家族企业高管性质与股票流动性关系研究——基于代理成本双重效应的分析
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摘要
家族企业高管性质在家族企业中起重要作用,本文从两权合一和家长权威两个视角研究了家族企业高管性质对股票流动性的影响,并进一步研究代理成本作为传导机制对高管性质和股票流动性的双重效应,分别验证两层代理成本是否具有不同的调节效应。研究结果表明:首先,高管性质对股票流动性有显著的正向影响,即家族成员担任高管可以显著地提升股票流动性;同时家族成员两职合一既担任董事长又担任总经理也会促进股票流动性显著地提高。其次,从家族企业代理成本的双重效应角度分析,家族企业的股票流动性主要受企业高管的直接影响,第一层代理成本比第二层代理成本对股票流动性有着更大的影响,第一层代理成本对高管性质与股票流动性的关系表现出显著的调节作用,而第二层代理成本并未表现出显著的调节作用。为我国家族企业高管性质的选择和缓解其代理问题提出了新路径。
This paper mainly explores the impact of family-ties on agency costs and stock liquidity of family firms,by using the research sample of listed family firm that the ultimate controller don't change.The results show that:first,family-tie has a significant effect on stock liquidity,Family managers can significantly enhance the stock liquidity.Meanwhile agency costs also have a greater impact on stock liquidity.The first agency cost show significant adjustment on the relationship between the family-tie and stock liquidity,while the second agency cost show no adjustment.In this paper,the results show that the importance of family-tie of family firms,and put forward a new path to alleviate the agency costs.This study have policy implication on regulating family firm'agency problems and help market participants get a deeper understanding on family-management.
This paper mainly explores the impact of family-ties on agency costs and stock liquidity of family firms,by using the research sample of listed family firm that the ultimate controller don't change.The results show that:first,family-tie has a significant effect on stock liquidity,Family managers can significantly enhance the stock liquidity.Meanwhile agency costs also have a greater impact on stock liquidity.The first agency cost show significant adjustment on the relationship between the family-tie and stock liquidity,while the second agency cost show no adjustment.In this paper,the results show that the importance of family-tie of family firms,and put forward a new path to alleviate the agency costs.This study have policy implication on regulating family firm'agency problems and help market participants get a deeper understanding on family-management.
引文
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2.Ensley M.D.and Pearson A.W.,2005,An Exploratory Comparison of the Behavioral Dynamics of Top Management Teams in Family and Non-family New Ventures:Cohesion,Conflict,Potency and Consensus[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,29(3):267-284.
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4.熊家财,苏冬蔚.股票流动性与代理成本---基于随机前沿模型的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2016(1):84-96.
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12.Demsetz H.and Lehn K.,1985,The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences[J].Journal of Political Economy,93:1155-1177.
13.Morck R.,Shleifer A.and Vishny R.W.,1988,Management Ownership and Market valuation:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,20:293-315.
14.Fan J.P.H.and Wong T.J.,2002,Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,33:401-425.
15.Ali A.,Chen T.Y.and Radhakrishnan S.,2007,Corporate Disclosures by Family Firms[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,44:238-286.
16.Durnev A.and Kim E.H.,2005,To Steal or Not to Steal:Firm Attributes,Legal Environment,and Valuation[J].Journal of Finance,60(3):1461-1493.
17.Doidge C.,Karolyi G.A.and Stulz R.M.,2007,Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,86(1):1-39.
18.王明琳,徐萌娜,王河森.利他行为能够降低代理成本吗?---基于家族企业中亲缘利他行为的实证研究[J].经济研究,2014(3):144-157.
19.杨超,山立威.家族企业实际控制人的任期如何影响企业绩效[J].当代财经,2016(3):65-76.
20.陈家田.上市家族企业CEO薪酬激励实证研究---基于双重委托代理视角[J].管理评论,2014(11):159-168.
21.陈德球,杨佳欣,董志勇.家族控制、职业化经营与公司治理效率---来自CEO变更的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2013(4):55-67.
22.魏春燕,陈磊.家族企业CEO更换过程中的利他主义行为---基于资产减值的研究[J].管理世界,2015(3):137-150.
23.谷祺,邓德强,路倩.现金流权与控制权分离下的公司价值---基于我国家族上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2006(4):30-36.
24.马忠,吴翔宇.金字塔结构对自愿性信息披露程度的影响:来自家族控股上市公司的经验验证[J].会计研究,2007(1):44-50.
25.高芳,傅仁辉.会计准则改革、股票流动性与权益资本成本---来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].中国管理科学,2012(4):27-36.
26.徐向艺,徐宁.金字塔结构下股权激励的双重效应研究---来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2010(9):59-65.
2.Ensley M.D.and Pearson A.W.,2005,An Exploratory Comparison of the Behavioral Dynamics of Top Management Teams in Family and Non-family New Ventures:Cohesion,Conflict,Potency and Consensus[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,29(3):267-284.
3.Jensen M.C.and Meckling W.H.,1976,Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,3:305-360.
4.熊家财,苏冬蔚.股票流动性与代理成本---基于随机前沿模型的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2016(1):84-96.
5.Yu-Thompson Y.,Andrews R.L.and Liang F.,2016,Liquidity and corporate governance:evidence from family firms[J].Review of Accounting and Finance,2:144-173.
6.Wang D.C.,2006,Founding Family Ownership and Earnings Quality[J].Journal of Accounting Research,44:619-656.
7.Cheng Q.and Warfield T.D.,2005,Equity Incentives and Earnings Management[J].The Accounting Review,80:441-476.
8.陈建林.上市家族企业管理模式对代理成本的影响---代理理论和利他主义理论的争论和整合[J].管理评论,2012(5):53-59.
9.许静静,吕长江.家族企业高管性质与盈余质量---来自中国上市公司的证据[J].管理世界,2011(1):112-120.
10.Schulze W.S.,Lubatkin M.H.,Dino R.N.and Buchholtz A.K.,2001,Agency Relationships in Family Firms:Theory and Evidence[J].Organization Science,12:99-116.
11.王明琳,周生春.控制性家族类型、双重三层委托代理问题与企业价值[J].管理世界,2006(8):83-93.
12.Demsetz H.and Lehn K.,1985,The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences[J].Journal of Political Economy,93:1155-1177.
13.Morck R.,Shleifer A.and Vishny R.W.,1988,Management Ownership and Market valuation:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,20:293-315.
14.Fan J.P.H.and Wong T.J.,2002,Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,33:401-425.
15.Ali A.,Chen T.Y.and Radhakrishnan S.,2007,Corporate Disclosures by Family Firms[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,44:238-286.
16.Durnev A.and Kim E.H.,2005,To Steal or Not to Steal:Firm Attributes,Legal Environment,and Valuation[J].Journal of Finance,60(3):1461-1493.
17.Doidge C.,Karolyi G.A.and Stulz R.M.,2007,Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,86(1):1-39.
18.王明琳,徐萌娜,王河森.利他行为能够降低代理成本吗?---基于家族企业中亲缘利他行为的实证研究[J].经济研究,2014(3):144-157.
19.杨超,山立威.家族企业实际控制人的任期如何影响企业绩效[J].当代财经,2016(3):65-76.
20.陈家田.上市家族企业CEO薪酬激励实证研究---基于双重委托代理视角[J].管理评论,2014(11):159-168.
21.陈德球,杨佳欣,董志勇.家族控制、职业化经营与公司治理效率---来自CEO变更的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2013(4):55-67.
22.魏春燕,陈磊.家族企业CEO更换过程中的利他主义行为---基于资产减值的研究[J].管理世界,2015(3):137-150.
23.谷祺,邓德强,路倩.现金流权与控制权分离下的公司价值---基于我国家族上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2006(4):30-36.
24.马忠,吴翔宇.金字塔结构对自愿性信息披露程度的影响:来自家族控股上市公司的经验验证[J].会计研究,2007(1):44-50.
25.高芳,傅仁辉.会计准则改革、股票流动性与权益资本成本---来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].中国管理科学,2012(4):27-36.
26.徐向艺,徐宁.金字塔结构下股权激励的双重效应研究---来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2010(9):59-65.