Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design

详细信息   

• 作者：Liu ; Heng
• 学历：Doctor
• 年：2015
• 关键词：Social sciences ; Contingent transfers ; Dynamic mecha
• 导师：Barelli,Paulo,Govindan,Srihari
• 毕业院校：University of Rochester
• Department：School of Arts and Sciences
• 专业：Economics;Economic theory
• ISBN：9781321749885
• CBH：3703255
• Country：USA
• 语种：English
• FileSize：588328
• Pages：108

文摘

This dissertation is a collection of two papers studying both the theoretical and the applied aspects of dynamic mechanism design. In Chapter 1,we address the problem of implementing socially efficient allocations in dynamic environments with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. In the case where the agents' information is correlated across time,we construct efficient and incentive compatible direct dynamic mechanisms. Unlike the mechanisms with history-independent transfers in the existing literature,these mechanisms feature history-dependent transfers. Moreover,they are reminiscent of the classical VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism,even though the latter is not incentive compatible with interdependent valuations. In settings where agents' private information evolves independently,we construct the dynamic counterpart of the generalized VCG mechanism in one-dimensional environments. In Chapter 2,we study the problem of designing efficient trade agreements when countries involved in trade can use "disguised protections" in the form of domestic policies. We take a dynamic mechanism design approach to examine the interaction between trade and domestic policies. In particular,we show that allowing countries to make transfers can solve the incentive problems associated with private information. However,due to lack of commitment,these transfers may or may not be self-enforcing,depending on the persistence countries' private information. Our results indicate the possibility for WTO to improve the existing trade agreements through financial transfers.