内部控制对高管薪酬激励的影响研究——基于薪酬能力业绩敏感性和薪酬运气业绩敏感性的视角
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摘要
突破业绩同质性的假设,将薪酬业绩敏感性分解为"薪酬能力业绩敏感性"和"薪酬运气业绩敏感性",在考虑业绩异质性的基础上,检验内部控制对薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。以2010—2015年上市公司为样本,实证研究发现我国上市公司存在"薪酬能力业绩敏感性"和"薪酬运气业绩敏感性",有效的内部控制能够提高"薪酬能力业绩敏感性",降低"薪酬运气业绩敏感性"。进一步研究表明,内部控制抑制"薪酬运气业绩敏感性"的作用仅在高管权力较低、产品市场竞争程度较高的公司中显著存在。
This paper breaks the hypothesis of homogeneity of performance.Pay performance sensitivity is divided into"Pay Capability Performance Sensitivity"and"Pay Luck Performance Sensitivity".On the basis of considering the heterogeneity of performance,this paper examines the impact of internal control on the sensitivity of corporate pay performance.Taking the listed companies from 2010 to 2015 as the sample,the empirical study finds that the listed companies in China have"pay-competency performance sensitivity"and "pay-luck performance sensitivity".Further study found that the impact of internal control on"pay-luck performance sensitivity"only plays a role in companies with lower executive power and higher product market competition.This study extends the understanding of the optimal contract theory.It will provide a reference for improving the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive.
This paper breaks the hypothesis of homogeneity of performance.Pay performance sensitivity is divided into"Pay Capability Performance Sensitivity"and"Pay Luck Performance Sensitivity".On the basis of considering the heterogeneity of performance,this paper examines the impact of internal control on the sensitivity of corporate pay performance.Taking the listed companies from 2010 to 2015 as the sample,the empirical study finds that the listed companies in China have"pay-competency performance sensitivity"and "pay-luck performance sensitivity".Further study found that the impact of internal control on"pay-luck performance sensitivity"only plays a role in companies with lower executive power and higher product market competition.This study extends the understanding of the optimal contract theory.It will provide a reference for improving the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive.
引文
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[2]Bertrand M,Mullainathan S.Agents with and without Principals[J].American Economic Review,2000,90(2):203-208.
[3]谢获宝,惠丽丽.成本粘性、公司治理与高管薪酬业绩敏感性---基于企业风险视角的经验证据[J].管理评论,2017,29(3):110-125.
[4]李晓玲,胡欢,刘中燕.分析师关注与薪酬业绩敏感性:基于职业声誉和产权性质视角[J].商业经济与管理,2015(7):34-45.
[5]郭吉涛,姜钰羡.会计稳健性对薪酬业绩敏感性的影响研究---来自民营房地产上市公司的经验证据[J].河海大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2014,16(4):68-73+92.
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[7]Gjesdal F.Accounting for Stewardship[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1981,19(1):208-231.
[8]Raithatha M,Komera S.Executive Compensation and Firm Performance:Evidence from Indian Firms[J].IIMB Management Review,2016,28(3):160-169.
[9]Firth M,Fung P M Y,Rui O M.Corporate Performance and CEO Compensation in China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(4):693-714.
[10]Holmstrom B,Milgrom P.Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives[J].Econometrica,1987,55(2):303-328.
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[15]袁根根,田昆儒.高管才能、公司控制力与高管薪酬---来自中国A股上市公司的证据[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2012(5):95-101.
[16]Campbell T C,Thompson M E.Why Are CEOs Paid for Good Luck?An Empirical Comparison of Explanations for Pay-for-luck Asymmetry[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2015,35:247-264.
[17]Cheng Shijun,Indiejikian R J.The Market for Corporate Control and CEO Compensation:Complements or Substitutes?[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2010,26(3):701-728.
[18]Brown K E,Lim J H.The Effect of Internal Control Deficiencies on the Usefulness of Earnings in Executive Compensation[J].Advances in Accounting,2012,28(1):75-87.
[19]罗正英,詹乾隆,段姝.内部控制质量与企业高管薪酬契约[J].中国软科学,2016(2):169-178.
[20]卢锐,柳建华,许宁.内部控制、产权与高管薪酬业绩敏感性[J].会计研究,2011(10):42-48.
[21]洪峰,戴文涛.内部控制缺陷披露与会计盈余契约有用性[J].兰州商学院学报,2013,29(6):98-105.
[22]杨程程,程小可.上市公司内部控制缺陷披露与高管薪酬的关联研究[J].东北师大学报(哲学社会科学版),2015(2):77-80.
[23]Bebchuk L A,Fried J M.Executie Compensation as an Agency Problem[J].The Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,17(3):71-92.
[24]Hambrick D C.Upper Echelons Theory:An Update[J].The Academy of Management Review,2007,32(2):334-343.
[25]沈艺峰,李培功.政府限薪令与国有企业高管薪酬、业绩和运气的关系研究[J].中国工业经济,2010(11):130-139.
[26]罗宏,曾永良,宛玲羽.薪酬攀比、盈余管理与高管薪酬操纵[J].南开管理评论,2016,19(2):19-31.
[27]方红星,金玉娜.高质量内部控制能抑制盈余管理吗---基于自愿性内部控制鉴证报告的经验证据[J].会计研究,2011(8):53-60.
[28]池国华,杨金,郭菁晶.内部控制、EVA考核对非效率投资的综合治理效应研究---来自国有控股上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2016(10):63-69.
[29]彭桃英,汲德雅.媒体监督、内部控制质量与管理层代理成本[J].财经理论与实践,2014,35(2):61-65.
[30]牟韶红,李启航,于林平.内部控制、高管权力与审计费用[J].审计与经济研究,2014(4):40-49.
[31]张正勇,谢金.高管权力会影响内部控制的执行效果吗?---基于应计和真实盈余管理视角的分析[J].南京财经大学学报,2016(1):75-83.
[32]干胜道,胡明霞.管理层权力、内部控制与过度投资---基于国有上市公司的证据[J].审计与经济研究,2014(5):40-47.
[33]Aghion P,Dewatripont M,Rey P.Competition,Financial Discipline and Growth[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999,66(4):825-852.
[34]张传财,陈汉文.产品市场竞争、产权性质与内部控制质量[J].会计研究,2017(3):67-74.
[35]解维敏,魏化倩.市场竞争、组织冗余与企业研发投入[J].中国软科学,2016(8):102-111.
[36]Garvey G T,Milbourn T T.Asymmetric Benchmarking in Compensation:Executives Are Rewards for Good Luck But not Penalized for Bad Luck[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,82(1):197-225.
[37]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲,等.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005(2):81-91.
[38]李万福,林斌,宋璐.内部控制在公司投资中的角色:效率促进还是抑制?[J].管理世界,2011(2):81-99.
[2]Bertrand M,Mullainathan S.Agents with and without Principals[J].American Economic Review,2000,90(2):203-208.
[3]谢获宝,惠丽丽.成本粘性、公司治理与高管薪酬业绩敏感性---基于企业风险视角的经验证据[J].管理评论,2017,29(3):110-125.
[4]李晓玲,胡欢,刘中燕.分析师关注与薪酬业绩敏感性:基于职业声誉和产权性质视角[J].商业经济与管理,2015(7):34-45.
[5]郭吉涛,姜钰羡.会计稳健性对薪酬业绩敏感性的影响研究---来自民营房地产上市公司的经验证据[J].河海大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2014,16(4):68-73+92.
[6]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[7]Gjesdal F.Accounting for Stewardship[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1981,19(1):208-231.
[8]Raithatha M,Komera S.Executive Compensation and Firm Performance:Evidence from Indian Firms[J].IIMB Management Review,2016,28(3):160-169.
[9]Firth M,Fung P M Y,Rui O M.Corporate Performance and CEO Compensation in China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(4):693-714.
[10]Holmstrom B,Milgrom P.Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives[J].Econometrica,1987,55(2):303-328.
[11]Banker R D,Datar S M.Sensitivity,Precision,and Linear Aggregation of Accounting Signals[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1989,27(1):21-39.
[12]Shleifer A,Vishny R W.A Survey of Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[13]Bertrand M,Mullainathan S.Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck?The Ones Without Principals Are[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2001,116(3):901-932.
[14]Brookman J T,Thistle P D.Managerial Compensation:Luck,Skill or Labor Markets?[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2013,21:252-268.
[15]袁根根,田昆儒.高管才能、公司控制力与高管薪酬---来自中国A股上市公司的证据[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2012(5):95-101.
[16]Campbell T C,Thompson M E.Why Are CEOs Paid for Good Luck?An Empirical Comparison of Explanations for Pay-for-luck Asymmetry[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2015,35:247-264.
[17]Cheng Shijun,Indiejikian R J.The Market for Corporate Control and CEO Compensation:Complements or Substitutes?[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2010,26(3):701-728.
[18]Brown K E,Lim J H.The Effect of Internal Control Deficiencies on the Usefulness of Earnings in Executive Compensation[J].Advances in Accounting,2012,28(1):75-87.
[19]罗正英,詹乾隆,段姝.内部控制质量与企业高管薪酬契约[J].中国软科学,2016(2):169-178.
[20]卢锐,柳建华,许宁.内部控制、产权与高管薪酬业绩敏感性[J].会计研究,2011(10):42-48.
[21]洪峰,戴文涛.内部控制缺陷披露与会计盈余契约有用性[J].兰州商学院学报,2013,29(6):98-105.
[22]杨程程,程小可.上市公司内部控制缺陷披露与高管薪酬的关联研究[J].东北师大学报(哲学社会科学版),2015(2):77-80.
[23]Bebchuk L A,Fried J M.Executie Compensation as an Agency Problem[J].The Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,17(3):71-92.
[24]Hambrick D C.Upper Echelons Theory:An Update[J].The Academy of Management Review,2007,32(2):334-343.
[25]沈艺峰,李培功.政府限薪令与国有企业高管薪酬、业绩和运气的关系研究[J].中国工业经济,2010(11):130-139.
[26]罗宏,曾永良,宛玲羽.薪酬攀比、盈余管理与高管薪酬操纵[J].南开管理评论,2016,19(2):19-31.
[27]方红星,金玉娜.高质量内部控制能抑制盈余管理吗---基于自愿性内部控制鉴证报告的经验证据[J].会计研究,2011(8):53-60.
[28]池国华,杨金,郭菁晶.内部控制、EVA考核对非效率投资的综合治理效应研究---来自国有控股上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2016(10):63-69.
[29]彭桃英,汲德雅.媒体监督、内部控制质量与管理层代理成本[J].财经理论与实践,2014,35(2):61-65.
[30]牟韶红,李启航,于林平.内部控制、高管权力与审计费用[J].审计与经济研究,2014(4):40-49.
[31]张正勇,谢金.高管权力会影响内部控制的执行效果吗?---基于应计和真实盈余管理视角的分析[J].南京财经大学学报,2016(1):75-83.
[32]干胜道,胡明霞.管理层权力、内部控制与过度投资---基于国有上市公司的证据[J].审计与经济研究,2014(5):40-47.
[33]Aghion P,Dewatripont M,Rey P.Competition,Financial Discipline and Growth[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999,66(4):825-852.
[34]张传财,陈汉文.产品市场竞争、产权性质与内部控制质量[J].会计研究,2017(3):67-74.
[35]解维敏,魏化倩.市场竞争、组织冗余与企业研发投入[J].中国软科学,2016(8):102-111.
[36]Garvey G T,Milbourn T T.Asymmetric Benchmarking in Compensation:Executives Are Rewards for Good Luck But not Penalized for Bad Luck[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,82(1):197-225.
[37]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲,等.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005(2):81-91.
[38]李万福,林斌,宋璐.内部控制在公司投资中的角色:效率促进还是抑制?[J].管理世界,2011(2):81-99.
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