”,The Journal of Finance,Vol.54(6),pp.2045~2073.
(27)Coval,J.D.and T.J.Moskowitz,2001,“The Geography of Investment:Informed Trading and Asset Prices”,Journal of Political Economy,Vol.109(4),pp.811~841.
(28)Croson,R.and U.Gneezy,2009,“Gender Differences in Preferences”,Journal of Economic Literature,Vol.47(2),pp.448~474.
(29)Darity,W.A.,P.L.Mason and J.B.Stewart,2006,“The Economics of Identity:The Origin and Persistence of Racial Identity Norms”,Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,Vol.60(3),pp.283~305.
(30)French,K.R.and J.M.Poterba,1991,“Investor Diversification and International Equity Markets”,National Bureau of Economic Research.
(31)Gillan,S.L.and L.T.Starks,2000,“Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism:The Role of Institutional Investors”,Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.57(2),pp.275~305.
(32)Grinblatt,M.and M.Keloharju,2001,“How Distance,Language and Culture Influence Stockholdings and Trades”,The Journal of Finance,Vol.56(3),pp.1053~1073.
(33)Hodler,R.and P.A.Raschky,2014,“Regional Favoritism”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.129(2),pp.995~1033.
(34)Ivkovic,Z.and S.Weisbenner,2005,“Local Does as Local Is:Information Content of the Geography of Individual Investors’Common Stock Investments”,The Journal of Finance,Vol.60(1),pp.267~306.
(35)Jensen,M.C.and W.H.Meckling,1976,“Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”,Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.3(4),pp.305~360.
(36)Jensen,M.C.,1986,“Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance,and Takeovers”,The American Economic Review,Vol.76(2),pp.323~329.
(37)Kalnins,A.and W.Chung,2006,“Social Capital,Geography and Survival:Gujarati Immigrant Entrepreneurs in the U.S.Lodging Industry”,Management Science,Vol.52(2),pp.233~247.
(38)Kang,J.K.and R.M.Stulz,1997,“Is Bank-centered Corporate Governance Worth it?A Cross-sectional Analysis of the Performance of Japanese Firms during the Asset Price Deflation”,National Bureau of Economic Research.
(39)Knight,B.,2008,“Legislative Representation,Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds:Evidence from the U.S.Congress”,The Economic Journal,Vol.118(532),pp.1785~1803
(40)Lazarsfeld,P.F.and R.K.Merton,1954,“Friendship as a Social Process:A Substantive and Methodological Analysis”,Freedom and Control in Modern Society,Vol.18(1),pp.18~66.
(41)Li,X.,A.Low and A.K.Makhija,2014,“Career Concerns and the Busy Life of the Young CEO”,Fisher College of Business Working Paper No.2011-03-004.
(42)Lister,R.,2003,Citizenship:Feminist Perspectives,NYU Press.
(43)McCann,B.T.,J.J.Reuer and N.Lahiri,2016,“Agglomeration and the Choice between Acquisitions and Alliances:An Information Economics Perspective”,Strategic Management Journal,Vol.37(6),pp.1085~1106.
(44)Morse,A.,V.Nanda and A.Seru,2011,“Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?”,The Journal of Finance,Vol.66(5),pp.1779~1821.
(45)Parrino,R.,R.W.Sias and L.T.Starks,2003,“Voting with Their Feet:Institutional Ownership Changes Around Forced CEO Turnover”,Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.68(1),pp.3~46.
(46)Pool,V.K.,N.Stoffman and S.E.Yonker,2012,“No Place Like Home:Familiarity in Mutual Fund Manager Portfolio Choice”,The Review of Financial Studies,Vol.25(8),pp.2563~2599.
(47)Richardson,S.,2006,“Over-investment of Free Cash Flow”,Review of Accounting Studies,Vol.11(2~3),pp.159~189.
(48)Rossi,S.and P.Volpin,2004,“Cross-country Determinants of Mergers and Acquisitions”,Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.74(2),pp.277~304.
(49)Seasholes,M.S.and N.Zhu,2010,“Individual Investors and Local Bias”,The Journal of Finance,Vol.65(5),pp.1987~2010.
(50)Shin,V.,2004,“Factions Matter:Personal Networks and the Distribution of Bank Loans in China”,Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.13(38),pp.3~19.
(51)Siegel,J.I.,A.N.Licht and S.H.Schwartz,2011,“Egalitarianism and International Investment”,Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.102(3),pp.621~642.
(52)Strong,N.and X.Xu,2003,“Understanding the Equity Home Bias:Evidence from Survey Data”,The Review of Economics and Statistics,Vol.85(2),pp.307~312.
(53)Su,F.and D.Yang,2000,“Political Institutions,Provincial Interests and Resource Allocations in Reformist China”,Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.9(24),pp.215~230.
(54)Tesar,L.L.and I.M.Werner,1995,“Home Bias and High Turnover”,Journal of International Money and Finance,Vol.14(4),pp.467~492.
(1)我们也对比了民营上市公司和地方国企的CEO向家乡投资差异,发现CEO向家乡投资在民营上市公司中显著更强。
(2)2014年3月13日印发了《企业会计准则第2号——长期股权投资》修订版(财会[2014]14号),并规定自2014年7月1日起执行,在CSMAR数据库中大多数子公司转到了其他长期投资类型,无法从股权和投资类型上获得相对准确的子公司数据。
(3)我们也以Tobit模型进行了回归,原结论不变,CEO家乡在两组样本中的边际效应分别为5.02和5.20,与OLS回归系数并无重大差别。