Voluntary public good provision with private information using order statistics

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• 作者：Stefano Barbieri ^{sbarbier@tulane.edu}
• 关键词：D61 ; D82 ; H41
• 刊名：Economics Letters
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：150
• 期：Complete
• 页码：63-66
• 全文大小：368 K
• 卷排序：150

文摘

We study the voluntary provision of a public good with private information when inputs are not perfectly substitutable. Modeling the production function as a mixture of order statistics of individual efforts, we bridge the extreme best-shot and weakest-link technologies, passing through summation, in a tractable framework. In contrast with existing predictions, increasing complementarity results in increased public good provision, if the marginal cost of effort rises sufficiently fast.